Finance & economics | Anatomy of a fall Turkey’s investment-fund fiasco The country could lose its status as an emerging market Sep 24th 2026 THE NUMBERS seemed too good to be true. Dozens of investment funds— and the financial groups behind them—posted spectacular returns, propelling Turkey’s stock market to record highs. One asset manager, Tera, saw its main fund soar by over 60,000% in only three years. Another financial firm, Destek Finans Faktoring, became Turkey’s second-biggest listed company barely 17 months after going public, as its share price rose by 7,000%. Now the bubble has burst. First, Tera and several other asset managers failed to pay investors seeking to cash out. Then details emerged of what one official called “Ponzi-like” schemes some other firms are alleged to have run. Turkey’s main stock-market index fell by over 5% on September 16th. In only two days the scandal wiped some $30bn from the market (see chart).

To mop up the mess, Turkey’s market regulator has moved to liquidate 131 investment funds. They are estimated to hold roughly $18bn in assets between them. At least 450,000 investors are now bracing for a painful haircut and a long wait for whatever money remains. Some of the people behind the schemes may be facing prison terms. Police have already rounded up scores of finance bosses, including Tera’s chairman, on suspicion of market fraud. Others have had their assets frozen. The scandal did not come out of the blue. As early as last year Turkey’s finance minister, Mehmet Simsek, pointed to signs of stock-market shenanigans and pledged new regulations. Meanwhile evidence mounted that some funds were buying thinly traded shares, including stakes in their own subsidiaries, to drive up their value. When prices jumped, they could report big gains to reel in new investors. They could also borrow against the newly expensive shares to buy more. In June MSCI, an index provider, hinted that unless regulators took action, Turkey risked being downgraded from an emerging to a frontier market. It would then join an asset class populated by much smaller economies such as Tunisia and Romania. Officials were slow to respond to these alarm bells. Only in late August did Turkey’s capital-markets board try to stop funds from cornering the market in the shares of individual companies. Fund managers scrambled to comply

with the new rules by unloading their holdings. Prices tumbled. Investors began to head for the doors. The doors were then slammed shut. Those who had sounded the alarm were ignored, or worse. A former deputy head of Turkey’s financial-crimes watchdog says he was detained by police on two occasions after he complained about Tera. The same firm also threatened legal action against reporters and social-media users who accused it of wrongdoing. Mr Simsek has rushed to calm nerves. The crisis, which he blamed on a few rotten apples, had been contained, he said on September 18th. “There’s no systemic risk,” he added. Foreign investors seem to agree. “This is not spreading through the broader economy,” says Viktor Szabo, a portfolio manager at Aberdeen, a wealth-management company. Fears of dollarisation have turned out to be misplaced. Rather than moving into hard currency, Turkish investors who pulled out of the stock market seem to be parking their money in high-interest lira deposit accounts. Confidence in Turkish financial markets has once again been shaken, however. In recent years Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has touted Istanbul’s prospects as a global financial centre. The country has also hoped to attract some of the capital fleeing the Gulf in the wake of Iranian drone and missile attacks. The investment-fund fiasco has dealt those ambitions a serious blow. Outside investors had already regarded Turkish equities as a “Wild West market”, says Timothy Ash of RBC BlueBay Asset Management. “Why would anyone have confidence in the regulatory environment after all this?” Arresting dodgy fund managers may not be enough. Turkey should investigate why regulators were so slow to act, analysts say. They could also examine claims that some of the asset managers responsible for the mess had enjoyed political protection, notably from members of Mr Erdogan’s entourage. Neither investigation appears to be on the cards. The scandal is a symptom of a wider malaise. Ordinary Turks have long been seeking protection from rocketing consumer prices. Inflation exceeded 80% in 2022 and remains about 30% a year. Lured by the promise of high returns, many investors, including wholly inexperienced ones, piled into

equities, including highly volatile shares. They learnt a painful lesson: in Turkey consumer prices only go up, but share prices can also go the other way. And when a stock rises by 7,000%, it’s cause for concern, not celebration. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/09/24/turkeys-investment-fund- fiasco

Finance & economics | Free Exchange How the Fed should measure inflation Pinning down the underlying rate may be harder than Kevin Warsh thinks Sep 24th 2026 IN THE EARLY 1970s Arthur Burns had an inflation problem. As one supply shock followed another, the pipe-smoking Federal Reserve chairman, known as the “Pope of Economics”, responded by excommunicating prices he blamed on “special factors”. The Arab oil embargo pushing up crude? Look past energy. A collapse in Peru’s anchovy harvest driving up feed costs? Strip out food. When inflation still looked too high, out went used cars, home purchases and mobile homes. Even rising jewellery prices were blamed on “gold mania” and waved away, as Stephen Roach, then a young Fed economist, later recalled. In search of the one true inflation rate, Burns kept narrowing the canon. Inflation, meanwhile, was becoming ever more catholic.

