The root of the problem is the government’s own heavy borrowing, which is pushing up rates for everyone else. Its debts amount to almost 100% of GDP. The deficit is over 9% of GDP. The government pays a higher share of GDP in interest than any big countries except Egypt and Pakistan. Brazil’s history of hyperinflation and recessions makes lenders especially wary. Much of the debt is linked to local interest rates, meaning every time they go up, so do its servicing costs. Over three terms as president, from 2003 to 2011 and since 2023, Lula has spent lavishly on handouts and subsidised credit. On September 17th, for instance, he increased payments under the government’s flagship welfare programme, Bolsa Família, by 15%. Brazilians have happily spent their windfall, which has kept the economy growing and unemployment low. But productivity has stagnated and consumers appear to be slowing down. Economists expect annual growth to average around 1% in 2027 and 2028. Earlier this month Lula offered an alarming solution: “We need to put an end to all this nonsense of running a surplus and maintaining fiscal discipline.” Inevitably, Brazil is falling behind. In 1980 Brazilians were markedly richer than Chileans and Colombians, not to mention Turks and Chinese, when measured by GDP per person adjusted to account for the cost of living.

Today Colombians have caught up and the others are all much richer (see chart 2). The Bolsonaros, dyed-in-the-wool populists, are little better. Mr Bolsonaro broke a spending limit that had been imposed in 2016 to regain market confidence. To boost his chances of re-election, he tripled the amount of cash handed out under Bolsa Família and almost doubled the number of recipients. Although Flávio pledges fiscal sobriety, in July, when his approval ratings began to trail among women, he promised 70m of them free phones and internet. Both candidates will struggle to tackle the interest groups that are driving spending up. One is pensioners, who have managed to lock in constant increases to payouts. The minimum wage in Brazil is adjusted annually based on inflation and GDP growth during the two prior years. Pensions are indexed to the minimum wage, as are disability allowance, unemployment insurance and other benefits. This means that for every increase of one real ($0.19) in the monthly minimum wage, annual public spending rises by 400m reais. This indexation is devouring the federal budget: 90% of it now goes on mandatory spending, mostly pensions. On current trends there will be no money left over for discretionary spending by 2029, precipitating a government shutdown.

This geronto-coddling robs the young of better schools, health care and roads. Brazil spends 10% of GDP on pensions, about the same as Japan, even though its population is far younger. Meanwhile it invests just 18% of GDP, less than half the share of India. Pampered bureaucrats are another strain on the budget. The constitution says that no official can earn more than Supreme Court judges, who receive $8,865 a month. Yet more than 67,000 civil servants make far more thanks to untaxed housing, transport and other allowances. These “super-salaries”, as the local press dubs them, lift the median earnings of judges and public prosecutors to 48 times the national figure. (America’s best-paid judge earns just six times the national median wage.) “Brazil has been taken hostage by public servants at the very top,” says Guilherme Coelho of Republica.org, a research outfit that looks at waste in government. Undeserved tax breaks are a third burden. Corporate-tax loopholes, some of which have been knitted into the constitution, cost a whopping 7% of GDP a year, up from 2% in 2003. “Here companies don’t compete for a share of the market, but a share of the government,” says an economist. Doctors, lawyers and other professionals also enjoy sweetheart deals. In theory both candidates are determined to fight entrenched interests. Lula has scrapped some tax breaks and made it harder to create new ones. An adviser to Flávio enthusiastically bashes “parasites” in the state. Daniella Marques, who leads economic policy for his campaign, has praised Javier Milei, Argentina’s libertarian president, as “a great example”. But when pressed, his team offers few specifics. In practice the winner will struggle to rein in such spending. Pension reform is as politically difficult in Brazil as it is everywhere else. Over the past decade a series of weak presidents has ceded control of a quarter of discretionary spending to members of Congress, to dole out in their districts with little oversight. Much of the money has ended up in friends’ pockets rather than in local schools or clinics. Over the past four years Lula has been unable to restore order. The next parliament is likely to be dominated by right-wing parties, which could make it even harder for him to govern. Flávio, too, has failed to win over

