before the latest sanctions, Iran’s pharmacists’ union said drug prices had risen by 150% this year. Iran’s rulers are looking for a way out—on their own terms. Abbas Araghchi, the foreign minister, held indirect talks with American officials at the UN General Assembly last month. He presented Iran’s latest offer for a deal, basically an accelerated return to the memorandum of understanding (MOU), the short-lived agreement signed in June. If America met a series of conditions, Iran would reopen the Strait of Hormuz within a week. Mr Trump refused. Diplomats were split on how to interpret the offer. Some, perhaps too optimistically, saw the compressed timetable as a sign of distress. The MOU gave Iran 30 days to reopen Hormuz; now Mr Araghchi proposed to do it in seven. Others thought Iran was going through the motions, presenting an offer it knew Mr Trump would decline. “It gives them cover if they decide to escalate,” argues one Arab envoy. “They can say America rejected diplomacy.” That is a possibility. Iran has already stepped up its attacks on commercial ships in the strait, with at least ten in the past fortnight. Both sides are preparing for another round of all-out war. The stalemate will probably continue. But by December, Mr Trump will be free of the midterms and Iran’s final oil payments should come due. Perhaps Mr Hemmati’s proverb will prove apt: autumn ends on December 21st. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/10/08/americas-blockade-is- breaking-irans-economy

Middle East & Africa | Lebanon’s sectarianism A grubby amnesty law highlights Lebanon’s sectarian divides Thousands could walk free from prison. That will not fix a broken justice system Oct 8th 2026 Those who run Lebanon have cut corners in the name of justice before. In 1991 the men who rose to power after a 15-year civil war granted themselves and their allies immunity from prosecution for many of that conflict’s crimes. The law helped secure a fragile peace, but also deepened sectarian divisions. So when lawmakers approved another amnesty in August, it brought back bad memories. The new one will be the most wide-reaching in 35 years. Perhaps a third of Lebanon’s prisoners will be released or have their sentences commuted. Ostensibly, the legislation is to reduce overcrowding in prisons, a real problem. Inmates at Roumieh, a jampacked prison overlooking Beirut, the

capital, celebrated when the law was passed. To others it looks like a grubby sectarian bargain. Lebanon’s prisons hold three times as many inmates as they are supposed to. Overcrowding has worsened since Israel began its war against Hizbullah, a Shia Muslim militia, forcing the authorities to transfer prisoners from the front lines in the south. Roumieh is overflowing; inmates sleep on the floor in shifts. Barracks, warehouses and stables have been repurposed as detention centres. The cash-strapped justice system barely functions. In 2024 over 80% of prisoners were awaiting trial, up from about 50% in 2017. But the law does also reflect sectarian politicking. With Hizbullah weakened by Israel, Lebanon’s Sunni Muslims are on the front foot. They pushed for the amnesty to include Islamists whom they argued had been unfairly tried in Hizbullah-aligned military courts. These include Ahmed al-Assir, an imam, and his followers. After Hizbullah intervened on the side of the Assad regime in Syria’s civil war in 2013, Mr Assir urged his supporters to take up arms against the group inside Lebanon. They battled the Lebanese army (and, say his supporters, Hizbullah) in Sidon, a southern city. Some 18 soldiers were killed. Changing regional dynamics tipped the scales, too. Since coming to power in 2024 Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s president, has pushed the Lebanese to hand over Syrian prisoners. Many have ideological ties to Lebanon’s Sunni Islamists. “This jump-started the whole process which got us to the amnesty law,” explains Makram Rabah of the American University of Beirut. In February Lebanon agreed to transfer 300 Syrians to Mr Sharaa’s authorities. Some 260 have been sent so far. To get through parliament, the amnesty had to appear even-handed. Shia mps lobbied for cannabis dealers, whose farms are mostly in the Hizbullah- dominated Beqaa valley; Christian ones sought protection for fighters who collaborated with Israel after it occupied southern Lebanon during the civil war. “Everyone wanted their share of the pie,” says Mr Rabah. “A simple legislative act that was supposed to remedy injustice morphed into a sectarian monster.”

Many Lebanese are angry. Nizar Saghieh of Legal Agenda, a pressure group, calls the amnesty a “Trojan horse”, aimed at exonerating corrupt public officials. Others point out that it will do little to fix deeper problems in the justice system. The courts will go unreformed and the prisons will fill up again. The sweeping powers of Lebanon’s military courts add to the overcrowding and critics worry that Hizbullah’s allies control them; efforts to fix them have stalled, complains Mark Daou, a reformist mp from the Druze community. The amnesty has been delayed by legal appeals but the Constitutional Council is unlikely to strike down the law. At best it may ease the pressure on Lebanon’s overstuffed prisons. But in doing so, it may also exacerbate sectarian tensions. Fixing the broken Lebanese state is a tall order. Its leaders have fallen short again. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/10/08/a-grubby-amnesty-law- highlights-lebanons-sectarian-divides

