—for carpal tunnel and total replacement of knees and hips—offer outcomes that are clearly superior to non-operative care. Six, including common ones like lumbar-spine decompression, are no better than drugs, physiotherapy or just Father Time. Similarly, roughly two-thirds of excised appendices could have been fixed with antibiotics and many prostates, around 100,000 of which are operated on in Europe each year, are better off with watchful waiting. The list goes on. For patients, needless surgery is a cause of physical pain and, especially in America, financial stress. For stretched health-care systems in ageing rich countries, it is a terrible waste of resources. A recent reduction in referrals for shoulder operations (just one of the six useless orthopaedic procedures) is saving England’s National Health Service (NHS) around £100m ($134m) a year, or 1% of its total surgical budget. The main reason for the persistence of useless procedures is a dearth of clinical data on whether they work. Surgeons liken asking about this to wondering whether parachutes are useful when leaping out of a plane. If the patient gets better, the parachute is assumed to have been a success. Regulators do not require proof that it actually was, as they do with new drugs. Individual surgeons have neither the incentive nor the means to check for themselves. Contrast that with drugmakers, which bankroll big, costly randomised trials in the hope of making lots of money from pills that are proven effective. Governments can start to correct this failure by running trials themselves. The NHS has already begun doing this, with some success. By testing procedures across many hospitals around Britain, it avoids the charge of impugning the skill of any individual surgeon or, conversely, of missing out the truly skilful. It and other public health-care systems should conduct more such exercises. Once the results are in, it will be easier for payers, be they public systems or private insurers, to refuse to cover procedures that do not benefit patients. This will not only save money. Surgeons freed from performing unnecessary shoulder and back operations could spend more time on knees, hips and carpal tunnels. In systems where care is rationed, like the NHS, this would have the welcome effect of trimming waiting lists. In July 6.2m patients in
England were awaiting non-urgent specialist treatment, a category that includes lots of surgeries. Unlearning decades of modern medical practice will not come easily to health-care systems. It will be harder still for the surgeons. Like all medics, they believe that they are doing right by their patients. But if your only tool is a scalpel, everything looks ripe for cutting. Surgeons must therefore be taught, starting in medical school and then by their mentors in what remains an apprenticeship-based craft, to present patients with a range of options and choose the best one together rather than dictating it from on high. Such “shared decision-making” has become common among clinicians but remains alien to many surgeons. It is in everyone’s interest to make it standard. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/09/24/back-and-shoulder-surgery-is-often- worse-than-useless
Don’t let AI kill the author The perils of machine-made prose Sep 24th 2026 If The Economist had just two loyalties, they might well be to good prose and creative destruction. Those seldom previously came into conflict—until artificial-intelligence models began writing. Now, AI text is winning literary awards, occupying op-ed pages and, as we report this week, filling the mouths of politicians. One in ten words spoken in Britain’s parliamentary debates, and one in seven in America’s House of Representatives, are probably drafted by AI. When it comes to the written word, no writer is a neutral party. This newspaper has applauded technological progress for nearly two centuries. It would be churlish to turn Luddite only now, once the wolves of automation have turned up at our own door. And yet. Both writers and readers should be wary of passing the pen to AI.
Admittedly, in some sorts of writing an AI takeover would be welcome: customer-service complaints, say, or technical write-ups where clarity is all. What matters in such cases is disclosing the use of AI and making sure that the human being whose name is on the page still takes responsibility. Writers of all sorts would be doing their readers a disservice if they did not use AI models for research, proofreading and, when appropriate, feedback. Elsewhere, however—in novels, speeches and even news articles— surrendering human authorship would be a mistake. For the time being, the most popular gripe about AI writing is the clumsiness of the prose itself. That complaint rests on shaky foundations. The Luddites grumbled, once, about the poor workmanship of machine-made stockings. But then the stockings got better. Doubtless, AI sentences will, too. Any serious case against AI writing must rest, therefore, on the ways that words are not stockings: how they carry meaning and significance beyond what ends up on the page. The act of writing tends to be painful, even for many of those who do it for a living. But much of that pain is really the pain of thinking, of crystallising thoughts in text. Sidestepping that is a sure-fire route to less rigorous, let alone original, human thought. Students who outsource their essays to Claude may lose the habit of reasoning. Politicians who let AI craft their arguments may be less mindful of their consequences. Another big concern is with the consumers of the written word—or readers, as they are better known. AI writing breaks the expectations of a literate culture. Human text takes longer to write than to read. This offers a certain guarantee if not of quality—the world still swims in dire prose—then at least of effort. Someone, somewhere, thought something was worth saying. Economists call that a costly signal. Whatever French theorists have to say about the death of the author, readers still want to know that a person wrote the words in front of them. Take poetry. Even a few years ago, when AI was less powerful, researchers were already finding that many people, in blind tests of AI- and human-written poetry, preferred the robo-rhymes. But making sense of a poem relies on the promise that a human wrote it, and thus that it meant something to someone.
