nearly double what it was before the pandemic. Borrowing costs are rising in other wealthy countries, too. This time, however, the result may be lower house prices. This is something that, for all their cakeist proclivities, politicians should welcome. The latest bout of interest-rate rises is not yet as acute as the previous one. But the housing market today is less resilient than it was. As variable-rate mortgages have spread across the rich world, the prospect of higher monthly payments may deter buyers, particularly now that households have mostly run down their covid-era savings. Meanwhile, the supply of houses is up a bit compared with the 2010s. House prices are unlikely to fall much in nominal terms—they seldom do, outside deep recessions. Yet even a decline after adjusting for inflation could be a healthy digestive. For a starter, if many people are unable to afford a home it weighs down the economy, especially in big cities that power 21st-century commerce. Although wage growth has comfortably outpaced inflation in America, the total cost of owning a home has grown even faster in recent years. Cheaper houses would be of particular benefit to first-time buyers, who often struggle to save enough for a down payment.

Falling prices may also reanimate the housing market. In the past few years it has frozen rigid in places where fixed-rate mortgages remain popular, as they are in America. Homeowners there have clung on to their rock-bottom mortgage fixes, meaning that fewer homes have changed hands in the past four years than at any point since the global financial crisis of 2007-09. This has curbed economic dynamism by making people less willing to move elsewhere to seek better jobs. In today’s economy homeowners may at last prefer to sell now rather than wait for prices to fall further. The last benefit of a housing slump is to remind people that houses are a poor long-term investment. For decades governments have told households to treat their homes as saving vehicles, and in many countries lavished them with tax breaks. A house has virtues as an asset: investors can count on a premium on account of its illiquidity and it gives ordinary mortals access to financial leverage (setting aside the wild world of retail options trading). Yet treating your house as a financial asset violates some basic tenets of investing, which becomes apparent when prices fall. It is undiversified (unless you are a serial landlord), related risks are hard to hedge (insurance gets you only so far) and returns are highly correlated with your future income (a downturn could bring down both your wages and the value of your property). Plus the more a family’s finances are tied up in a home, the greater the NIMBY temptation to block development, which could dilute its value. The causes of the latest rise in interest rates—inflation, debt, geopolitical tensions—are nothing to cheer. Its effect on house prices may offer some cake crumbs of comfort. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/09/24/why-house-prices-may-be-in-trouble

Leaders · Leaders | Lula v Bolsonaro, again

Brazil turns its back on the future The looming election will not bring the change the country needs Sep 24th 2026 Brazil is blessed. Its proven reserves of oil are huge and growing. Within its borders the world’s largest river, the Amazon, flows through its greatest rainforest. More than half of Brazil’s electricity comes from hydropower. Its farmland is among the most productive on the planet; it will soon become the largest exporter of food, overtaking America. Beneath its soils lie vast deposits of rare-earth minerals. Its 220m people are enterprising, creative and diverse. Brazil’s vast potential has long been apparent. When the capital, Brasília, was built in the 1950s, its streets were laid out in the shape of an aeroplane, symbolising a country ready to take off. Yet it is still stuck on the runway. Over the past half-century, rather than taking wing, Brazil’s economy has stagnated relative both to its peers and

average global growth. The general election on October 4th offers little hope of a turnaround. The choice before Brazilians is bleak. The incumbent left-wing president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as Lula, faces Flávio Bolsonaro, the eldest son of his right-wing populist predecessor, Jair. Lula is about to turn 81, the same age Joe Biden was when he dropped his re-election bid in 2024. He is a democrat, and sound on the environment. But he has done precious little to unleash growth or restrain spending. He has failed to push economic reforms, bar a sales-tax simplification, and calls fiscal discipline “nonsense”. His government is on course to end the term with the largest public-debt-interest bill in a quarter of a century. The junior Bolsonaro, who is only 45, denies that humans are causing climate change, questions the integrity of voting machines and hints that he will not honour the result if Lula wins. He has been investigated for alleged ties to violent criminals, which he denies. His main policy is to pardon his father, who in September 2025 was handed a 27-year sentence for plotting a coup—including a plan to assassinate Lula—after losing his re-election bid in 2022. The pair are tied in the polls, with Flávio on the rise. Neither man is credible when it comes to tackling Brazil’s two biggest problems: entrenched corruption and the relentless expansion of public spending. Without a sound plan to shrink public debt relative to GDP, the risk of a debt-interest spiral will keep borrowing costs high, starving the economy of the capital it needs to raise productivity and growth. Ever-expanding government spending drives inflation, forcing the central bank to keep interest rates high. Shrinking that debt and lowering rates will require deep cuts to government spending, 92% of which is mandated either by law or by Brazil’s absurdly overprescriptive constitution. In the absence of stronger growth, the jockeying of political elites to control public resources makes many ordinary Brazilians feel hopeless, an advantage for politicians who operate at the extremes. Corruption also undermines the institutions that provide Brazil’s checks and balances. A few weeks after Jair’s conviction, a scandal known as Banco Master erupted and quickly engulfed the Supreme Court. Police investigations have so far

shown that five of the court’s 11 justices had connections to Daniel Vorcaro, the playboy mastermind behind it. This feeds public cynicism, making it easier for Brazilians to overlook Jair’s conviction for coup-plotting and back his son. The candidate whose ideas match the moment most closely is Renan Santos, a hard-charging libertarian. He wants to enact deep structural reform and spending cuts to transform Brazil into a great power. But neither he nor any other outsider has made headway against the opposing political machines of Lula and Mr Bolsonaro. The country is drifting towards a predictable crisis, but most of its political elite are too comfortable with the way things are to change course. And so Brazil’s glittering future will be on hold for at least four more years. It is not quite dead. Despite the corruption and insular thinking of pork- barrel politicians, many of the country’s vital institutions still work. The federal police have done remarkably well to investigate the Vorcaro fraud, and the coup plot before that; the press remains ferocious, independent and relatively well funded; the diplomatic corps is respected around the world. Even the Supreme Court, despite its abundant flaws, was able to send a coup-monger to jail. The most likely trigger for a crisis would be a sharp acceleration in the level of debt and borrowing costs leading to a worsening economy. That is a vicious circle, familiar to older Brazilians, which could lead to falls in the value of the real, yet more inflation and a painful recession. Perhaps only then would Brazilians turn to someone prepared to make the unpopular case that sacrifices will be needed for a future in which a blessed country is never again condemned to choose between two such dismal candidates. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/09/24/brazil-turns-its-back-on-the-future

Leaders · Leaders | The cost of cutting

Back and shoulder surgery is often worse than useless Millions of operations should be scrapped Sep 24th 2026 SIX IN TEN Britons have surgery at some point. So do lots of Americans, at a cost of perhaps $500bn a year, a third of all spending on adults in the world’s biggest health-care market. Plenty of these procedures save lives, by removing tumours, transplanting new organs or mending broken ones. Many others make life better, say by restoring vision (cataract extraction) or hearing (tympanoplasty, for example). Yet a growing body of evidence suggests millions of surgeries performed each year are unnecessary—and, given the risk of complications when a person is sliced open, often worse than useless. Of ten common orthopaedic procedures, a specialty which accounts for a quarter of all operations in Britain and a similar share in America, only three