Russia. They booted out French and American troops and UN peacekeepers before launching brutal campaigns against the militants. America’s bases in Niger, which had been used to gather intelligence, have been closed. According to American defence officials, the Sahel has become an “intelligence black hole”. The Trump administration wants to shake things up. Richard Michaels, the State Department’s deputy Africa chief, said on April 30th that America had drawn a line under open-ended commitments. AFRICOM, its command structure in Africa, talks of stricter “prioritisation”. This suggests America will move away from what Aneliese Bernard of Strategic Stabilisation Advisors, a consultancy in Washington, calls “soft approaches” to counter- terrorism—such as improving relations between soldiers and local communities—towards the hard sort, such as drone attacks. Sure enough, America has stepped up air strikes, most obviously in Somalia, where it has cut funding for its special forces and reduced the number of anti-militancy initiatives. At the same time AFRICOM has increased bombing raids on jihadist groups. Insiders say the threshold for military action has fallen, as has the level at which authority to approve strikes is delegated. In December America also conducted its first-ever air strikes in
Nigeria, after Donald Trump claimed Christians there faced religious persecution. For now, America has no plans for offensive air sorties in the Sahel. But the Trump administration has been feeling out the juntas about resuming co- operation. Last year America shared intelligence that helped the Malian army conduct strikes on jihadist leaders. In February it sent a top State Department official to the Sahel to discuss normalising ties. Soon after, it lifted sanctions on three Malian officers, including the (now deceased) defence minister. A deal would let America resume flying intelligence- gathering aircraft and drones in Malian airspace. America also wants to open up economic opportunities for investors. The region’s mineral resources include gold, lithium and, in Niger, significant deposits of uranium. Flagship Gold Corp, a mining firm based in New York, struck a deal with Mali’s state-owned miner in October. This week American officials for the first time brought a delegation from Burkina Faso to SelectUSA, an investment summit in Washington. All this suggests a more nakedly transactional approach to curbing terrorism in Africa. “They are asking: who is the strongman here and who might work with us?” says James Barnett of the Hudson Institute, an American think-tank. But the region’s strongmen do not look eager to partner with America. JNIM’s recent attacks in Mali underscore the dangers of relying on Russia. The Malian rank-and-file are said to be growing frustrated with their Russian allies. Yet Assimi Goïta, Mali’s military leader, may be “doubling down on the current strategy”, says a Western diplomat in Bamako, the capital. His first public appearance since the attacks was at a meeting with Russian officials. JNIM’s successes in Mali also highlight the flaws in America’s current approach. The Sahelian juntas, despite their brutality, are struggling to defeat jihadism and provide the security needed for American investment. Mr Goïta, in particular, might not remain in post much longer. At Flintlock, American officers talk of supporting co-operation between west Africa’s armies and training them to respect human rights and the rule of law. Such ideas, always under-emphasised in counter-terrorism efforts, are even more
unfashionable in the Trump administration. But they could prove more fruitful than grubby deals with failing strongmen. ■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//middle-east-and-africa/2026/05/07/mali-shows-the- growing-strength-of-jihadism-in-the-sahel
Friedrich Merz can’t go on like this Why Swedish schools are going unplugged A Ukrainian strike on a Russian oil hub causes catastrophe Trump’s threat to withdraw troops is serious for Europe Germany claims it has the world’s best bread Inside the Brussels deep state
Friedrich Merz can’t go on like this His one-year-old government looks exhausted, and voters are tiring rapidly May 7th 2026 IT IS A sunny spring morning in Salzwedel, a picturesque town of half- timbered houses and cobbled streets in the east German state of Saxony- Anhalt, and people have come to shout at Friedrich Merz. Outside the cultural centre where Germany’s chancellor has agreed to take questions from locals, farmers and others protest against his energy policies. Inside, a skin-cancer victim upset about proposed changes to screening rules complains that politicians feather their nests as ordinary folk suffer. “The chancellor only talks around the issues, he offers nothing concrete,” says Thomas Becker, an entrepreneur angry about red tape and aid to Ukraine. He wants new elections.
