Before its listing, the NSE flagged to investors that selling data was becoming a larger part of its revenues. It has recently launched electricity futures, which allow utilities to hedge against declining prices, and electronic gold receipts, which allow Indians to trade dematerialised bullion. Its management has also pointed out that the market for exchange-traded funds in India is still “tiny”—implying that there is plenty of room for it to become less so. The punters themselves still seem game. Indian households held almost 27% of their net financial assets in equities and investment funds in March last year, up from about 5% four years earlier. The figure should continue to grow. And both the NSE and BSE can hope to benefit. There is space for two exchanges, says Aditya Kondawar of Complete Circle Capital, a financial-services firm. Indeed the state government in West Bengal, which is hoping to revive another venerable stock exchange in Kolkata, seems to think there is space for three. Despite recent setbacks, India’s equity culture remains large and clamorous. No single banyan tree can canopy it all. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/09/24/the-battle-between- indias-stock-exchanges-is-heating-up-again
Finance & economics | The two-tier solution Israel’s war economy is thriving But conflict is worsening its industrial divide Sep 24th 2026 WAR CAN wreak havoc on any economy. But open, knowledge-based economies are especially vulnerable. International connections come under strain; the best minds can flee. Israel’s conflicts in the past three years have thus raised many fears for its prosperity. Will its skilled elite stay? Must its Palestinian labourers go? So far, however, the economic data keeps defying the doubters. Between April and June GDP expanded by nearly 15% at an annual rate. Growth forecasts for 2026 as a whole have been raised. With an election looming, Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, has been in bullish spirits. “I’m not a stockbroker,” he said in an interview with American television last month, “but I would say buy anything in Israel, because Israel is going up.”
The economy has been on a war footing ever since Hamas attacked in October 2023. GDP briefly contracted under the threat of further strikes and the removal of 200,000 Palestinians, who once manned fields and construction sites. But after this backward step, a furious scramble of activity began. Defence spending ramped up. Wages also rose as firms rushed to replace 300,000 reservists called to duty. Economists once fretted that such spending would panic investors and warp the private sector. For one tier of industries, these worries have been justified. Construction firms have found it hard to replace Palestinian labourers. Farms, retailers and consumer manufacturing have also struggled for investment. But Israel’s economy has another, more sophisticated tier. Its highly productive tech industry accounted for a fifth of GDP and half of all exports even before 2023. Since the war began, its share of exports has risen further. This higher tier of the economy also contributed nearly half of total GDP growth last year. The top tier’s success has two sources. The first is war itself. Many of Israel’s high-tech firms produce defence-related products, from cyber- security software to weaponised drones. The government procures defence- tech from at least 800 Israeli firms. And it is not the only buyer. European countries have also shown an interest, as they seek to diversify away from American suppliers. The second source of growth is artificial intelligence. Nvidia, which makes the chips that power many AI models, is a notable contributor. It purchased Mellanox, an Israeli supplier of computer products, in 2019. Since then, Israel has become the chipmaker’s biggest research hub outside America, with 6,000 employees. The combined result is that Israel’s economy has weathered the war better than expected. GDP rose by over 1% in 2024, twice official forecasts, and by 3.5% in 2025. The government thinks growth will exceed 4% this year. Israeli stocks were among the world’s best performers in 2025, rising by 51%. Mr Netanyahu’s suggestion to buy anything in Israel would have been excellent advice a year ago.
