Lula also lost the support of centrists who “felt betrayed by the PT”, says Magno Karl of Livres, a liberal think-tank in São Paulo. “They voted for Lula in 2022…thinking that the government would spend less, would listen more to other parts of society and would not demonise criticism—but it didn’t happen.” His spendthrift policies have pushed up interest rates, raising debt costs for households, businesses and the government. Despondency prevails, despite modest real gains in income and record-low unemployment. Brazil’s rightward shift has continental implications. Since Donald Trump returned to power, all seven presidential elections in the region have been won by like-minded candidates. If Brazil, the last big holdout in South America, comes under the sway of the Donroe Doctrine, the United States could gain preferential access to the country’s vast trove of rare earths. Flávio is expected to appoint his brother, Eduardo, as either foreign minister or ambassador to Washington, given his close ties with Steve Bannon and the MAGA movement. Even so, there will probably be some continuity in foreign policy. No MAGA-aligned leader in South America has broken relations with China, the biggest buyer of South American commodities. Brazil is unlikely to buck the trend. Though its ties to the European Union could become strained over deforestation, this is unlikely to threaten a newly minted free-trade deal between the EU and Mercosur, a Brazil-led trade bloc. The EU “needs all the economic partners it can get outside China and America,” says Sándor Nagy of Corvinus University in Budapest. At home the consequences of a Flávio presidency would have a sharper edge. He could pursue a campaign of vengeance against his father’s perceived enemies. Among his targets may be Supreme Court justices, soldiers who resisted the coup attempt, diplomats who do not kowtow to MAGA and federal policemen who have investigated the clan. Flávio would also be able to shape the country’s regulatory agencies and institutions for a generation, due to an unusually large number of vacancies. Up for grabs are four out of 11 seats on the Supreme Court and two spots on the board of the central bank, as well as posts at the securities regulator and antitrust watchdog.

The big beneficiary of a Flávio victory would be the economy. Stocks rallied after the results were announced, and the currency strengthened. Investors believe that Flávio and a right-wing Congress will enact a tough fiscal adjustment. Flávio has promised savings worth 1.5% of GDP over 18 months through privatisations of state-owned firms, a spending cap and slashing the government. Yet so far, details have been thin. Flávio promises to scrap a large number of taxes, which would shrink revenues. His team has written off a reform of the pension system, the main item pushing up unsustainable spending. Congress, which is beholden to lobbies, appears unwilling to cut tax breaks, which cost 7% of GDP. Flávio’s advisers have unhelpfully ruled out delinking social benefits such as pensions from the minimum wage. As this rises inexorably each year, it drives up all other spending indexed to it. Markets will study Flávio’s campaign, especially his pick for finance minister. Meanwhile environmentalists, judges and those who have investigated his family will look on with trepidation. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2026/10/08/brazil-falls-into-magas-orbit

The Americas · The Americas | Low taxes, high hopes

The investment frenzy gripping Paraguay But corruption and poor infrastructure may hold growth back Oct 8th 2026 AT THE AIRPORT in Asunción, Paraguay’s capital, Blanca, a regular traveller who lives nearby, used to recognise many faces in the arrivals hall. Mostly there were families waiting by the barriers, children running forward as relatives returned home. Now the crowds are too large. Last year Paraguay welcomed 3.7m international visitors, almost twice as many as in 2024. Some are tourists; others are moving in. Last year immigration authorities recorded 47,600 residency applications, a record high and up by 63% on 2024. The numbers are still rising. “People didn’t used to come to Paraguay looking for opportunities,” says Blanca. “Now they do.” After decades of steady macroeconomic management, the country has won a reputation for stability. Following a financial crisis in 2003, policymakers

tightened fiscal policy, beefed up the central bank and tamed inflation, points out Alonso Chaverri Suárez of the Inter-American Development Bank. Ratings agencies have declared its debt to be investment grade, an accolade granted to only six countries in Latin America. Since taking office in 2023, Santiago Peña, the president, has set out to turn Paraguay into an export-oriented manufacturing hub. He has eased red tape and expanded the “maquila regime”, under which firms can import materials duty-free and pay only 1% tax on value added, making Paraguay attractive for manufacturers. Exports of goods such as car parts, clothing and textiles were 25% higher last year than in 2019 in real terms, helping propel economic growth to 6.6%. So far, investment has come mainly from domestic firms—expanding at home as confidence in the economy grows—and neighbouring countries. Paraguay’s membership of Mercosur, a trade bloc with Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, gives manufacturers tariff-free access to a market of more than 260m people. A trade deal between the bloc and the European Union should further boost exports. Manufacturers from Brazil and Argentina, facing higher taxes and heavier regulation at home, are shifting production across the border.

