currency. Nor is China willing to share its technology when investing in Europe. Then there is China’s weaponisation of its control over critical inputs, such as rare earths, needed by defence firms, among others. China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine also infuriates Europeans. The final round of talks began on October 8th, as The Economist went to press. To boost the EU’s negotiating position, on October 5th France and Germany sent an astonishing letter to the European Commission with far- reaching proposals on how to deal with China’s export machine (without mentioning the country). Next week a summit of European leaders will decide whether to follow the pair’s lead. Most are expected to fall into line. More than anything it is a change of mind in Germany that has inspired this new European hawkishness. German politicians have long avoided any confrontation, even as parts of German industry grew sceptical of China. But with Chinese exports now bunging up Germany’s industrial machine, this year has seen a dramatic shift. “There is a wide consensus now that things cannot continue like this,” says Oliver Richtberg of the vdma, Germany’s association of machine makers. German policymakers also fear that the persistent loss of industrial jobs—which stands at around 15,000 a month— risks bolstering support for the right-wing Alternative for Germany. As if to underline its resolve, on October 7th Germany’s government blocked a state- owned Chinese shipping giant from acquiring an 80% stake in a German logistics group. If implemented through the eu’s lawmaking apparatus, the proposals in the Franco-German letter would mark a dramatic shift in the bloc’s approach to China. The main novelty is a “second-strike capability”, says Sander Tordoir of the Centre for European Reform, a think-tank. Emmanuel Macron, the French president, and Friedrich Merz, the German chancellor, want to grant Brussels powers to hit back quickly at countries that retaliate when the eu imposes trade measures over allegedly unfair competition. The pair call for “regulating access to the single market” with a “wide range of trade remedies and other tools”. The proposal looks awfully vague. But “it is a political signal to show Beijing that Europe, and Germany, mean business,” says a German official.

A second proposal is for a “diversification instrument”. Details are also scant, but the idea is to reduce European firms’ supply-chain dependencies and prevent new ones from emerging. Previous attempts have struggled: China can simply build components, then send them for final assembly in other countries. That can even increase risk for European firms. “You still have China risk in the supply chain, but now a new country risk on top,” says Martin Sebena of the University of Hong Kong. To better understand Europe’s vulnerabilities, firms and governments would need to share sensitive data across the eu. But the letter is silent on that. Other proposals are familiar. In line with the eu’s recent trade agreements (some of which France rejected), the letter urges co-operation with third countries to boost supply-chain resilience. France and Germany call on Brussels to use existing trade-defence instruments more aggressively. The current rules for imposing tariffs in case of unfair subsidies are narrow in scope and cumbersome to impose. The pair want to speed things by staffing up the commission’s trade desks and, importantly, broadening the rules to apply to whole sectors rather than individual firms. The letter also proposes reforms to “safeguards”: counter-duties that can be imposed on all countries when imports surge. Since safeguards are time- limited, earlier this year the eu had to replace its measures on steel imports

with a dedicated regulation. Trade analysts reckon that reformed safeguards could also target individual countries, which in most cases will mean China. And the letter calls for more enforcement of eu regulations on imports, for example on consumer safety, including on the many small packages Europeans order from China. France and Germany also want a European industrial policy, but, officials say, differ on its scope. The letter says the eu should expand production in “strategic” sectors and introduce Buy European clauses (“European preference”, as they call it). But they remain vague on what sectors these might be, and whether close economic allies would be included. This is where free-traders in Europe see room to prevent the worst protectionist instincts. All of this will irk leaders in Beijing, as France and Germany well know. The Chinese commerce ministry said that the pair should “avoid taking a wrong road by wrong means and ultimately having it rebound on themselves”. To prove a point, on October 3rd it launched an anti-dumping investigation into European chemicals exports, after Europe had opened three such investigations aimed at China last week. Europe is braced for more. For its part the commission called the letter a “valuable contribution” that aligns with its “clear stance on competitiveness and the approach to trading partners, including China”. Europe’s free-trading nations, many of which welcome Germany’s tougher stance, will have to ensure that the eu does not allow legitimate concerns about economic security to tilt into damaging protectionism. One aspect works in Europe’s favour. Its economy has proved more resilient to the recent energy shock than many expected. China, on the other hand, has just decided to put together another massive infrastructure package to stimulate its troubled economy. The eu hopes that its new resolve will dissuade China’s leaders from escalating further, and that they will avoid emboldening Europe’s hawks just as Germany has joined their flock. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/10/05/germany-and-france-want-eu-storm-gates- for-chinas-trade-surge

