However, she offers no clear timeline, nor much hint of who will stump up the staggering amounts of cash such an expansion would require. And the deal comes with warning lights flashing red. First, it was negotiated with an illegitimate regime that stole the most recent election. Second, Mr Trump’s chosen private partner, Alejandro Betancourt, NABEP’s boss, is reviled by some in Venezuela for the moral flexibility that let him get rich working with the regime. Third, Mr Trump will surely enrage Venezuelans with his imperialist bragging: on September 1st he said he would take all of the country’s oil. Any future, freely elected government of Venezuela might question a deal which gives America so much control of the country’s oil. That fact will make investors hesitate. Oil majors remain wary, though Chevron, which was already in Venezuela, has just announced a separate $7bn investment. Worse, cash and tax revenue from the deal create incentives for powerful people to block Venezuela’s transition to democracy. Mr Betancourt, who is well-connected in both Caracas and Mar-a-Lago, has every reason to whisper to Mr Trump that a rush to free elections could spoil his oil bonanza. Ms Rodríguez will no doubt reinforce this message. In background briefings American officials insist that Venezuela’s transition to democracy will continue. And some within the administration, such as Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, clearly understand that a democratic Venezuela is both desirable and in America’s interest. So there is still hope. America could in theory use its power over NABEP to press for transparent competition in Venezuela’s oil industry. This, in turn, would allow the opposition to campaign on a platform that does not undermine the deal. But all this depends on Mr Trump. Ominously, in public he has started to refer to Ms Rodríguez as Venezuela’s “president-elect”. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/09/02/donald-trumps-venezuela-deal-is-bold- but-dodgy
Yoweri Museveni’s decline is putting Uganda on a terrifying path It faces the prospect of a worse despot or a messy power struggle Sep 3rd 2026 UGANDA HAS never been an easy place to be a dissident. Since taking power at the head of a rebel army 40 years ago, Yoweri Museveni, the president, has restored order to a country drenched in blood, overseen robust economic growth and ruthlessly suppressed challenges to his rule. Of his two main opponents, one, Bobi Wine, lives in exile. The other, Kizza Besigye, is in jail and on trial for treason; in July he collapsed in court. In January Mr Museveni won a sham election marred by thuggery and ballot- stuffing. Yet as the president, who is 81, grows frailer, Ugandans have begun to worry less about what he will do next, and more about what will happen when he is
gone. As potential successors jockey for position, Uganda is a reminder of how nasty things can get when an ageing autocrat starts to lose his grip. Once known for punishingly long work days, Mr Museveni has lately been spending less time at the office. He has cancelled engagements at short notice and appeared shaky in public. Stunts to demonstrate youthful vigour, such as a brief jog down a red carpet during last year’s election campaign, have fooled nobody. As the leader fades, those around him are stepping up. Salim Saleh, Mr Museveni’s brother, is thought to handle much of the day-to-day governance from behind the scenes. Other relatives have increased their influence, too. Most worrying is Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the president’s son and head of the army. He has called himself the future president and a descendant of Jesus. As he throws his weight around, repression in Uganda is growing more intense and less predictable. General Kainerugaba is notorious for his unhinged (and often quickly deleted) social-media posts, ranging from boasts about his sexual appetite to ethnic slurs and threats to kill or castrate opponents. His father used to curb his antics. One post in 2022—in which the general said it “wouldn’t take us, my army and me, 2 weeks to capture Nairobi”—briefly got him sacked from his army position. (Mr Museveni apologised to Kenya, a friendly, bigger neighbour on whose ports Uganda relies, for the unprovoked threat to its capital.) As he ages, though, the president seems less able to rein in his son. In June the general sent the army to occupy Uganda’s biggest private media outfit. (It reopened after weeks of negotiations.) He has ordered the abduction of dissidents. In late August he had his men kidnap an associate of his own brother-in-law, gloated over the man’s mistreatment and threatened to arrest the brother-in-law, too. What will happen once Mr Museveni leaves the scene? Even government insiders have started talking darkly of a return to the days of Idi Amin, a mass-murdering military dictator in the 1970s. That is not likely, but the future still looks bleak. The general could take over from his father and impose a capricious, vengeful and ethnically charged despotism on Uganda.