Even when AI is not used, it can sully readers’ experiences. They may stumble on a turn of phrase that sounds suspiciously machine-made, and give up on reading the rest of the text. Or the proliferation of AI-generated fakery may make them distrust real news. Polluting the information environment like that is what economists call an externality. Technology will remake many of these norms. AI offers immense opportunities, too, many of which no one can yet fully grasp. Yet liberal societies negotiate these momentous changes not by passively surrendering to technologies, but by adapting to them. The printing press set off religious wars in early-modern Europe. In the 1930s the radio heralded fascism. Few associate either with such high drama today. Societies are grappling with plenty of other technologies that pose risks, such as fattier foods and more potent illegal drugs. So it would be hubristic to try to chart out exactly how societies ought in future to approach the use of AI in writing. But any writer knows to start with a first draft. This is ours.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/09/24/dont-let-ai-kill-the-author
Is the term “Islamism” a useful way to discuss extremism? Also this week, America and Panama, contrails, NASA’s latest telescope, Chinese law, punctuation, French cheese Sep 24th 2026 Letters are welcome via email to letters@economist.comFind out more about how we process your letter The Economist puts forward the argument that the term “Islamism” is a useful way to discuss extremism without treating Muslims collectively as a threat (“Much ado about…something”, September 12th). Yet throughout the article, religious observance, conservative attitudes, political organising, Gaza activism, views on sharia and support for violence are brought together as evidence of a wider ideological threat.
“Islamism” is now used so loosely that it can describe both violent authoritarian movements and ordinary Muslims lobbying the government, protesting or standing for election. Muslim political participation is not evidence of “entryism”, which requires evidence of an attempt to enter and actively subvert an institution, not to merely contribute to public life. Muslims are not a single political project. Our faith may inform how we understand poverty, racism, war or inequality, but religious commitment tells us little about somebody’s preferred form of government. Sharia, for many Muslims, primarily concerns personal religious and ethical practice. Muslims have spent decades being told to integrate and participate. Yet when they organise effectively, elect Muslim politicians or challenge government policy, participation itself becomes suspicious. Neighbourhoods with significant Muslim populations reflect patterns of migration, family and community networks, housing, employment, deprivation and discrimination, rather than a shared political ideology. Britain has seen sustained anti-Muslim hatred, ranging from discrimination and threats to mosque attacks, arson and serious physical violence, alongside foiled far-right and neo-Nazi plots to kill Muslims. Recent racist and Islamophobic mob violence in Northern Ireland and stabbing attacks in Glasgow are part of a much wider pattern of hostility and violence affecting Muslim communities across Britain. Extremism and violence should be confronted. But conservative belief, prejudice, coercion and violence are not different degrees of the same phenomenon. Rejecting the vague label of “Islamism” means refusing to treat ordinary Muslim religious and political life as evidence of extremism. Dr Naomi GreenAssistant secretary-generalMuslim Council of BritainBelfast I have no difficulty calling out Islamists. As you note, at Kismet, a café in the Whitechapel area of London, we do not platform people who spend their lives telling other Muslims that they are insufficiently Muslim. But confronting Islamism requires defining it. A Muslim who believes faith should inform politics is not, by that fact, an Islamist. Nor is one who wears a hijab, dislikes Prevent (a UK government early-intervention counter- terrorism strategy), protests over Gaza or votes for an independent Muslim