swapped armoured vehicles for nippy jeeps with the doors removed, the better to leap out quickly. “Sometimes they walk up to 20km carrying everything on their backs, so if they hear a drone it’s easier to hide.” But soldiers cannot rely just on their ears for early warnings. “Ambush drones” lie in wait on known routes, sometimes on roofs or behind bushes, rising to strike unexpectedly. Both sides turn to robotic vehicles, trundling to and fro with gear, food and water, or ammunition. Soldiers alongside such a robot mule know drones may swoop to destroy it—and them. Both sides are operating drones ever farther into the enemy’s rear, trying to starve supply lines. Step down into the well-hidden operations centre of “Nemesis” drone battalion and a hushed, businesslike effort is revealed. Camouflaged material drapes the walls. The unit flag bears the black-and- white logo of a sci-fi alien face. Pilots and navigators sit together like gamers, clad in T-shirts and armed with controllers, hunting for targets well behind the front, in Russian-controlled territory. On screen, a road bridge comes into view, spanning a lush tributary. A Russian lorry already burns there, and the drone settles itself between some trees, waiting for another to pass by. In these open hunting grounds it can be difficult to spot military traffic, as the Russians use civilian lorries. “We never hit the cabs,” claims Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, the bearded commander of the Unmanned Systems Force, a group of dedicated drone specialists that includes Nemesis. They have been using these tactics to try to isolate Russian-occupied Crimea. Magyar explains the campaign from his basement suite, which features a Metallica pinball machine and a coffee-table copy of “On War” by Carl von Clausewitz. “Crimea is the jewel in Russia’s crown,” he says, describing how Ukraine’s efforts weakened Russia’s forces, especially early on. Since then, the Russians have adapted defensively, patrolling the same beats with mobile anti-drone units, and with a far higher density of communications jammers. Now the enemy forces are building equivalent offensive operations of their own. Piloted drones at this range most often rely on a satellite-based data connection. For Ukraine, it is Starlink. Troublingly, Russia has developed local jamming techniques and is rushing to establish a copycat constellation
called Rassvet. In the meantime Russia is using a “mesh” network of radio relays between drones. They base it around long-range Geran drones, more commonly called the Shahed, after their Iranian-designed parent. These relays can reach only about 200km into Ukrainian air space, but within that range piloted drones can hunt moving targets, not just home in on pre-set co- ordinates. Trains are a favoured target. Previously attacks focused on stationary trains that were carrying military materiel. Now the Russians are coming after all locomotives, including city commuter services and, recently, a railway station close to the border with Poland. The head of Ukraine railways, Oleksandr Pertsovsky, speaking from his own command centre, says his trains are in essence “swimming with sharks”. Then there is Russia’s progress with long-range attacks. Ukraine’s deep strikes (see chart 1) against Russian oil refineries and logistics centres belonging to Wildberries, an e-tailer, have impressed some. But Russia is striking inside Ukraine with greater reach and at a vastly greater scale (see map). Two further dismaying developments are helping Russia along. The first is that old propeller-driven Shaheds are being replaced by ones powered by jet
engines, probably imported from China. Ukraine’s ground-based defences— mostly machineguns and shoulder-fired missiles—can barely cope with such swifter, higher-flying assailants. Fighter aircraft, such as Ukraine’s F-16s and MiG-29s, can destroy them, but they lack ammunition or, being older second-hand models, are often abroad for expert maintenance. That leaves ground-based interceptors, but Ukraine lacks the sort to do the job. Sacrificial quadcopter drones cannot catch the jet-powered Shaheds. Prototypes have been devised to meet the challenge. One test-launch video shows something closer to a missile than a drone. That is a big demand on testing and engine design. It raises unit costs. Even if rushed into service (unlikely before winter), boosting production will take hefty financing and at least six months. By contrast, Russia’s production target for jet Shaheds is reportedly 24,000 for 2026; a Ukrainian source suggests they have used only 1,000 so far. The second development is Russia speeding up its production of ballistic missiles. By one estimate it can launch over 100 of all types every month. Ukraine has little answer, especially given its very low stocks of American Patriot interceptors.