Half a century later Kevin Warsh has taken up the same challenge. The Fed’s new-ish chairman has made a mission out of pinning down underlying inflation (“underlying” is fast becoming his favourite adjective). Yet he has dismissed the usual guide, “core” indices excluding food and energy, as a “rough swag” for where inflation is headed. Mr Warsh instead prefers “trimmed averages”, which exclude the biggest price swings, and measures of inflation’s breadth. On September 16th he complained that prices were rising by more than 3% in “too many” product categories. That was one reason why the Fed raised interest rates for the first time in three years. He has even sent a task-force hunting for cleaner, timelier economic signals. Can Mr Warsh get closer to the underlying trend without stumbling into Burns’s trap? Underlying inflation is, roughly, the part of today’s inflation most likely to still be there tomorrow. In a market economy, individual prices are always moving around. A drought makes coffee dearer; a glut makes cars cheaper. In August prices for mobile-phone services mysteriously jumped by nearly 6% in the space of a month. Such idiosyncratic movements can move headline inflation without saying much about the broader trend. Central bankers therefore try to look through the one-offs, training their gaze instead on the underlying movement in the general price level. After the supply shocks of the 1970s, a simple shortcut took hold: strip out volatile food and energy prices. The resulting “core” measure replaced Burns’s discretion with a fixed rule that usually gave a better steer on where inflation was headed. But it is a crude shortcut. As Jim Dolmas and Evan Koenig of the Dallas Fed put it, “Not all food and energy items are equally volatile, nor are all of the most volatile items exclusively food and energy.” Restaurant prices get thrown out despite being fairly stable, whereas more volatile categories such as airfares and hotel rooms stay in. It is, indeed, a “rough swag”. Economists have long looked for a better swag. In a paper from 1994 Michael Bryan, then of the Cleveland Fed, and Stephen Cecchetti of Brandeis University built a model showing how lopsided movements in individual prices can obscure the common inflation trend. Their answer was to rank price changes and focus on the middle—either by chopping off the extremes before taking an average, or simply by taking the median. In their

data, the median did a better job of forecasting future inflation than either the headline consumer-price index (CPI) or the index excluding food and energy. Later research has generally found that such trimmed measures can provide a cleaner signal of durable inflation. The idea has been put to work. The Cleveland Fed publishes a median and trimmed CPI. The Economist’s predictive inflation tracker downweights extreme price movements rather than discarding them. Yet pruning can work badly if price patterns shift. The Dallas Fed releases a trimmed-mean measure of changes in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE). For decades the biggest price falls tended to be larger than the biggest rises. So the Dallas Fed used an uneven cut, dropping the bottom 24% of price changes and the top 31%. That made sense when inflation was low; less so once more prices began to rise. During the inflation surge of 2021, the Dallas measure started stripping out too many genuine price increases. The problem persists. In April researchers at the Dallas Fed warned that their gauge may still be understating inflation. They have since produced an alternative that cuts more evenly from both ends of the distribution. It would have picked up the surge in 2021 much sooner. For the year to June it put underlying inflation at 2.6%, against 3.3% for core PCE. But any trimmed measure is calibrated to how prices behaved in the past. If that pattern shifts, as it often can in periods of high inflation, the measure risks trimming away part of the inflation it is meant to capture. Mr Warsh thinks the Fed can do better. Part of his answer is more timely, granular data. The Billion Prices Project, pioneered by Alberto Cavallo of Harvard University and Roberto Rigobon of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, gathered millions of online prices each day to track inflation almost as it happened. The Fed chair wants similar feeds to supplement official statistics. But more prices do not necessarily reveal the trend. To find it, Mr Warsh prefers to focus on the middle. Earlier this year he imagined assembling a billion prices and said what really mattered was what was happening to the “500 million and one” price. That may be an improvement, but the median has a blind spot. A large minority of prices can surge without moving the middle much, as happened in 2021, when median measures understated the underlying trend. The

episode is a reminder that no rule will perfectly capture underlying inflation. The temptation, then, is to compensate by deciding which prices to ignore. That was the cardinal sin of the Pope of Economics. Mr Warsh would do better to take a leap of faith and embrace an imperfect rule. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/09/24/how-the-fed-should- measure-inflation