extremely unlikely—for the first time since 2023. The move in the 30-year has been even larger, pushing that yield above 5.35%, at a time when budgetary interest payments have risen sharply and now consume around a fifth of tax revenue. America is funding its budget deficit at borrowing costs not seen in two decades or so, while refinancing maturing bonds issued at much lower rates in a debt stock that has doubled to $40trn in just ten years. The effects are being felt beyond the budget, including in politically sensitive areas such as mortgages, where the average 30-year rate is now over 7%. This aggravates the top issue on voters’ minds ahead of the midterm elections: affordability. It also raises corporate borrowing costs and risks diverting capital away from a stock market that has been rewarding investors with a series of record highs this year. No wonder Mr Bessent was keen to intervene. On August 19th he announced that he would target longer government bond maturities through what’s known as a “twist”: buying back these bonds by issuing very short- dated ones or, though this has not been officially confirmed, using the $1trn that sits in the Treasury General Account, which is meant to be for cash management. The rationale for this unusual intervention has evolved as criticism of it has grown. It has been characterised at different moments as reducing yields, improving market functioning and compensating for summer illiquidity. Underpinning this is the “fever” notion: that the spike in yields is a temporary and reversible phenomenon that intervention can help address. Some of the reasons behind the surge in yields are consistent with this interpretation. The problem for the Trump administration, though, is that they are not the fundamental drivers. As such, it is far from surprising that yields continued to surge even as the Treasury on September 9th went beyond what it had initially indicated on bond buy-backs. The surge in energy prices, including Brent crude above $100 a barrel and the domestic price of diesel at over $6 a gallon, a record, is seen as a contributor to the recent market moves; so is uncertainty about the Federal Reserve’s independence and “reaction function”, ie, how it adjusts policy in response to economic changes. As the administration expects these to fade over time, it sees a bridging intervention as warranted. Yet these factors have merely

accentuated an existing phenomenon rather than being materially responsible for it. Market pricing of inflation and Fed credibility, which points to the former being contained and the latter holding up, tells us as much. The most important driver of higher yields lies elsewhere and is unlikely to be temporary. It reflects a fundamental imbalance between the demand for bond financing and the ability to meet that demand without elevated yields. The demand for bonds has been turbocharged by the need to fund a large increase in corporate capital expenditure, much of it related to the development and application of artificial intelligence. This has led financiers to require greater compensation. This higher demand comes at a time when historically reliable buyers and holders are less so. China has been reducing its holdings of Treasuries amid high geopolitical tensions. Gulf states are redirecting resources to domestic needs, including rewiring supply routes and reconstruction. Japan’s intervention in its currency markets involves selling American securities to raise dollars to buy yen. And the Norwegian sovereign-wealth fund, also a traditionally long-term holder, is reconsidering its exposure to Treasuries. The resulting imbalance is cleared at higher yields unless demand collapses and the economy weakens substantially, which is not in America’s interest. AI’s productivity promise raises the hope of the type of sustainably higher economic growth that can help improve debt ratios and income distribution. Unleashing this potential while mitigating the risks is not just an economic priority but also a national-security one. Rather than experiencing a fever, the market is trying to make room for promising investments that can materially enhance the wellbeing of this and future generations. The right policy response is to help create space for new capital expenditure. This means less borrowing by the government to fund deficits and the reversal of policy moves, such as the excessive weaponisation of trade, investment and the payments system, that push away foreign investors. Repeated rounds of market intervention, conversely, risk causing greater volatility, contaminating the dollar, increasing the risk of systemic financial instability and causing economy-wide resource

misallocations. They could also threaten the global standing of Treasuries and the dollar. What is at stake goes beyond the ability to profit from a transformational innovation while limiting its collateral damage and unintended consequences. What happens in America with bond yields and AI does not stay there. Its implications are felt internationally, at a time when the global economy has already lost much of its physical, financial and human resilience. It is time to stop thinking of higher Treasury yields as an aberration. They are a loud call for the adjustments needed to unleash, in a more orderly fashion, much stronger productivity and growth.■ Mohamed El-Erian is a former chief executive of PIMCO. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2026/09/14/bond-markets-arent-just-running- a-temperature

