The strategy of backing Arab militias dates to the 1980s, when Iran sent its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to train Hizbullah fighters in Lebanon. It saw such groups as a substitute for its weak conventional army: they would serve as forward defence, projecting power while keeping conflict away from Iran. The defence clearly failed. The Hamas-led massacre on October 7th 2023 started a cascade of wars that ended with Iran itself being attacked. Hizbullah and Hamas are badly weakened. Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria has gone. The Iraqi government has ordered militias to disarm by October. Some regime foes hope that Iran will have to curtail its support, perhaps to facilitate a deal with America, and trigger the collapse of the axis. That is unlikely. The militias are wounded but alive, and the strategic rationale for supporting them is stronger than ever. Yet the axis may also struggle to rebuild itself as a consortium: the parent company in Tehran is bankrupt, and many of its subsidiaries are poorly run. A likelier outcome is that its constituent parts survive but diverge. Some will become Iranian wards, held tightly but used sparingly. A few will graduate from the axis. Others will emerge as strays: clients that might have

somewhere else to go. Counter-intuitively, Iran will exercise the tightest control over groups that have suffered the greatest blows to their capabilities. Take Hizbullah, once Iran’s most feared proxy. Until 2023 it had an arsenal of more than 100,000 rockets and missiles aimed at Israel and a well-trained commando force that had honed its skills fighting to save Mr Assad’s regime. Hassan Nasrallah, its charismatic leader assassinated by Israel in 2024, saw himself as a peer rather than a proxy. He was a true believer steeped in Iran’s revolutionary ideology, but tried to preserve some autonomy. No longer. Naim Qassem, Nasrallah’s successor, is an unloved middle- manager. Israeli strikes have killed many of the group’s experienced commanders. The Lebanese government insists that Hizbullah must hand over its diminished arsenal. With so many commanders dead, the IRGC sent its own men to Lebanon to exercise direct control over the group, leaving it little choice but to start another war with Israel in March. At the same time, its domestic popularity has collapsed. Iran will preserve Hizbullah less for what it can do than for what its loss would signal. At the other extreme are the Houthis, the most independent-minded of Iran’s allies. They started as a local insurgency in northern Yemen in the 1990s. It would be decades before Iran offered significant financial and military aid. When it came, it vastly improved their capabilities. Once derided as barefoot gunmen, Houthi fighters now wield anti-ship missiles to harass vessels in the Red Sea and air defences to shoot down American Reaper drones.

Yet the Houthis continue to guard their autonomy. Their involvement in the post-October 7th wars has waxed and waned, based more on their own interests than Tehran’s. They are increasingly able to produce their own weapons and are forging their own alliances, for example with al-Shabab, the al-Qaeda affiliate that controls much of Somalia. Houthi delegations have visited Russia and held talks with China. Iran and the Houthis will continue to find common interest: both loathe America, Israel and Saudi Arabia. But that is not the same as taking orders. In between are the strays. Many Shia militias in Iraq are a by-product of the American-led invasion in 2003, after which Iran poured weapons and money into the country to bleed its American foes. Two decades later their priorities have changed. Iran remains an ally, but their main patron is the Iraqi state, which has more than 200,000 militiamen on its payroll. Some militias did launch attacks on American bases earlier this year, but they worry that open conflict with the Iraqi government or its allies would jeopardise their position. The IRGC is said to have sent advisers to Iraq to establish small cells tasked with attacking Gulf states, a sign that the bigger militias were reluctant to do so.

Hamas was always an awkward fit in the axis, a Sunni group in a largely Shia bloc. It fell out with Iran over the latter’s support for the Assad regime in Syria. Khalil al-Hayya, its newly appointed leader, is considered a loyal Iranian ally, but other officials would prefer a pivot towards Sunni powers, namely Turkey and the Gulf. In March Hamas urged Iran to halt its attacks on Gulf states. Iran will not abandon it—support for the Palestinians is central to the regime’s identity— but its support may be more rhetorical than material. Even if Iran wanted to rebuild all its allies, its resources are limited. The war has caused hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of damage. America is blockading its ports and tightening sanctions on its economy. The fall of Mr Assad’s regime also severed the land route to Lebanon. Iran will need to prioritise. In some ways, the fate of the axis may mirror that of Soviet client states in the 1980s, when Moscow could no longer afford to offer them generous support. This is an imperfect analogy, of course. Moscow’s allies had a rival superpower to turn to, while Tehran’s face a messier board: some have a range of possible partners; others, none at all. Still, the Middle East’s most ambitious conglomerate may be heading for a restructuring. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/09/03/irans-proxies-are- going-their-own-way

