Mr Siegmund, whose slogan is the sunny “Everything is possible!”, hopes to become the first right-wing nationalist leader of a German state since the second world war. The AfD is set for a big win over the ruling Christian Democrats (CDU) on Sunday (see chart). Depending how many other parties cross the 5% threshold, it could secure a majority alone. If it falls short Mr Siegmund has other routes to power, perhaps via CDU defections —although he insists to your correspondent that he has no interest in that. Supporters in the crowd dismiss allegations that the party has dark designs. “The AfD is not radical, it just stands for freedom of opinion,” says Heike Schmidt, a local. Yet its plans for Saxony-Anhalt, laid out in a 258-page governing programme, are among the most sweeping ever produced by a party with a credible chance of taking office. They amount to a vision for a new sort of state, one party officials see as a blueprint for the rest of Germany. But they are also uncosted and in places unserious. Some proposals, such as abolishing the right to asylum or restoring relations with Russia, are not in the gift of state governments. But plenty are. Start with education. The AfD wants to remove disabled children and the children of refugees from regular classrooms, which experts say violates European and international law. It wants more Russian-language teaching, and to restore exchanges with schools in Russia. It aims to remove the Schulpflicht,

or obligation to attend school, so that distrustful parents can educate their children at home. The AfD would rewrite curricula to excise wokery and celebrate historical German achievements. Hans-Thomas Tillschneider, the state party’s chief ideologue and principal author of its manifesto, argues that Germany’s culture of condemning the Nazi past has induced a national “identity disorder”. “More Bismarck, less Hitler” is the remedy. The AfD detests Germany’s universities in their current form. Mr Tillschneider has called academic humanities the “legitimising whores” of social change. The party wants to restructure university governance, to withdraw from European standards for granting degrees and to establish a chair of demographic studies and an institute for “critical Islamic studies”. It will struggle to achieve much of this: academic freedom is constitutionally protected. But since universities are largely funded by the states, an aggressive government could apply financial thumbscrews. Mr Siegmund has promised to replace the public broadcaster, long a bugbear of Germany’s populist right, with a “neutral” alternative. The AfD’s programme takes aim at Saxony-Anhalt’s slogan #moderndenken (“think modern”) and its celebration of the 20th-century Bauhaus architectural movement, based in Dessau. The party sees Bauhaus as just the sort of deracinated culture it wishes to eradicate. Its alternative approach, #deutschdenken, emphasises the achievements of Martin Luther, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Holy Roman Empire, and proposes “patriotic tourism concepts”. Yet getting all this done assumes a degree of competence that many, even inside the AfD, suspect is lacking. German states require hundreds of officials and staff, and bar a couple of towns and districts the AfD has no governing experience. Two of Mr Siegmund’s closest aides once belonged to a neo-Nazi youth group; unpromising material for running a state. A “Black- Red-Gold” academy set up last year is training party cadres in administration, and the AfD has sought advice from Austria’s populist-right Freedom Party, which has joined governments at both the state and national level. But this does not seem equal to the task. Fiscal constraints will also hold the AfD back, notes Petra Dobner of the University of Halle. Saxony-Anhalt, a poor state of 2.1m people, owes

around €25bn ($29bn) and relies on huge transfers from the rest of Germany. The AfD’s programme, which includes lavish promises for child care and school meals, would leave an annual financing gap of €2.2bn, according to the Halle Institute for Economic Research. Perhaps in acknowledgment, the AfD’s recent 100-day governing programme focuses on symbolic matters like putting up German flags and scrapping gender-neutral language. Yet organisations in the party’s crosshairs are not complacent. Universities, judges and NGOs have for months been drafting strategies to prepare for an AfD government. Earlier this year Saxony-Anhalt lawmakers changed their rules for electing judges and the parliament’s president. A big fear is that the AfD could push through endless anti-constitutional measures in the knowledge that courts would take years to overrule them, sapping adversaries’ morale. The prospect of an AfD government is concentrating minds elsewhere in Germany. Noting the party’s cosiness with Russia, interior ministers in the 15 other states have been mulling how to exclude it from some intra- ministerial discussions. Georg Maier, the interior minister of Thuringia, favours erecting “Chinese walls” to ensure crucial national-security information is not shared with the party’s ministers. The AfD also fears opposition from the “deep state” within Saxony-Anhalt. Mr Siegmund says he would seek to replace up to 200 state employees, and has threatened “administrative measures” against others who stand in his way. The party may make a handful of political appointments, and can fire some officials. It will surely dismiss the head of the state’s intelligence service, who in 2023 decreed the Saxony-Anhalt AfD “right-wing extremist”. Most civil servants cannot simply be fired. But Friedrich Zillessen, a legal scholar who works on judicial resilience in the state, notes that an AfD government could find other means: attrition as civil servants retire, promoting friendly figures or creating a culture of intimidation. Saxony-Anhalt is hardly a model of health. It has the highest median age among Germany’s states and some of its worst poverty. The AfD promises to replace “culturally alien” professionals by seducing Germans who have left the state to return. But its policies seem likely to have the opposite effect. Talk is rife of workers who might leave if the AfD takes office.