Middle East & Africa | Flydubai and Netanyahu In a near-catastrophe, Binyamin Netanyahu sees an opportunity Israel’s prime minister hopes to turn an electoral weakness into a strength Oct 8th 2026 The margin between tragedy and deliverance could seldom have been as narrow as on September 30th, when Flydubai flight 1073 plummeted over 17,000 feet towards the desert in just two minutes. Had Captain Smit Machchhar not fought back long enough to open the cockpit door, after his Omani co-pilot, Hamam al-Hammami, attacked him with an axe; had the mother of six-year-old Nina Manes not had to take her to the toilet and heard the commotion; had passengers and crew not overpowered Mr Hammami and pulled the Boeing 737 out of its dive; had an off-duty pilot on board not landed the damaged plane. Had all of these not happened, some 180 crew and passengers, mostly Israelis, would have surely died on impact, perhaps killing many on the ground. Instead the plane made an emergency landing in

Saudi Arabia and the passengers flew on to Tel Aviv, and a heroes’ welcome. The distance between political triumph and fiasco is just as slim. Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s long-serving prime minister and always the showman, was on hand when they landed for a triumphant photograph and was filmed calling the pilot in hospital. He has, however, avoided difficult questions about the near-catastrophe. Why was an apparently radicalised pilot flying a plane to Tel Aviv? Why did the transport ministry, controlled by an ultra- loyal member of Mr Netanyahu’s Likud party, fail in its job of vetting air- crew flying to Israel? How did Israel’s intelligence and security services, which answer to the prime minister directly, miss this? The prime minister’s office has offered no answers. But for Mr Netanyahu, the incident has offered a political opportunity. Rather than allow another security failure to reinforce the charges against him when it comes to the October 7th attacks on Israel by Hamas, Mr Netanyahu is trying to turn it to his advantage, campaigning once again as Israel’s indispensable protector. The saga captures the central issue in Israel’s election. Mr Netanyahu’s unwillingness to grapple with the security lapses that led to the hijack attempt mirrors his refusal to take responsibility for such failures in the run- up to October 7th 2023. Yet he is campaigning on the issue where he is arguably most damaged: security. His longstanding policy allowed Hamas, a militant Islamist group, to entrench and arm itself in Gaza. He ignored warnings from Israel’s security service and, so his opponents claim, from the Egyptian and Emirati governments, of an impending attack by Hamas. That helped create the conditions for the worst security debacle in Israel’s history. Mr Netanyahu denies there were any specific warnings and has blamed his security chiefs. They have all since resigned. The prime minister, who has just begun his 20th year in office, is fighting for yet another term.

Even before the Flydubai attack, Mr Netanyahu was warning voters of the dangers that await their country, dangers that only he has the experience and fortitude to confront. On September 29th he released a tough-talking video, standing in a fighter-jet hangar, claiming there were “signs that towards the election our enemies will try to attack us”. Security officials say that there were no specific imminent threats. But after the attempted hijacking (which did not appear on any official risk assessment), his proxies gloated that this was exactly what he had been talking about. The opposition has accused the prime minister of trying to cause a public panic in an effort to win votes. He has reason. According to The Economist’s election tracker, Mr Netanyahu’s coalition of far-right and ultra-religious parties will fall short of a majority in the Knesset, Israel’s parliament. Most Israelis say they hold Mr Netanyahu responsible for the failures of October 7th. His opponents claim that they will find better ways to destroy Hamas, but offer no clear security or diplomatic strategy. And Mr Netanyahu talks tougher. He may lose the election but whoever rules will do so according to his agenda. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/10/08/in-a-near-catastrophe- binyamin-netanyahu-sees-an-opportunity

· Europe

Germany and France want EU storm gates for China’s trade surge Pedro Sánchez gambles on a snap election—and populist policies Arson at the school gate and tear gas on the streets An explosive allegation rocks Germany’s spy agency The plague may have escaped from a lab in Siberia Europe’s lame-duck year could hardly come at a worse time

Europe · Europe | A European kill switch

Germany and France want EU storm gates for China’s trade surge A bold joint letter suggests confrontation looms with China Oct 8th 2026 IN CHINA’S eyes, Europe is weak and divided. It has neither the prowess to compete in technologies like artificial intelligence nor the military strength to defend itself. Its economy depends on Chinese rare earths and other supplies, and its companies are no match for their Chinese rivals’ innovation. Endless elections and diverging interests prevent the eu from building a united front. In the escalating trade spat between the two powers, why would China make any concessions? That was the starting point from which the eu embarked on trade negotiations with China in June. Its grievances are legion. Chinese firms threaten Europe’s industry with superior products and lower prices. That, Europeans allege, is in part the result of unfair subsidies and an undervalued