This technological shift is beginning to reshape finance. But the effects will be different from the predictions made by Mr Nakamoto. As finance becomes more digital, it will depend more, not less, on a widely trusted public form of money. Central banks are not going to become irrelevant anytime soon. Let me explain why. Every transaction, from buying a used car to trading bonds, is complete only when the buyer receives the asset they purchased, and the seller receives money they trust. This is called settlement. If the seller cannot fully rely on the asset they are paid with—if they receive an IOU, for example, or a voucher from a company they have never heard of —they are exposed to the risk that the issuer could default. This risk reduces the convenience of the deal. Central banks are the only institutions that issue risk-free settlement assets that everyone can trust. This is particularly important for wholesale markets, where banks and other institutions routinely process daily trades worth billions of euros. It is crucial that these trades are made using a universally accepted settlement asset that carries no risk. Today, transactions are typically concluded between the respective banks of the payer and the payee via an exchange of the safest settlement asset you can think of: central-bank money. Now ask yourself whether this will change because the technology we use to move money is evolving. Tokenisation can automate transactions, remove intermediaries and compress into seconds processes that previously took days. For that transformation to happen, though, investors will require a safe settlement asset. The types of “money” currently available on distributed-ledger technology don’t fit the bill: stablecoins and tokenised deposits carry intrinsic credit risk, while bitcoin and other unbacked cryptocurrencies are nobody’s liability and subject to wild price swings. At the European Central Bank (ECB), we draw one fundamental lesson from all this. We want to create the conditions to enable this new technology to unlock safer, more efficient and more resilient markets. Providing central- bank money in tokenised form—a common monetary anchor that offers safety and universal acceptance—is at the centre of this vision.
Throughout history, the most successful financial systems have rested on a common foundation: banks and other financial firms compete with one another but all operate within a system where a public authority—be it a king putting his face on coins or a central banker signing banknotes— guarantees trust in money. We should therefore take the efficiency gains made possible by tokenisation and distributed ledgers, and pair them with the trust, safety and universal acceptance of central-bank money. This is precisely the idea behind the ECB’s Pontes initiative, which went live on September 21st. Pontes connects the platforms on which tokenised assets are issued and traded with the system in which trades are already settled using central-bank money. This gives the next generation of financial assets the same solid foundation that traditional finance is built upon. And this is only a first step. By 2028 we aim to make tokenised central-bank money directly available on the same blockchain where assets sit, bringing all the advantages of digital-ledger technology, including round-the-clock trading, to the backbone of Europe’s financial system. And we are working to create an integrated landscape for digital assets from the outset, with shared standards across borders and platforms, thereby avoiding the fragmentation that has been hobbling Europe’s capital markets. Of course, as in the traditional set-up, there will still be forms of money that complement central-bank money; stablecoins are a case in point. But even the widespread use of these private assets for settlement requires central- bank money in tokenised form: to facilitate convertibility between those assets, to avoid a fragmentation of liquidity and, most importantly, to ensure that one euro is worth one euro whatever form it takes or technology it uses —a principle that central bankers call “singleness of money”. To ensure the efficiency gains from tokenisation are ultimately passed on to the general public, and to issuers and investors, healthy competition is needed. It is important to avoid the emergence of walled gardens that benefit only a few. With this in mind, central banks are promoting shared standards and network interoperability. If we get this right, the cost of financial intermediation, which has remained roughly constant at around 2% since the late 19th century, could finally start falling.
