scholars at leading universities. Familiar to many in China, the words are drawn from Mao Zedong’s “On Protracted War” speeches, delivered in the remote Communist base of Yan’an in 1938. Mao’s musings nine decades ago should not be given undue weight. But the protracted-war framework yields valuable insights about how China views its contest with America and offers clues to how things might develop. With Xi Jinping about to hold talks with Donald Trump in Washington as The Economist went to press, the old dictator’s words in his guerrilla days are of interest. Mao argued that in the first phase of a long war against a technologically superior adversary, scrappy revolutionaries must hunker down in defence. The next phase is strategic stalemate: the overstretched adversary can no longer advance and the revolutionary forces get better organised. Then comes the final phase, the counter-offensive, when the once-weaker revolutionaries rout the once-stronger enemy. So declaring that China and America have reached strategic stalemate is freighted with significance. No one doubts which of the two powers is to be seen as the weary incumbent and which the energetic revolutionary. The trade war started in 2018, when Mr Trump slapped an initial batch of tariffs on China. For the rest of his first term, China was on the back foot. It was not entirely quiet, hitting back at America with its own tariffs. But it settled for a lopsided deal that if implemented in full would have led to China buying far more American goods and opening more widely to American investors. In Maoist terms, the deal showed “the courage to retreat”, often necessary in the first phase of protracted war. The point of retreat is not to give up but to conserve resources for a fightback. This is precisely what China did throughout Joe Biden’s presidency. Keenly aware of where America had immense leverage— notably, in advanced semiconductors—Chinese officials redoubled efforts to cultivate domestic alternatives, no matter how expensive. They also honed their counter-attack, creating a stronger system of export controls and tightening their grip on the Chinese companies that mine and process critical minerals. When Mr Trump returned to office and cranked up tariffs, his officials were astonished by the ferocity of China’s pushback. In blocking
the exports of minerals, especially rare earths, China threatened to bring swathes of American industry to a halt. It has become commonplace to say that the superpowers have achieved rough parity in their ability to harm each other. America has computer chips; China has rare earths. Analysts call it “mutually assured disruption” or a “balance of vulnerability”, as if the two countries are, in economic terms, basically equal. The “strategic stalemate” framing gets at something more profound about this parity: to have come this far is already progress for China. One obvious question is whether Mr Xi has designs on the third stage of the “protracted war”—a full-blown counter-offensive. Last year when trade hostilities with America were at their most intense, state media urged the public to revisit Mao’s speeches, to boost confidence in China’s resilience. Yet the parallels with the great helmsman’s analysis go only so far. Most Chinese thinkers believe it is impossible to score a decisive, enduring economic victory over America. Maintaining a strategic stalemate looks like a more realistic objective. Huang Renwei of Shanghai’s Fudan University has said, hopefully, that it can last for 30 years. The trouble with a stalemate is that it may prove short-lived. Both countries want to break out of it and are seeking new ways to gain an advantage—and are alert to risks that might pin them down. Fear of being permanently reduced to an inferior position in artificial intelligence is one reason why China is reluctant to embrace AI safety regimes proposed by America. Until Chinese AI models are as powerful as America’s—ie, until they have reached a stalemate in AI—China appears unwilling to slow its AI labs down. The fragility of the stalemate also explains why China has continued to restrain rare-earth exports to America and its allies, especially Japan. If the two superpowers truly enjoyed a constructive relationship, as they claim, China could have created a transparent, efficient licensing system for global companies seeking rare earths. Instead their relationship is marred by mistrust, and China knows that throttling the supply of rare earths is the swiftest way it can discipline Mr Trump if he turns more aggressive again.
