“Betancourt is probably the most controversial person you could do this deal with,” says a person with connections to Venezuela’s oil industry. “He’s associated with the fact that we have one of the worst electricity services in the world.” Mr Betancourt, who has been investigated in Europe for money- laundering, has consistently denied all wrongdoing and has never been convicted of a crime. A US official calls him a man “who knows how to run this business” and pointed to his proven record in raising production in the three oilfields that his company already controls. The American government insists that the deal with NABEP will involve no investment of public money. It therefore falls to the company itself to raise the $100bn it says is needed to quintuple its oil production to one million barrels a day. The fact that the US government has a stake in the firm, it is hoped, will give potential investors the security to commit. The Trump administration is meanwhile pushing hard on many fronts the notion that Venezuela is ripe for investment. On September 2nd Mr Trump’s energy secretary, Chris Wright, was in Caracas for an announcement that Chevron, the only oil major to have remained in the country throughout the turmoil of the past quarter of a century, plans to invest $7bn in the next five years, in a deal separate from the NABEP one. But no other international oil company has made a similar commitment. Several have unhappy memories of Venezuela, losing billions when their previous joint-venture contracts were rewritten under the Chávez government in 2007. Another source of their hesitation may be the question-mark still hanging over the durability of contracts. If a future democratic government comes to power, will it honour agreements forged under pressure with a government widely deemed illegitimate? “It will be a fiasco for all involved,” said Ricardo Hausmann, a former Venezuelan planning minister. That in turn leads to a further troubling prospect. Both the Trump administration and the Rodríguez regime perhaps now share an incentive to stall democracy, given the risk it presents to their mutually cosy arrangement. “As the deal takes shape, the opposition’s role and influence could increasingly fade,” says Imdat Oner, a Turkish former diplomat who served in Caracas. Already, the Trump team has strongly discouraged the popular opposition leader, María Corina Machado, who left Venezuela to

travel to Norway to collect the Nobel peace prize last year, from returning home. She has remained conspicuously silent about the deal. The American official roundly rejects this, insisting that the Trump administration is rescuing Venezuela’s economy in advance of a future election. The plan is for the next government to inherit a country with a solid economic foundation, not one in crisis, so as to be better able to move beyond the catastrophe of the past 25 years. “A stable democracy, a stable republic, that can conduct elections on a repeated basis,” says the official. Maybe. It was a Venezuelan energy minister who, in 1975, described oil as “the devil’s excrement”. Perhaps no deal involving the black stuff—let alone any nation-building—was ever going to be clean. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2026/08/29/america-has-laid-claim-to-a- fifth-of-venezuelas-oil

The Americas · The Americas | The bad boy of Brazilian politics

The presidential candidate Brazil’s authorities tried to ban Renan Santos, a fast-talking liberal with a rock band, models himself after Argentina’s Javier Milei Sep 3rd 2026 Editor’s note (August 31st): Shortly after this piece was published, José Antonio Dias Toffoli, a Supreme Court justice who also sits on Brazil’s Electoral Court, suspended the candidacy of Renan Santos. Mr Toffoli said that the Santos campaign had failed to register its social-media handles correctly. The Santos campaign said it would appeal .RENAN SANTOS is cocksure. “I am the greatest orator of my generation in the world,” he claims in his small office, only half-jokingly. He has boasted of learning fluent Swedish in order to chat up girls on an annual pilgrimage to Europe that his friends have dubbed “the blondes tour”. He