Mr Peña has suggested Paraguay could surpass Uruguay and Chile in income per person. That goal remains distant. One in five Paraguayans still lives below the poverty line, though that share is falling. And the economy still relies on farming; food accounts for nearly 70% of merchandise exports. Manufacturing exports under the “maquila regime” make up just 2.5% of GDP and are largely low-value. To support more complex growth, Paraguay needs a more skilled workforce, says José Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs, head of the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Public spending on education is just 3.5% of GDP, among the lowest in the region; in the latest PISA tests, Paraguayan students rank near the bottom. Infrastructure is another constraint. Only 16% of Paraguay’s roads are paved, and road transport makes up around 26% of export costs. Asunción’s small airport is also struggling with rising traffic. Because Paraguay is landlocked, it depends on the 3,400km Paraná-Paraguay waterway for much of its trade. But droughts have made parts of this harder to navigate. The Inter-American Development Bank estimates that Paraguay will need around $10bn by 2030 to improve its roads, airports and urban transport. Though Paraguay has plenty of cheap hydroelectric power, its grid is wobbly, with frequent power cuts. But there is little fiscal space to upgrade infrastructure. Paraguay’s tax take comes to just 16% of GDP, compared with 22% across Latin America and 34% in the OECD, a club of mainly rich countries. Its largely informal economy narrows the tax base. Upping taxes is politically tough because trust in the state is low, says Mr Salazar-Xirinachs. Higher taxes could weaken Paraguay’s main attraction to investors: its low costs and light regulation. Borrowing is one option, since Paraguay’s credit rating allows it to raise money on international markets relatively cheaply. Another is to get private investors to finance infrastructure, but that would require better institutions: Paraguay ranks 150th out of 182 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (where lower is worse). Cutting a culture of kickbacks is far tougher than slashing red tape, but it is no less important. ■

This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2026/10/08/the-investment-frenzy-gripping- paraguay

The Americas · The Americas | Easy riders

Latin America has caught motorcycle fever They are cheap, nimble and provide employment, but at a deadly cost Oct 8th 2026 A RAMPANT SPECIES has taken over the urban jungles of Latin America. Small, noisy and remarkably good at squeezing into tight spaces, motorcycles have found the crowded streets of Bogotá, São Paulo and Mexico City an accommodating habitat. They swarm between cars at traffic lights, crowd pavements and are the trusty steeds of delivery riders. They are also multiplying fast: annual motorcycle sales across the region doubled from 3m in 2019 to almost 6m last year. In 2010 there were just five registered motorcycles for every 100 people; by 2024 there were 14. Mexico’s motorcycle fleet more than quadrupled in the decade to 2025, from 2.6m to 10.5m.

Motorbikes are a cheap and easy way to weave through horribly congested cities. As public transport has failed to keep pace with rapid, and often informal, urban sprawl, motorcycles have filled the gap. Their buyers are disproportionately young, poor and male. Many work as couriers. Brazil had 351,000 motorcycle gig workers in 2024, 66% more than two years earlier. In Mexico an industry group estimates that seven in ten motorcycles sold in 2023 were bought for work, including for deliveries and for use as motorcycle taxis. Governments have added fuel to the boom by encouraging their use, in part to support growing domestic industries. In Colombia, where more than 90% of motorcycles sold are assembled locally, bikes of up to 125cc are exempt from vehicle tax; none pays any road tolls. In June Brazil launched subsidised loans for delivery workers to buy locally made bikes. Good reasons exist to encourage the use of motorcycles. They not only provide employment for poor and unskilled workers, they may also help labour markets function better by enabling people to take jobs farther from home. A wealth of evidence shows that making commutes cheaper and quicker can lower unemployment and lift wages. Many of the gains from public