Briefing · Briefing | The empire strikes back

Russia has entered a new phase of total war Ukrainians are feeling the heat Sep 17th 2026 LIFE IS NEWLY, intensely, disrupted in Kyiv. Wailing sirens and screeching apps that warn of incoming strikes are common sounds all over. Explosions at petrol and railway stations, shopping malls, offices and apartment blocks are a constant backdrop. Some reports suggest there is a new exodus of families from the capital to safer parts west. Ukrainians in the capital had grown accustomed, if not entirely inured, to the vicissitudes of life in wartime—air-raid alerts, missiles, blackouts and bouts of freezing cold due to Russian attacks on power plants. But the arrival at scale in late August of jet-powered Shahed drones—and a rise in Russian missile hits—wreaked a new level of fear and devastation. Russia’s ramped- up deep-strike capability, combined with a dearth of Ukrainian interceptors, has once again brought the front line closer to the people of Kyiv.

A team from The Economist saw, during a recent reporting trip in the country, how the new phase of the war has put stress on Ukraine physically, psychologically, economically and politically. Your correspondents also learned just how routine close encounters with strike drones have become; they were near enough to feel a drone explosion in the street of one front- line city. Even before the blasts occur, it is an unnerving experience to stare up at the black, triangular shape of a Shahed drone, as it swoops and whines overhead. It is unclear what respite Ukrainians can hope for from diplomacy. Early this month Donald Trump’s envoys—Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner—paid their virgin visit to the Ukrainian capital. That was on the heels of a briefing by Vladimir Putin in Moscow, where the two Americans have become somewhat regular visitors. Sources with knowledge of the pair’s lengthy talks with Volodymyr Zelensky suggest a proposal for a limited technical arrangement could emerge in the next few weeks. Mr Trump is keen to blame Ukraine’s attacks on Russia (rather than his war in Iran) for high global prices of diesel. A window for discussions may exist after the charade of Duma elections in Russia on September 20th, and ahead of America’s midterms in November. Mr Trump may hope to brag to voters that he has cut a deal focused on the Black Sea, easing the blocked exports of Russian oil and of grain from both Russia and Ukraine. Trilateral talks involving America, Russia and Ukraine may happen in Abu Dhabi in early October. All that would be welcome—and Ukraine is holding some cards. The European Union is united behind it. There is no prospect of America pushing for an entirely pro-Russian settlement of the sort raised at last year’s summit in Anchorage (“Alaska is dead,” a senior official in Kyiv says with a smile). But it would be fantasy to hope for anything like a wider peace or ceasefire. Mr Putin will not countenance pausing his assault before next spring, at the soonest. Ukraine will fight on and will continue to inflict enormous pain on Russia. On the front line and in the areas 200km behind it, arguably it has the upper hand. The battle for territory is not static, but it is clearly not progressing to Mr Putin’s liking—a net gain of perhaps 100 square kilometres this year, or

just 0.017% of Ukraine’s pre-2014 territory. A Ukrainian source puts confirmed Russian dead at 600,000, and estimates Ukraine is killing 22,000- 23,000 Russians each month. Add the seriously wounded, and Russian losses are probably running above the current recruitment rates of 30,000- 31,000. (Ukrainian sources also fear that reinforcements from North Korea are on the way.) The war is not in pure stalemate. The stasis on the map obscures a Darwinian struggle of innovation and adaptation. And in an era of drones and missiles, the balance of fortunes behind the front also matters hugely. Here, in the long-range fight, Ukraine is in trouble. Going into the winter, Russia has the lead in both production and technology of long-range weapons. Where the war was once split between contested battle lines at the front and the weary but mostly safe cities farther back, drone innovations are now blurring the distinction. It is becoming harder to know where the battle area starts and stops. Take the front itself. It is made up not of consistent trench lines but a contested band of territory 40-80km wide, generally known as the “kill zone”, where all movement is perilous. If soldiers are spotted, the sky above teems night or day with small remotely piloted first-person-view (FPV) hunter drones. A Ukrainian soldier describes how the Russians have