dummy corporation”. The Post later reported that Mr Gordillo, the co- chairman of the city chapter of the DSA, studied art and literature at Yale; that he was fired from an electricians’ union apprenticeship programme for failing to show up; and that his mother drives a silver Porsche. Other leftist piñatas for the Post have included Tracy Rosenthal, who advocates abolishing rent and whose father is a successful music producer. (“Anti-rent radical and Mamdani pal who is ‘squatting’ in Brooklyn is Grammy nepo baby”.) The Post has branded Grace Ryan, “a 25-year-old chocolate heiress from Ohio”, as “one of the most shameless” members of the DSA for posting pictures of herself on social media “puffing a cigar on a boat in a $400 Ralph Lauren stars-and-stripes sweater”. To the Post’s unmistakable glee, Ms Ryan, who worked during the primary for a successful left-wing congressional candidate, defended herself on X by writing, “Like have y’all never heard of noblesse oblige?” This is an old game. Since Karl Marx relied upon Friedrich Engels not just for his ideas about communism but for his textile fortune, lefties have fattened upon fat cats, and righties have made fun of them for it. From the start, socialism has also, for certain bourgeois faddists, radiated a subversive glamour. More rigorous socialists have seen this as the ideology’s Achilles’ heel. “The worst advertisement for Socialism is its adherents,” grumbled George Orwell in “The Road to Wigan Pier”. The typical socialist was either “a youthful snob-Bolshevik” or “a prim little man with a white-collar job” who had “vegetarian leanings” and, above all, “a social position which he has no intention of forfeiting”. Yet Ms Ryan has a good point about noblesse oblige. She may never live like common people, but why should that bar her from trying to help them? Doesn’t it beat the alternative, a chocolate heiress in a $400 sweater who is indifferent to the plight of less fortunate Americans, if not out to screw them? Here, amid the posturing, one arrives at something that may matter: an emerging distinction between the two periods of lefty activism becoming known as Woke 1 and Woke 2. Any such distinctions must be fuzzy and provisional, since few Democrats have had the decency to explicitly repudiate radical positions they once embraced. Some have shrugged off

former excesses, as when Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez quoted another Democrat saying “Woke 1 was crazy!” and then laughed as though every American was in on the joke. Some have tried to redefine the slogans, insisting that “defund the police” did not mean defunding the police. Others have not retreated; time will tell whether they are the vanguard or the dead- enders. Still, some time between Donald Trump’s second inaugural address in January 2025 and Mr Mamdani’s first inaugural the next January, America’s left began to shift its emphasis, from race and gender to class. Pick your causes or effects, whether the illiberal ideas that stampeded from the academy into social media; the rise of Mr Trump; the #MeToo movement; or the death of George Floyd under a policeman’s knee in 2020. These combined to concentrate the left on racism and gender bias. Identity became destiny. The poorest white person had privileges denied to the wealthiest black one. In theory the social-justice movement focused on policing; in practice it became obsessed with other preoccupations of America’s multiracial elite, such as preferential admissions to top schools. For prim little people with white-collar jobs, calling out advantages based on race became a way to prove enlightenment; so did disdaining the deplorables who voted for Mr Trump. Any true Marxist would have seen a classic attempt to split the working class, but Democratic leaders embraced this divisive politics. Then came new effects and new causes. Kamala Harris lost in 2024 and Mr Trump demonstrated growing support among non-white working-class voters. Mr Trump cracked down on diversity, equity and inclusion programmes and the Supreme Court struck down race-conscious admissions. Democratic activists became outraged by injustice in Gaza instead of in America. Perhaps most important, Mr Mamdani won with an inclusive message about making life more affordable—as did moderate Democratic candidates for governor in Virginia and New Jersey. For all the duelling between progressives and moderates, their agendas overlap when it comes to the precariat, if not the proletariat. From Georgia to Alaska, Democrats are all economic populists now, calling for higher wages, lower prices and more affordable health care. Victims and villains are judged not by the colour of their skin but by the content of their bank accounts. Billionaires are the bad guys, and in the capacious definition in use

across the Democratic spectrum, anyone who works to pay their bills is working-class. This may not, in the end, revive the Democrats, let alone rescue struggling Americans. But if it does, the party will have at least some youthful snob-Bolsheviks to thank for helping remind it of the sorts of things it once stood for. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/united-states/2026/09/03/woke-1-was-about-identity-woke- 2-is-about-class