Middle East & Africa | Horses for coalitions Binyamin Netanyahu sows discord ahead of Israel’s election The campaign is entering a new phase Sep 3rd 2026 TROJAN HORSES seem to be everywhere this summer. Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, has featured one in a campaign video for Israel’s parliamentary election on October 27th. In the ad, an AI-generated Gadi Eisenkot, a former general now leading the polls, rides the horse. Lurking inside are Mansour Abbas and Yair Golan, two other opposition leaders. Mr Netanyahu’s message is crude—and clear: Mr Eisenkot can win only by joining forces with Mr Abbas’s Arab-Israeli Ra’am party and Mr Golan’s Zionist-left Democrats. Yashar, Mr Eisenkot’s centre-right party, has overtaken Mr Netanyahu’s Likud in The Economist’s poll tracker. But he

will need to woo a range of partners to form a government—as will Mr Netanyahu. Mr Eisenkot’s growing popularity among centre-right voters, Likud’s constituency, is unsettling Mr Netanyahu’s party. Hence it is trying to taint Mr Eisenkot by association. Smearing the Arab parties, which represent over 20% of Israel’s population, is an old tactic. Mr Netanyahu has repeatedly labelled them “terror supporters” and accused Ra’am of being an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood (though he has not been above trying to elicit Mr Abbas’s support when desperate). Efforts to do the same to a Jewish and Zionist party are new. A decade ago, when Mr Golan was deputy chief of staff of the Israel Defence Forces, he likened what was happening in Israel to “horrifying processes that occurred in Europe” before the Holocaust. More recently, during the war in Gaza, he said that “a sane state does not wage war against civilians, does not kill babies as a hobby, and does not set goals for itself like the expulsion of a population.” Mr Golan’s opponents are now using these quotes to depict his party as radical and non-Zionist, and therefore unfit for government. But so far the polls are not moving in Mr Netanyahu’s favour, and none of the main opposition parties has ruled out governing with the Democrats. When it comes to including an Arab party in the next government, however, Likud has managed to split the opposition. Mr Golan is the only one openly in favour. All his potential partners are either adamantly opposed to working with the Arab parties or have been evasive. In public Mr Eisenkot has said he will consider governing with any party that accepts a vague set of principles. But he would rather lead a minority government, however unstable, than include Israel’s Arab representatives. Though his alliance of hard-right and religious parties may not be capable of winning a majority, Mr Netanyahu is already dictating the terms by which his rivals will try to form a coalition. His campaign is pushing Mr Eisenkot towards harsher nationalist positions; the latter recently ruled out the possibility of accepting a Palestinian state if he were to govern. He may

struggle to form anything better than a short-lived government bound to policies not unlike those of the outgoing one. Mr Abbas, one of the canniest politicians in Israel, is the only Arab-Israeli leader to have ever joined a ruling coalition. In 2021 he supported a government led by Naftali Bennett, a right-wing politician who is running again this year. Mr Abbas claims the other Arab-Israeli parties, which are running together on a joint list, are refusing to make the necessary compromises to be in government and effect change. To boost his chances of joining a government again, Ra’am will field its first Jewish candidate this year. Yoav Segalovitz is an unlikely pick for a party dominated by conservative Islamists. A secular centrist, Mr Segalovitz’s main attraction is his former career as a police investigator. One of Mr Abbas’s priorities is to get the police, currently under Itamar Ben-Gvir, the leader of the ultranationalist Jewish Power party, to take seriously the bloody wave of gang violence afflicting Israeli Arabs. But he also wants to make Ra’am more palatable to Jewish parties. Mr Segalovich could help. Like Mr Netanyahu, Mr Abbas is not only trying to win votes, but to change the terms of coalition-building. Rather than languish as a hidden passenger within the Trojan horse, Mr Abbas wants to ride it. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/08/31/binyamin-netanyahu- sows-discord-ahead-of-israels-election

· Europe

How the Alternative for Germany would govern Cornered, Vladimir Putin plans to escalate his war Haakon VIII, Norway’s new king, has a big crown to fill EU enlargement hits an Icelandic snag Tiny Montenegro still hopes it will be the EU’s next member America has a whopping debt. But Europe has the whopping debt problem

Europe · Europe | Populists in power

How the Alternative for Germany would govern If it wins its first state, ideology in schools and broadcasting is just the start Sep 3rd 2026 IT IS A horribly hot afternoon in the market square of Zerbst, a small town in the east German state of Saxony-Anhalt, but Ulrich Siegmund’s grin barely slips. For three hours Mr Siegmund (pictured), lead candidate for the populist-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Saxony-Anhalt’s election on September 6th, signs t-shirts and takes selfies with fans who have endured long waits under the blistering sun. There is no trace of the resentment that once typified AfD rallies. “This is not a party, it’s a movement!” beams Phillipp-Anders Rau, the local AfD hopeful.