Unfortunately, the stock market is not the only thing going up. Public debt also rose from 60% of GDP in 2022 to 68% last year, as the government prioritised the urgent demands of the war over the distant claims of the future. The IMF reckons the debt ratio will not return to its pre-war level until 2040 at best. Over that horizon, other threats lurk. Israel could lose some of its innovative magic as its tech workforce atrophies. The country’s ultra-Orthodox population, whose men have low employment rates, is the fastest-growing section of society. By 2040 the group will represent over 20% of the population. Meanwhile many highly educated Israelis are contemplating lives elsewhere, especially if the country’s politics retreat further from secularism. These internal conflicts are manifest in the election campaign. The opposition has blocked some of the government’s requests for defence spending, unless the money comes from “coalition funds”, which have already been promised to ultra-Orthodox parties. It will never be easy to reconcile the triple demands of defence, innovation and devotion. Israel’s economy has coped with its military conflicts surprisingly well. But it faces other, slower-moving dangers, less kinetic and more demographic. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/09/24/israels-war-economy-is- thriving
Finance & economics | Buttonwood You can’t trade your way through the AI apocalypse It’s hard to price the threats posed by a misaligned superintelligence Sep 24th 2026 MORE THAN ever, the big questions about artificial intelligence drive the ups and downs of financial markets. The bulls, who think AI will be both transformative and lucrative, stand against the sceptics, who believe the promised returns will never arrive. But a third sentiment is now coming to the fore for investors: what if AI systems are immensely capable, as the bulls predict, but deeply dangerous? Fears about “misaligned” AI that hacks other systems, enables fraud or misleads human engineers are growing. Researchers in frontier AI labs worry that their tools could help rogue states or terrorist groups build their own bioweapons. Some think the models could result in human extinction,
which would take the shine off any future listing. It’s hard to celebrate an initial public offering that leads to a terminal public offing. Tyler Cowen, an economist, wishes the alarmists would put their money where their mouth is. Many place high odds on a catastrophe. If they are right, then intimations of doom should start affecting the markets before the cataclysm actually arrives. The technophobes could therefore test their theories by making financial trades. If they were successful, it would add credibility to their prophecies well in advance of the disaster that would ultimately vindicate them. This call for intellectual accountability is understandable. Alex Tabarrok, one of Mr Cowen’s colleagues, once called such a bet “a tax on bullshit”. But when it comes to the dangers of advanced AI, the bets can be hard to place. Some of the milder downsides of powerful AI are already being priced into markets. Concerns about AI-enabled hacking have helped lift the value of cyber-security stocks like CrowdStrike. Its price, which has more than doubled in the past six months, now stands at nearly 200 times its forecast earnings for the next 12 months. For some companies, fear, not just greed, is good. Other, untested strategies could work for more adventurous worriers. If cyber-security firms are trading at a premium, then surely the companies most vulnerable to hacking and fraud should be trading at a discount. In the private sector, the health-care, finance, telecoms and transport industries are often targeted. Small and medium-sized firms are more vulnerable than their larger rivals. One way to trade on this logic would be to buy credit-default swaps against the debt of regional banks, for example. For more conventional perils, such as floods, wildfires or even terrorism, the obvious answer would be to buy insurance products. But the market for AI risk has been slow to develop. Even the physical risks faced by data centres are tough to insure. Earlier this year, Insurance Services Office, a standards- provider for the industry, released a new template that excluded damage caused by generative AI from a wide range of claims. Several big firms have asked regulators to let them leave out such novel threats. That wariness has created a gap in the market, which a handful of startups are aspiring to fill. But for now the firms are piddling in size relative to the task.
The problem faced by insurers has deeper roots. They struggle to cover AI risks, because “risk” is too neat and tidy a concept for what is at stake. In economics, risk refers to quantifiable probabilities. The wild and woolly threats associated with AI are harder to pin down. They are new and poorly understood. The base of evidence is thin. Thus neither the buyers nor sellers of insurance know how to price them. In the long history of human pessimism, there have been many doomsayers who were fast and loose with their predictions. People who scream and shout about supply-chain collapses, hard landings or financial meltdowns could easily make money from their prophecies, if they were as far-sighted as they claim. But AI is different. At the most extreme end of the spectrum, the dangers are intrinsically unhedgeable. Even if you could calculate the chances of an existential threat, there is not much point in buying protection from counterparties that will not be around to pay up. In the case of an “AI takeover”, where humans are subjugated or sidelined, the big winners will be the AI beings taking charge as the dominant forms of life on Earth. They would make the natural counterparties in any insurance policy a doomsayer might want to buy. But even if this were possible, a superintelligence would make a tough negotiating partner. Unlike humans, they would probably read the small print.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/09/22/you-cant-trade-your-way- through-the-ai-apocalypse