Mr Merz, who took office a year ago, is not without achievement. Even before becoming chancellor he pushed through constitutional changes to enable massive investments in rearmament and infrastructure. Mr Merz’s coalition—which unites his centre-right Christian Democrats (cdu) and their Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (csu), with the Social Democrats (spd)—has approved reforms to welfare, tax, energy and, most recently, health care. The sting has been drawn from a bitter debate over irregular migration as numbers have tumbled (albeit largely due to events outside the government’s control). And notwithstanding his recent spat with Donald Trump , Mr Merz has restored a sense of vitality to German foreign and security policy. Yet, as the event in Salzwedel suggests, Germans are fed up with the chancellor. Although Mr Merz never commanded Germans’ affection, now just 13% say they are satisfied with his work and only 11% think his government is doing a good job. The cdu/csu has slid in polls to just 23% since winning last year’s federal election with 29%. The SPD is in even worse shape; it was hammered in two recent state elections and languishes on 13%. Meanwhile, the populist-right Alternative for Germany (afd) has opened a polling lead (see chart), despite endless scandals and squabbles. It hopes to
take power for the first time when Saxony-Anhalt votes in September. Mr Merz still talks a good game, relishing his self-appointed role as a teller of unvarnished truths to a struggling country loth to accept change. But with three years of his term to run, he cuts an ever-lonelier figure. As he admitted this week: “The crisis narrative has taken on a life of its own.” What has gone wrong? Mr Merz’s well-documented flaws—failure to grasp detail, a short temper and a tendency to speak before thinking—do not help. (He ticked off his ill critic in Salzwedel rather than sympathise with her.) A deeper problem is his shaky grip on the political machinery he oversees. The chancellery is disorganised and badly co-ordinated with cdu/csu mps. Lars Klingbeil, the vice-chancellor and spd co-leader, enjoys a decent rapport with Mr Merz but struggles with his own rank-and-file. Politicians’ speeches may hit the right note, but fail to become policy. Big promises, such as last year’s “autumn of reforms”, fizzle. A pall of exhaustion hangs over the government. mps from the governing parties tend to offer more-in-sorrow-than-anger laments about their partners’ failings. There is something to this. spd lawmakers have cried foul over minor changes to social-security rules. Last year a caucus of young cdu/csu die-hards threatened to torpedo a pension change they said was unaffordable. The government’s slim majority of just 12 makes it easy for renegade mps to exert outsize influence. Isabel Cademartori, an spd mp, describes a “baffling disconnect in perception” whereby both governing parties believe their respective leaders have surrendered everything to the other lot, limiting space for the compromises needed to oil a coalition’s wheels. This is partly because governing has become a grim drumbeat of cuts, crisis management and painful reforms. The government recently halved its economic-growth projection for 2026 to just 0.5%, owing, in part, to the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, but also the sluggish pace of domestic reforms. Germans, as Mr Merz often notes, work fewer hours than those in almost any other country in the oecd, a club of mainly rich countries. Ballooning social-security costs and high marginal tax rates are hardly incentives to work harder. And German industry is buckling under the twin assaults of American protectionism and Chinese mercantilism. “The real
problem is that we can’t say that things will be better in three to four months,” says Reinhard Brandl, a csu mp. Troublingly, bigger battles lie ahead. The governing parties are scrapping over how to fund a proposed tax cut for low- and middle-earners. Bar defence, almost every ministry must slash spending before next year’s budget is finalised. The biggest drama, predict insiders, will be over the public-pension system, which gobbles up a quarter of the federal budget. After an official commission reports in late June, the government will have to find a way to trim €4bn ($4.7bn) from its pension bill, and battle lines are being drawn up. “The reform debate suffers from one big defect: this country needs a vision but doesn’t have one,” says Stefan Kolev, the head of the Ludwig Erhard Forum, a think-tank. So grim is the mood that Mr Merz has had to push back hard against the growing number in his ranks who want to blow up the coalition, either by calling an early election or governing alone with ad hoc majorities. That is unlikely, since in both cases the biggest beneficiaries would be the afd. And optimists may yet be found. “When we do our job properly, our support will rise again,” insists Mr Brandl—perhaps more in hope than expectation. ■ To stay on top of the biggest European stories, sign up to Café Europa, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//europe/2026/05/06/friedrich-merz-cant-go-on-like-this
Why Swedish schools are going unplugged Nordic pupils are returning to books and pens May 7th 2026 When Cecilia Rosenbaum saw a book-spine staircase where the vertical part of each step was adorned with colourful stickers showing “Peter Pan”, “Charlie and the Chocolate Factory” and other titles of beloved children’s books, she decided to copy it for her school. The principal of Montessori Mondial Kungsholmen, a grundskola (mandatory nine-year comprehensive school), is on a mission to get her charges to read more. During break, books are brought out to the park in front of the school. Each day starts with 15 minutes of reading in class. One day a week the teacher reads aloud for everyone. Once the country with the world’s highest literacy rate, Sweden’s reading standards have declined of late. In 2022 (the latest available data) Sweden’s