Europe · Europe | A house divided

Pedro Sánchez gambles on a snap election—and populist policies Spain’s prime minister makes a last stand for the European left Oct 8th 2026 PEDRO SÁNCHEZ’S talent for bold ventures has helped him survive for eight years as prime minister atop minority governments. But his decision on October 5th to call an election for November 29th, months before it was due, is a last-ditch gamble. He hopes to capitalise on indignation over an elderly woman’s eviction from her home—a symbol of Spain’s housing crisis. Mr Sánchez, the last important standard-bearer of the left in the European Union, has framed the election in populist terms, as a contest between affordable housing and the privileges of right-wing elites. That will be a challenge: for more than a year, opinion polls have put the right-wing opposition well ahead.

The prime minister has been on the defensive for months. His government mishandled a migrant surge from Morocco into the Spanish exclave of Ceuta in July. Leaders of his Socialist Party have been charged with corruption; his wife faces trial for influence-peddling (she and he insist on her innocence). But the eviction of Maricarmen Abascal, an 87-year-old who left her home of 71 years on September 23rd (and died in hospital on October 7th), let him change the subject. With leftist protesters camped out in Madrid, Mr Sánchez dusted off an emergency-housing decree from earlier this year. This would temporarily have banned evictions of “vulnerable” people, extended rental contracts and barred corporate landlords from buying properties at below-market prices. This approach to housing, favoured by the global left from Berlin to New York, protects existing tenants but leads to falls in the supply of rented property. The decree was rejected in parliament on October 2nd when Junts, a Catalan nationalist party, joined other right-wing parties to vote it down. Mr Sánchez had lost the fickle majority he had cobbled together among the left and regional nationalists. In announcing the election, the prime minister complained of an obstructive opposition and “very powerful economic and social elites”. He boasted that he has refused to sign up to Donald Trump’s demand to spend 5% of GDP on defence. On his watch Spain has become “a global reference point of peace, feminism and prosperity”, he claimed. He also boasted of the economic-growth rate, forecast to reach 2.5% this year.

This appeal is calculated to mobilise disillusioned left-wing voters. It may have some success: rent controls are popular. With the country divided into two political blocks, Spanish elections are no longer won in the centre, but rather depend on which side’s supporters turn out more. Polls give the conservative People’s Party (PP) 33% and the Socialists 26% (down five percentage points since the last election in 2023). The big gainer is Vox, a populist-right party which is polling at 18%, up from 12% in 2023. The populist left, which won 12% last time, is leaderless and divided (see chart). “At last”, said Alberto Núñez Feijóo, the PP leader, in response to the election announcement. His party won the most parliamentary seats in 2023. The right has never forgiven Mr Sánchez for blocking it from governing by allying with Junts, in return for an amnesty for Catalan separatist leaders involved in an illegal independence bid in 2017. Many legal scholars called the amnesty unconstitutional, as did Mr Sánchez himself until he needed it to stay in office. The PP will campaign against corruption and government incompetence. Mr Feijóo accuses Mr Sánchez of failing to solve the housing problem or improve schools and health care despite record tax revenues. Vox will point to Mr Sánchez’s championing of immigration as a contributor to the housing

crisis. Spain builds only 80,000 homes a year, but there are at least 700,000 more households than in 2023. Mr Sánchez is by far the most effective campaigner in Spanish politics. In the snap election in 2023 he hung on partly by whipping up fear of Vox. The polls suggest that if the PP forms a government, it will depend more on Vox than it might have done then. But they govern together in several regions, and the public has accepted that the populists cannot be excluded for ever. The prime minister may well narrow the gap, but it will be hard for him to close it. Mr Feijóo comes across as plodding in public (though he is more persuasive in private), and his party is notoriously accident-prone in campaigns. Nevertheless, it is his election to lose. Should he beat Mr Sánchez, the continental left will lose its last major champion. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/10/05/pedro-sanchez-gambles-on-a-snap- election-and-populist-policies