He could also exacerbate the conflict in the east of the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo, where Uganda has meddled in the past. He has a close relationship with Congo’s main enemy, Rwanda. Others in Mr Museveni’s inner circle and in the armed forces may try to stop his errant heir. A power struggle or even a violent split in the army might ensue. Some younger officers are loyal to the general; others are appalled by him. Veterans of the civil war are devoted to the father but wary of the son. In theory, the passing of an autocrat could create space for free elections that Mr Wine or Mr Besigye might even win. In reality, that is unlikely. Mr Museveni came to power at a time of democratic resurgence, when many other African countries ditched military dictatorship for multiparty democracy. Back then, Western donors sometimes used their influence to promote human rights. Now, by contrast, coups occur with impunity and plenty of leaders who won power democratically are looking for undemocratic means to hang on to it. Uganda’s plight should serve as a warning to its peers: without real elections to refresh the faces at the top, expect trouble as autocrats age. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/09/03/yoweri-musevenis-decline-is-putting- uganda-on-a-terrifying-path
In many countries, the biggest barrier to prosperity is in the home A less sexist world would be much richer Sep 3rd 2026 All around the world, women have struggled for equal treatment in the workplace. But in some countries the struggle is more basic: to be allowed into the workplace at all. In an experiment, married mothers in Egypt were offered free or cheap child care near where they lived, to make it easier to go out and find jobs. Only 11% took up the offer. The obstacle, for many, was husbands who thought it wrong for women to work outside the home. And although 90% of Egyptian women disagree, the weight of tradition can be hard to defy—as can the literal heft of a reactionary husband. In much of the Middle East, north Africa and South Asia, many men believe their family’s honour depends on female seclusion. They fear that if a wife
goes out to work any farther away than the backyard vegetable plot, she might meet a man to whom she is not related and bring disgrace on her kin. This backward belief may be enforced with threats. In India violence against women is so normalised that nearly 40% even of women think a husband is sometimes justified in beating his wife. In Mali the figure is nearly 70%. Such attitudes make whole populations poorer. In South Asia only a third of women are in the labour force; in the Middle East and north Africa, only a fifth are. Since 1990 the share of labour income that accrues to women has risen from 35% to 44% in liberal France; in patriarchal Pakistan, from 1.5% to a still-woeful 9%. Removing the barriers to women working would raise income per person by a fifth in many countries, estimates the World Bank— a bigger economic benefit than avoiding a typical civil war. That is more than enough reason to care about female seclusion. But there is another. When women earn, the balance of power at home shifts. The Economist analysed data from 27 countries and found that, after correcting for how sexist a country is and how well-off a household is, women who work for pay have more say on everything from how to divvy up the family budget to whether they can go and visit a friend without asking their husband’s permission. Paid work, in short, makes families more equal. So opening the glass front door should be a priority in all countries where it is currently shut. Alas, it has several complicated locks. The first key to insert is legal. By the World Bank’s count, 540m women live in countries where formal equality before the law is not merely imperfect but “distant”. Yet even the most sexist laws can be scrapped, as Saudi Arabia has shown. Before a series of reforms that started in 2011, women there were barred from all but a handful of jobs and not even allowed to drive. Now they are free to work, drive and shun the hijab if they choose. The share of women in the labour force has nearly doubled since 2010, from 18% to 34%. That is startling progress for a kingdom many thought hopelessly stuck in the past— even if there is still a long way to go. Another key is social norms. These are often assumed to be intractable, yet history shows they can change rapidly. Until 1975, British banks could refuse a woman a mortgage if she lacked her husband’s consent; until 1997, Germany did not criminalise marital rape. Since then British and German