Outsiders, especially foreigners, who might otherwise have been tempted to come will surely think twice. The AfD has even vowed to reject its share of a national infrastructure fund established last year by Friedrich Merz, the chancellor. “What happens when all of us leave because we can’t stand it here any more?” asks Sophie Jungnickel, a manager for a local business. Plenty of the AfD’s foes seem inclined to quietly let Mr Siegmund mess up, hoping a mishap in a small state will remove the party’s sheen of invincibility. Residents of Saxony-Anhalt feel differently. “It’s easy to say these things in Berlin or southern Germany,” says Lennart Birth, a political activist who recently left the state. “But not for those who have to live with it every day.”■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/08/31/how-the-alternative-for-germany-would- govern

Europe · Europe | An orca-eat-bear world

Cornered, Vladimir Putin plans to escalate his war His refusal to back down is rooted in Russia’s gangster politics Sep 3rd 2026 On August 29th at a university in Moscow, Vladimir Putin observed that orcas feed on polar bears. “That’s the food chain,” Russia’s president stated. “Children should be taught about this, so that they understand what kind of world we live in and why we are conducting the special military operation”—ie, Russia’s war on Ukraine. The claim was fanciful: there is no known case of an orca eating a polar bear. But it provided insight into the Russian president’s predatory worldview. Recently NATO countries have become increasingly concerned about the direction Mr Putin’s thoughts are taking. Russia’s army has been largely stalemated for years. The war has become a contest of drone and missile attacks that, while devastating to Ukraine, are damaging Russia too. But Mr

Putin is not backing off. The worry is that he may try to escape from a tupik (dead end) as he has in the past: by finding some new way to escalate the conflict. On August 25th John Ratcliffe, the director of America’s CIA, unexpectedly flew to Moscow. Accounts differ on whether he went to warn Mr Putin not to attack NATO countries, or to deliver a bleak assessment of Russia’s prospects and persuade him to negotiate. Three days later Finland requested the help of Swedish aircraft and warships in monitoring its border with Russia for incursions. On September 1st Germany openly blamed Russia for a drone attack at Leipzig’s airport on August 4th, and imposed some trifling sanctions. In late August Romania destroyed a Russian naval drone that targeted a drilling platform in its waters, and Slovakia foiled an arson attack on a drone factory. Meanwhile Mr Putin has ended his silence over Ukraine’s drone attacks on Russian refineries and e-retailer warehouses. In an address on August 22nd he accused Ukraine of opening a “Pandora’s box” and promised “blowback on the most sensitive sectors of your economy”. Earlier that day he dismissed any notion of ending the war: “The special military operation continues.” Sources close to the Kremlin say that, after several weeks of consideration over the summer, he has chosen to escalate. Indeed, a longtime associate of Mr Putin says he is likely to have seen Mr Ratcliffe’s visit as a sign of American weakness. That, the source said, was the president’s interpretation of the visit to Moscow in November 2021 by Bill Burns, Joe Biden’s CIA director, to warn him against invading Ukraine. No one can know what is inside Mr Putin’s head. But his reasons for escalating, like the decision to invade, are internal. His key objective has always been preserving his own power, and ultimately his life. One concern for the Kremlin is the evaporation of the public’s silent assent for the war. Deep strikes by Ukrainian drones, along with internet restrictions, have shattered the veneer of normal life. The Levada Centre, an independent pollster, says 57% of Russians describe the situation as “tense”;