Let’s go back to that manifesto from 2008. The early crypto movement may have imagined a world with no central banks, where finance could operate without governments, public institutions or trusted intermediaries. But the financial system now taking shape points to a different destination. The history of digital finance is often presented as an attempt to escape public money, but all along it may have been a search for a better way to use it.■ Piero Cipollone is a member of the European Central Bank’s executive board and chair of the euro-area task-force on the digital euro. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2026/09/21/the-future-of-digital-finance- rests-on-public-money-not-private
Brazil’s next president will either be a vengeful nepo-baby or a doddering leftie Latin America’s biggest country is headed for more polarisation and stagnation, or worse Sep 24th 2026 FEW COUNTRIES are as lucky as Brazil. It faces no threat of invasion. Its economy is more resilient to Donald Trump’s senseless tariffs than almost anywhere else. It enjoys relatively friendly relations with both superpowers. Above all, it is awash with coveted resources. Yet as Brazil gears up for a general election on October 4th, an old adage, that it is the country of the future and always will be, once again rings true. Instead of capitalising on its advantages, Brazil is all but certain to opt for another four years of polarising gridlock. Neck and neck in the polls are Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the 80-year-old incumbent known as Lula, and Flávio Bolsonaro, the eldest son of Jair Bolsonaro, a former populist
president serving a 27-year sentence for plotting a coup after losing his bid for re-election in 2022. Think Bernie Sanders versus Donald Trump junior, if the younger Mr Trump had connections to the criminal underworld. The ballot is an unpopularity contest. Brazilians fear that Lula will run the economy into the ground, whereas choosing Flávio could mean culture wars, environmental havoc and uncomfortably close relations with President Trump’s administration. Neither candidate will receive the thumping mandate that is needed to tackle Brazil’s fiscal malaise or institutional dysfunction. Hovering over the election is a sordid corruption scandal involving bunga-bunga parties and a playboy banker, which has ensnared the entire political class as well as the powerful Supreme Court, hitherto the last line of defence against the self-serving elite. The stakes could scarcely be higher. The government is living far beyond its means and its creditors are becoming restive. Mr Trump treats Latin America as a personal playground, abducting Venezuela’s president, propping up Argentina’s, endorsing like-minded right-wing populists in a series of elections and blowing up boats in the Caribbean. If Brazil, the region’s biggest country and a rival centre of gravity, comes into close alignment with America, he will be even more emboldened. To top it all, the winner of the election will appoint four of the 11 justices on Brazil’s Supreme Court, shaping the country for a generation. Brazil is a veritable El Dorado. As the rest of the world wrestles with a shortage of oil and of renewable alternatives, Brazil is overflowing with both. In August Petrobras, the state oil firm, discovered its first crude in the Equatorial Margin, the world’s fastest-growing oil province, off the north- eastern coast of South America. That will in time boost its already prodigious production from the “pre-salt” fields off its eastern coast. Fully 89% of Brazil’s electricity is supplied by renewables, mostly hydropower. Wind and solar energy have grown so fast the grid often cannot absorb all the output. The surplus green energy could power data centres and make Brazil a hub for the production of low-carbon steel and clean aviation and shipping fuel. The abundance in energy is matched in food. As recently as the 1970s severe hunger was common, driving millions of migrants, including a young Lula
and his seven siblings, from the arid north-east to the mega-cities of the south. Then advances in agricultural research opened the interior up to cattle-ranching and farming. This year Brazil is set to overtake the United States as the world’s leading agricultural exporter. It is now king in beef, coffee, cotton, orange juice, soyabeans and sugar cane. Last year Mr Trump had to rescind tariffs he imposed on Brazilian farm goods during Mr Bolsonaro’s trial after they helped push up food prices in America. There is wealth below the soil, too. Brazil boasts the world’s second-largest store of rare earths, a group of minerals used in many high-tech goods that are produced and processed almost exclusively by Chinese firms. Brazil could thus be central to Western countries’ efforts to secure alternative suppliers. European and American emissaries are “harassing us for deals on rare earths, in a good sense”, says a diplomat in Brasília, the capital. This cornucopia of energy, food and minerals made Brazil the biggest recipient of foreign direct investment among developing countries last year bar China. It attracted $77bn, far ahead of India’s $39bn. “Brazil has hard assets that will grow in value in a world of greater geopolitical conflict,” says Christopher Garman of Eurasia Group, a consultancy in New York. Yet grave problems are holding the economy back, despite outsiders’ enthusiasm. Real interest rates of 9% are throttling growth. They have spurred a rise in corporate defaults and household indebtedness (see chart 1). Lula faces a similar predicament to Joe Biden, another geriatric leader whose re-election campaign struggled because voters felt gloomy about the economy. Over half of Brazilians say the economy is in a bad or very bad state, a share that has crept up in recent months. Some 9m firms are in default, up from 4m a decade ago, when Brazil was in recession. Debt repayments eat up 30% of average household income according to Tendências, a consultancy in São Paulo, the highest level since it began counting in 2004.