problem: he may have to pick someone with whom he has had relatively little chance to build up trust. This could cause turbulence. “Whoever is the first person that Xi picks is not going to be the last,” reckons Mr Czin (Mao and Deng both cycled through several heirs-apparent). “I’m buckling up for a pretty tumultuous period in Chinese politics.” ■ Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/09/22/chinas-communist-party-faces-a- generational-shift
China’s kids rank near the top in global school tests What if all of China’s provinces took part, not just rich areas? Sep 24th 2026 Many parents have heard of PISA, the Programme for International Student Assessment, which tests 15-year-olds worldwide on maths, reading and science. The 2025 results, released this month, were a disappointment for many countries. But the 12,385 mainland Chinese who sat the tests made their parents proud. They scored better than any other contingent in maths and science and came second only to Singaporeans in reading. Real devotees of the programme have also become familiar with another four-letter abbreviation: BSJZ. These unpronounceable initials stand for Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, the only parts of the mainland that took part. The four locations (two mega-cities and two eastern provinces) have a combined population of almost 200m. But they are sadly not
representative of China as a whole. Enrolment in academic high schools and universities exceeds national rates. And disposable income per person averages almost 70,000 yuan a year ($9,700), about 60% higher than the mainland average. In 2018 researchers at the World Bank tried to get a sense of the bigger picture. Various bits of China have taken part in PISA at different times and thus at different levels of development. That allowed the experts to calculate a link between disposable income and test scores. Since China’s nationwide income is known, the researchers could use this relationship to infer PISA scores for the whole country. The Economist has updated this approach, adding data from later assessments. The raw trendline between income and results suggests China would have scored highly even if every province had taken part. Its extrapolated maths score of 579 would still have been world-beating. But caution is required. Most countries performed worse than hoped in 2025, perhaps because of the lingering effects of the covid-19 pandemic or technological disruption to learning habits. Even the students from Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang did worse on reading than in 2018. And
their scores on other subjects did not improve as much as you would expect given income gains. That suggests some kind of break in the trend. The simplest way to adjust for this break is to drag the pre-2025 trendline down so that it aligns with the actual 2025 results for the four rich places that took part. By that yardstick China as a whole would have scored 536 on maths. Although lower than BSJZ’s actual result of 612, the country would still have ranked fourth worldwide. China’s average score across all three subjects (501) would have placed it seventh, much higher than you would expect given its economic level (see chart). China is not the only country that enrolls only some of its kids in PISA. Iraq is represented only by its Kurdish region; Tajikistan by its capital city, Dushanbe. But if our calculations are roughly right, China should welcome countrywide participation. Let China be represented by China. And let BSJZ pass into PISA history, as hard to remember as it is to say.■ Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/09/24/chinas-kids-rank-near-the-top-in-global- school-tests
Is China easing some online censorship? It doesn’t want free speech, but it does want to know what’s going on Sep 24th 2026 “Treating differing voices as floods and terrifying beasts is a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of governance,” would be an unsurprising homily from a liberal newspaper in a democracy. From the actual source, Qiushi, the Chinese Communist Party’s main theoretical journal, in September, it is positively startling. Other party outlets have been sounding similarly enlightened. “Wherever energy is spent on targeting the commenter and blocking channels of speech, almost without exception the result is an even greater crisis of trust,” said China Youth Daily, run by the Communist Youth League, in July. Some officials “seek only silence in public discourse, not the resolution of problems, and habitually block and delete posts instead of solving issues”, China Comment, a magazine run by the country’s official news agency, Xinhua, also weighed in that month.
Is China going through one of the post-Mao era’s occasional phases when liberals in the establishment push back against conservatives through articles like these? Far from it. Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, liberals have been all but silenced. And censors have been as frantic as ever of late in their efforts to scrub the internet clean of grumbling about officialdom. In July news turned viral online of a parking-space dispute between an ordinary citizen and a cadre. The censors deleted suggestions that an inquiry may have been rigged in the official’s favour. The police are ever vigilant, too. Dare to post a message online that the death toll in last month’s flash flood on the Nepal-China border was higher in China than reported? Seven days in jail for that. A system that brooks no dissent is behaving true to form. But China’s leaders do sometimes worry that censorship can go too far. Overly tight restrictions on everyday moaning, they suggest, can make it harder to get the feedback they need to improve government behaviour and thereby defuse public grievances before they explode on the streets. In China, calibrating how much censorship to apply is an art that officials often struggle to master in a way that pleases their bosses. In recent months several articles in state media have implied that many are not doing it right. Officials would be correct to think that Mr Xi prefers them to err on the side of caution when deciding whether to censor. “Unhealthy discourse can become a narcotic for the public, a social divider, a soft knife that kills and a catalyst for unrest,” he told media bosses a decade ago. But Mr Xi may now want some fine-tuning. Examples of over-censorship given by the media imply that his concerns relate to the deletion of comments that reflect badly on local officials. There is no hint that he wants to encourage criticism of the party, let alone of himself. China Comment cited several examples of excessive twitchiness by officials, such as their blocking in May of a person’s social-media account for posting a complaint on a local tourism department’s account about the cleanliness of seating at a concert. Another involved someone who last year posted a video online of a woman trying to assert her right of way on a narrow road by flashing her husband’s law-enforcement credentials. Police put pressure on the citizen to delete the footage. He did so, but later reposted an edited version that drew 10m views.
Mr Xi will hardly be surprised by such stories. Local governments often go to great lengths to prevent higher levels from learning about their mistakes. During Mr Xi’s rule, many authorities have used the achievement of “zero public-opinion [incidents]” to assess whether officials are fit for promotion. “The obsession with zero public opinion has given rise to a bizarre and inverted approach to handling public complaints, resulting in multiple deep- seated governance problems with significant harm,” thundered an article on the website of the party’s main mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, in July. Local officials, however, will remain cautious. ■ Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/09/23/is-china-easing-some-online-censorship
What Mao can teach China about managing America An insurgent power has fought the incumbent to a stalemate Sep 24th 2026 TRADE WAR. Tech war. New cold war. All of these shorthand descriptions for frayed Sino-American ties have an air of foreboding. Not so the label that the two countries agreed on earlier this year, at China’s urging. They are now officially in a “constructive relationship of strategic stability”. If that fails to set your pulse racing, the cumbersome phrase has succeeded: it is meant to signify a calm approach for managing the superpowers’ tensions. More candid, and more alarming, is how many thinkers in China now describe its relationship with America. Instead of strategic stability, they call it a “strategic stalemate”—a loaded term in China, evoking not diplomacy but a struggle for the upper hand. Among those to do so recently: advisers to the Chinese cabinet, researchers under the Ministry of State Security, and