Ukraine is trying to build a home-grown equivalent to the Patriot, based on a ballistic missile being developed by Fire Point, a local firm. But it is unlikely to produce anything usable for a long time, perhaps several years. This is even trickier than hunting jet Shaheds. Intercepting a ballistic missile requires marrying complex radars, data uplinks and hypersensitive missile guidance. Ukraine’s mil-tech industry is growing in leaps and bounds, but it cannot solve this within months. Nor does Ukraine have the leeway—in particular, access to Starlink inside Russian-held territory—to “strike the archer” (that is, the mobile launchers) rather than the arrow. So Ukraine’s war prospects are mixed. Soldiers, whether in subterranean command centres near the kill zone or sipping tea in city cafés, say they can hold firm at the front. Under a youthful new commander-in-chief, Mykhailo Drapatyi, “This is no longer a small Soviet army fighting a big Soviet army,” says Oleksiy Honcharuk, a former prime minister who now chairs Nemesis’s expert council. They do not fear another round of Russian troop mobilisation either, as many in Kyiv do. “More Russians to kill,” one coldly concludes. But the same officers are troubled by the wider overall fight across Ukraine. For four-and-a-half years front-line heroism and air defences had kept Ukraine’s main cities running. A resilient domestic economy had provided the government with tax revenue and given citizens a sense of normality. Russia’s latest phase of total war has ended that.
Ukraine is short of money. Its military materiel bills are rising. Direct Western funds for the armed forces are too little to meet this year’s needs. Russian weapons are tearing through a number of Ukraine’s largest corporate taxpayers. They have shut down massive steel plants in cities like Kryvyi Rih and Zaporizhia; steel output in August was 60% lower than a year ago (see chart 2); this month will be worse. Supermarkets, e-commerce and the postal service have been hit hard, with warehouse capacity in the capital down by as much as 80%. On the road from Kyiv towards the front, this is plain to see. Petrol stations have green barrier nets and sandbag bastions around storage tanks. Warehouses lie agape, blackened by explosions. Russia is also seeking to choke Ukraine’s ability to move goods and people. Strikes on the railways have destroyed more than 250 locomotives this year alone; that damage has been mitigated by repairs, but the rail network could come under severe strain later this year. Petrol stations are bombed daily, with those that fuel lorries quickly singled out. Most damaging of all, Russia in effect closed Ukraine’s deep seaports in Odessa in July. That has meant a significant share of this year’s harvest risks going unshipped; last year Ukraine’s agricultural exports accounted for more than 10% of Ukraine’s GDP (see chart 3). With domestic prices depressed
and storage likely to fill up by December, some of Ukraine’s biggest agriculture outfits are questioning whether to plant at all next season. All this is before the winter hits. In some respects, Ukraine is better prepared than it has ever been to cope with the Russian onslaught. Its energy infrastructure, long a favoured target for Russia, has been hardened with Western help. Even so, Russian strikes will occasionally cause huge power cuts, probably more than last year. Several large cities, especially Kyiv, are especially vulnerable since they depend on large central-heating plants that are impossible to protect fully. If, as last year, local power generation is destroyed, Kyiv could become an electrical island, dependent on a handful of fragile choke points. One is the large 750kv substation in Makariv, west of the city. With that node working, Kyiv would get roughly 16 hours of daily electricity; without it, perhaps only four. Last winter, whole districts survived weeks in freezing temperatures after Russia destroyed nearby heating plants. This year, the fear is also that food, water and especially sewerage will be messed up. “This city can collapse,” says a Western diplomat. A Ukrainian official expects “absolute hell” by October. “They will torment Kyiv,” he says. Russian propaganda campaigns will seek to divide and enrage the people. “They will use fatigue, exhaustion and other factors to try to create a tragedy.”
The unease is palpable. Since the appearance of jet drones in the city on August 27th, daily life has been interrupted. Businesses are closing several times a day during air-raid alerts. Commuters are stranded when the metro and buses stop. Schools are sending kids home or moving classes underground; others are considering closing for the winter. Parents debate the possibility of sending children to western parts of the country—or even abroad. Every family that leaves reduces the tax base and labour force, already depleted by roughly a million people serving and a similar number hiding to avoid the draft. It is not all bad news. The increasingly home-made weaponry is giving the economy a leg up. Almost half of Ukraine’s top-20 taxpayers are military- technology firms. These firms are also decentralised and harder to hit. In time, they may become the new export champions. But the wartime economy is starting to show signs of stress. Falling export earnings will put pressure on the hryvnia, which could force the central bank to burn through some of its reserves, currently at just under $50bn, to stabilise the currency—or raise interest rates. On September 12th Serhiy Koretskiy, the new prime minister, estimated that just the first few weeks of the Russian surge would deprive the government of 70bn hryvnia ($1.6bn) in tax revenue. That comes on top of higher military spending. In August Mr Zelensky surprised European backers by asking for help to fill a $27bn hole in the military budget. Analysts at Dragon Capital, an investment firm, have raised their overall deficit forecast for this year by $4bn-9bn. Next year looks no better. The finance minister, Sergii Marchenko, says Ukraine in 2027 Ukraine will need $32.6bn in foreign finance more than what has already been promised.