many of them. To advance his agenda, either man would have to keep buying off Congress. Congress is not the only institution with questionable motives. In 2023 the Supreme Court allowed judges to rule in cases that involve firms or individuals with connections to their own relatives. Eight of Brazil’s ten current Supreme Court justices have relatives working for law firms representing cases before the court. Unscrupulous clients hire them in the hope that they will receive special treatment. The ubiquity of influence-peddling has become clear through the collapse of Banco Master, a fraud-riddled lender. Its boss, Daniel Vorcaro, threw lavish parties for politicians and judges, flying in sex workers from Russia, Venezuela and elsewhere. He had a preference for foreign prostitutes because they could not understand their clients’ conversations. At a Halloween party thrown at a nightclub called “Madame Satan”, 120 women attended alongside only 20 men, mostly politicians. “Davi’s going crazy asking if the Swiss girls are coming” read a text message between the banker and his fixer, in an apparent reference to Davi Alcolumbre, the head of Congress (he denies this). After Mr Vorcaro was arrested trying to flee on a private jet last November, federal police worked their way through his eight mobile phones. Almost half the Supreme Court had links to him, it turns out. Messages suggest that Mr Vorcaro paid for an escort for one justice, bought a $4m stake in a hotel owned by another and hired the wife and sons of two further judges on lavish but vague contracts. Brazil’s institutions have thus arrived at a point of mutually assured destruction. Only the Supreme Court can investigate politicians for crimes, such as corruption. And only politicians can impeach Supreme Court justices, which they are promising to do. Congressmen have an incentive to target judges investigating them, while judges have an incentive to target congressmen who want to impeach them. That the Banco Master scandal involves the entire elite means that a backroom deal could eventually let everybody off.

Neither front-runner can tackle the rot. Flávio is part of it. He claimed never to have met Mr Vorcaro, which made the leak in May of a recording of the two of them speaking embarrassing, especially because he called the banker “my brother” and asked for $25m to pay for a film about his father. Almost $11m was forthcoming, most of which ended up in a bank account linked to Flávio’s actual brother, Eduardo, who lives in Texas. Flávio has also been investigated for allegedly pocketing the salaries of fake workers while serving on Rio’s local council (he denies it) and for his links to local criminals. A particularly infamous contact was Adriano da Nóbrega, a former police captain who went on to run a death squad. Flávio nominated Nóbrega for a medal after he was jailed for homicide and gave jobs to his wife and mother. (He says he was unaware they were on his payroll.) Meanwhile, though Lula has not been implicated in the Banco Master case, some of his allies have. His party continues to be tarnished by previous corruption scandals and his son is being investigated for influence-peddling. The campaign has been petty and insubstantial. Flávio’s main proposal is to pardon his father and impeach the judges who jailed him. This month the former head of the air force, Carlos Baptista Junior, published a book detailing how Mr Bolsonaro tried to persuade him and the other military chiefs to stage a coup, floating ideas about how to annul the election he had

just lost. Mr Bolsonaro dropped the plan only after the army chief warned him, “If you do that, I’ll have to arrest you.” Like his father, Flávio has cast doubt on Brazil’s voting machines, falsely claiming the same kind were used in a stolen election in Venezuela—a complete fabrication. It is unclear if he would accept a Lula victory. Flávio’s other proposals are fluff. He says he will decree that “Brazil belongs to the Lord Jesus Christ” and chemically castrate rapists. Victory would spell a close alignment with Mr Trump. Flávio and his family have lobbied the Trump administration to impose tariffs and sanctions on Mr Bolsonaro’s enemies. At campaign rallies, supporters have paraded with American flags and inflatable effigies of Mr Trump holding Lula by the scruff. Flávio appears willing to acquiesce to America’s expansive demands over rare earths. The White House wants Brazil to notify it before the sale of any firms or assets involving critical minerals and to limit investment by “foreign entities of concern”, in effect giving the United States a veto over the use of Brazil’s minerals. Nevertheless Faria Lima, Brazil’s equivalent of Wall Street, is cautiously lining up behind Flávio in the hope that he will make good on his talk of spending cuts. Lula, for his part, talks about investing in defence and artificial intelligence. He has a solid record of reducing deforestation. He has championed laws to spur investment in data centres and in rare earths, albeit with heavy state involvement. “We want to build a supply chain with value-added, not simply export raw materials in a colonial way, leaving behind only holes in the ground,” says Guilherme Boulos, a minister working on Lula’s campaign. Yet there is no money to pay for Lula’s ideas and he does not have a credible plan to right the government’s finances. At rallies he rambles on for hours, mainly about his past glories and life-story. His much younger wife has taken to posting videos of him working out to prove he is fit. In public he wears a Panama hat to hide scars from the removal of a mole and an operation after a fall in the bathtub. Brazil is not a lost cause. Even as politics descends into debauched scandal, a robust civil society, thriving free press and independent national police force are holding the powerful to account. “At least in Brazil corruption