· The Americas

America has laid claim to a fifth of Venezuela’s oil The presidential candidate Brazil’s authorities tried to ban A prawn superpower rises

The Americas · The Americas | The devil’s business

America has laid claim to a fifth of Venezuela’s oil The deal could give both countries reason to forestall a democratic transition Sep 3rd 2026 It was a typically Trumpian announcement. On August 28th the American president announced what he called “the biggest oil deal in world history”, an agreement he said would give America “majority control” of more than 65bn barrels of Venezuelan crude, around a fifth of the country’s vast proven reserves. He described Delcy Rodríguez, Venezuela’s unpopular leader, as the “Highly Respected Interim President of Venezuela”. Ms Rodríguez joined in the mutual obsequiousness, offering her “deepest gratitude” to Donald Trump for a deal she said would contribute to “our country’s economic growth”.

Mr Trump says the arrangement “more than doubles” American oil reserves. That is misleading. The United States, whose own reserves stand at around 46bn barrels, has not been “gifted” 65bn barrels of Venezuelan oil—as Mr Trump has claimed. Instead, via the Pentagon, it is taking a 35% stake in the parent company of a private oil producer, North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP). The Venezuelan government has granted NABEP concessions over 14 oilfields, as well as three it already runs. According to the White House, America will have the right to buy 20% of NABEP’s future production at cost, and will have first refusal for its remaining output. It will also have veto power over the appointment of any member of NABEP’s board of directors, the majority of whom must be US citizens. The Trump administration says the contract will be for 100 years and bring in more than $200bn in royalties and tax revenue for the Venezuelan state. The Venezuelan regime says the deal runs for just 25 years. Mr Trump relishes the deal’s imperialist connotations. “To the victor go the spoils,” he said on September 1st. That referred to the raid carried out on January 3rd by American special forces to nab Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro and his wife in Caracas, Venezuela’s capital, and fly them both to the United States, where they face drug-trafficking charges. Mr Trump suggests that once the “spoils” of that action—a large chunk of Venezuela’s oil—are in American hands, it will diminish the relevance of Middle Eastern oil, bring down fuel prices for American consumers and make Venezuela rich. The reality is a lot more complicated. Significantly increasing production from Venezuela’s decrepit oil industry will take years. It is a rusting relic of what it once was after two decades of mismanagement and corruption under the administrations of the incompetent regime led by Mr Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chávez. “Venezuela will be completely irrelevant in terms of the global oil market price for the next year or so,” says Francisco Monaldi, a Venezuelan oil expert at the Baker Institute at Rice University in Houston. Then there is the snag that Mr Trump is striking an agreement not with Venezuela, but rather its unelected leadership led by Ms Rodríguez, Mr

Maduro’s vice-president, who has chosen to work with Mr Trump rather than suffer her ex-boss’s fate. On the streets of Caracas the main complaint is not that the deal is a colonialist grab by the United States, but that it props up a regime which Venezuelans voted out by a thumping majority in 2024. (That election, with the connivance of Mr Maduro’s cabinet, including Ms Rodríguez, was stolen). “This is all being done behind the people’s back, by people who are illegitimately in power,” says Xiomara, as she queues to fill her car with petrol. That sense that Mr Trump is working with the latest incarnation of a rejected cabal is amplified by his choice of business partner. NABEP is controlled by Alejandro Betancourt, one of a group of Venezuelan businessmen who made fortunes on the back of lucrative contracts during the chaotic heyday of corruption under Mr Chávez. In Venezuela his name is forever tainted by an enormous contract granted to one of his previous companies by Mr Chávez in the early 2000s, to upgrade state electricity power plants. Venezuela’s political opposition called that deal over-billed and under-fulfilled, pointing to power cuts that plague the country to this day.