writes off his rivals as “infantile”, “pathetic” and “mediocre”. Yet for all his bragging, Mr Santos is no charlatan. The 42-year-old is running to become Brazil’s next president on a wonkish platform that sketches out a bold vision for the country. Mr Santos’s rise has parallels with that of Javier Milei, Argentina’s firebrand president. Like Mr Milei, he is obsessed with free-market economics. In 2014 he founded a political group, the Free Brazil Movement (MBL by its Portuguese acronym), to advocate a minimal state in a country with a long tradition of big government. Like Mr Milei, Mr Santos mixes his dogmatism with rock music, fronting a band that extols the virtues of competition and low taxes. (Mr Santos claims to be the superior musician. His aide says both politicians’ bands are “equally awful”.) And like Mr Milei, Mr Santos is a political outsider. Name recognition came after he organised mass protests against the government of Dilma Rousseff, a left-wing former president who was impeached by a hostile Congress in 2016. Only in 2025 did MBL register as a political party, under the name Missão (Mission). It has one congressman in office, Kim Kataguiri. As well as Mr Santos’s presidential run, the party is fielding 57 candidates for Congress in Brazil’s general elections in October. Walking into the Missão offices reveals a project focused on cultural revolution as much as political power. The entrance is littered with copies of Revista Valete, the movement’s magazine, which has run features on Elon Musk and critiques of Judith Butler, a queer feminist philosopher. The mood is more startup than party headquarters. Programmers type code furiously behind large black screens, while down the corridor is a studio to shoot snappy videos for dissemination to the movement’s mostly male 4m online followers. The focus on media is a response to “wokeism”, says Mr Santos. The rise of cancel culture “required responses that classic liberalism didn’t have to offer”, he explains. Many millennials like him, he says, went from supporting gay marriage and legalising drugs to “being labelled a fascist because you don’t want to use certain pronouns…or are expected to accept that a child can change their gender.”

But the cultural battle “is not our core identity”. Mr Santos distances MBL from Donald Trump’s MAGA movement. Economics remains its most important cause. The movement was spurred towards new thinking by “the failure of a childish form of economic liberalism” influenced by American libertarians, he says. “It is naive to think that if you remove the state from all activities and privatise everything, things will fix themselves. The state must be present in many areas, especially in a country like Brazil,” with gaping inequalities. The party now believes that companies such as Petrobras, Brazil’s state-owned oil firm, should not be privatised, but that the government’s influence should be reduced. Mr Kataguiri, who oversees the party’s economic proposals, calls this “pragmatic, non-dogmatic liberalism”. Mr Santos wants to turn Brazil into a great power within 30 years through deep structural reforms. The transformation is sketched out in the party’s “Yellow Book”, a 350-page manifesto which applies lessons for Brazil from successful public policies around the world. Mr Kataguiri travelled to Denmark to study its patent laws and to Japan to learn about its system of evaluating local governments. Germany’s apprenticeship system, China’s infrastructure spending and the United States’ light-touch approach to AI regulation all feature. “We definitely don’t want the EU model, which is more obsessed with controlling and regulating than with developing its own AI,” says Mr Kataguiri.

The result is a policy programme packed with new ideas for Brazil. Missão proposes digitising patient health-care records and using AI to improve triage and reduce queues at public hospitals. A new law would create performance targets for local politicians on education, health care and access to sewerage. Officials who hit targets would be eligible for more money from the federal budget; persistent underperformers would be threatened with a temporary prohibition from holding office. AI would be used to recommend cuts to public jobs. “There is no limit to how AI can be used to improve administrative efficiency,” gushes Mr Kataguiri. Mr Santos is frank about the need for spending cuts. Over 90% of Brazil’s federal budget is tied up in mandatory spending, particularly pensions. The share is growing relentlessly as many pensions and several welfare benefits are indexed to the minimum wage, which rises automatically with inflation and GDP growth. By 2029 discretionary spending is expected to comprise an unworkable 0.1% of the budget. Missão proposes de-indexing pensions and benefits and tying spending on education and health care to inflation rather than revenues, which are growing fast. Cuts to lavish civil-servant salaries would follow, and a pension reform. All this, hopes Mr Kataguiri, would make room for growth-boosting infrastructure investments, which he wants to double to 4% of GDP. When it comes to security, populism trumps liberalism. One of Mr Santos’s slogans is “Prendeu, Matou” (“Catch, Kill”), referring to how he believes police should treat criminals. He frequently praises Nayib Bukele, El Salvador’s strongman, who has reduced crime by locking up 2% of the country’s adult population and trampling over democracy. (Mr Santos claims to be “Bukele in style, Milei in substance”.) He promises to call states of emergency and allow a “bloodbath” against gangs. The Yellow Book extols “the doctrine of the enemy”, a controversial legal theory which argues that some criminals do not deserve civil rights. In practice it could be easily abused by an executive bent on repressing its political enemies. Mr Santos has been polling in the single digits, but his willingness to propose bold ideas is winning him prominent backers on the Brazilian right. Many are disheartened by the candidacy of Flávio Bolsonaro, a son of Jair Bolsonaro, a populist former president who is serving a 27-year sentence for attempting a coup. “Flávio is extremely weak,” says one Santos supporter.