More dismally for China, another aspect of Mao’s stalemate phase also applies today. He warned it would be “a very painful period for China”, during which “pessimism will grow”. The echoes with the economic situation today are clear. A relentless focus on technological self-reliance has helped insulate China from American pressure. But Chinese people have paid the price, their income growth slowing as the state channels money into industrial capacity rather than social welfare. It resembles the economy of a country at war—and a protracted war at that. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/09/21/what-mao-can-teach-china-about-managing- america
A contentious battle in Alaska may determine control of the Senate Schools for the poor are not poor schools Donald Trump will lose his latest media battle Why licence-plate readers are angering Americans The White House may soon announce a nonsensical diesel-export ban Donald Trump’s least favourite thing As goes Maine, so goes the Senate
A contentious battle in Alaska may determine control of the Senate Democrats hope idiosyncratic politics and presidential missteps win a crucial seat Sep 24th 2026 Alaska is an unusual state with unusual politics. It is both tiny and enormous, with fewer than 740,000 people living in a territory more than twice the size of Texas. It is staunchly Republican yet politically open. The last Democratic presidential candidate to win Alaskans’ vote was Lyndon Johnson, in 1964, but the state prizes moderation. Now America’s 49th state is one of a handful that will determine if Democrats win the Senate. The Senate campaign, between Dan Sullivan, a Republican incumbent, and Mary Peltola, a former Democratic congresswoman, is a toss-up, and may become more contentious still. On September 23rd the New York Times published an investigation about Ms Peltola, alleging chaotic
mismanagement and mistreatment of her staff. Her campaign denies any pattern of abuse. The allegations are particularly jarring for a candidate whose appeal to voters was built, in large part, on her charisma and approachability. Democrats hope that Alaska’s unique political culture and the outsized impact of Donald Trump’s policies on the state will help to bolster Ms Peltola’s chances. But much depends on Ms Peltola, too. The Economist’s forecast model, which does not yet account for the Times report, puts her odds of victory at 56%. That she has even a chance is a reminder of how, in a partisan era, Alaska’s politics have remained remarkably fluid. In 2010 Lisa Murkowski, Alaska’s other Republican senator and a centrist, lost to a Tea Party candidate in the primary, then won the first write-in Senate campaign in more than 50 years. The ruling majority in the statehouse is a “tripartisan” coalition of Democrats, Republicans and non-partisans. Alaska is the only state that combines a non-partisan primary with ranked-choice voting. “When it comes down to it, parties really don’t play an important role,” says Gary Stevens, the state Senate president who worked alongside Ms Peltola in the legislature in the early aughts. Ms Peltola is a product of this environment. A native Alaskan who captained her first fishing boat at 14, she won statewide office in 2022, when she beat Sarah Palin, a former governor, to represent Alaska in Congress. Ms Peltola and Ms Murkowski endorsed each other that year. Mr Sullivan’s campaign ads try to portray Ms Peltola as a puppet for “Lower 48 liberals”, but she often bucks her party—the National Rifle Association supported her in 2024.
She is also happy, on occasion, to side with the president. Mr Sullivan argues that Ms Peltola and a Democratic Senate majority would restrict leasing and drilling in the Arctic. “My opponent would ally herself with the anti-Alaska energy groups in Congress, who will do what they always do: shut down Alaska energy,” he said in a debate on Kodiak Island on September 12th. Ms Peltola has released a pro-oil ad in which she promises that she will “work with Donald Trump to unlock more land and more development”. On other issues, Ms Peltola criticises the effect of Mr Trump’s policies on Alaska, if not Mr Trump himself. The president carried the state by 13 points in 2024, so Ms Peltola must win over many Trump voters if she is to eke out a victory. Despite the state’s oil riches, Alaskans are particularly affected by pricey fuel, which raises the cost of heating rural villages, transporting goods and people over long distances and, of course, fishing. Because Kodiak Island is a fishing hub, the entire debate was devoted to fisheries issues. Fuel “is the number one cost for all fishermen”, Ms Peltola told the crowd. “We are being priced out of petroleum, and we’re being priced out of our lives in Alaska because of the war in Iran.” In the state’s survey of Alaska’s rural