Revolutionary Guard Corps (irgc) vanished when Israel killed the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on the first day of war. His son and successor, Mojtaba, is conspicuously absent. Formal authority rests with a 12-member National Security Council (NSC) which includes a posse of generals. In reality, the generals—all veterans of Iran’s eight-year war with Iraq—dominate. “It’s a soft revolution,” says an Iran-watcher. Immediately after the ceasefire, pragmatists seemed to be ascendant. The most prominent, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf (pictured), a former irgc commander who is now speaker of parliament, flew to Islamabad as chief negotiator. He typifies a generation of veterans who have entrenched themselves in Iran’s conglomerates, hobnob with oligarchs and have a stake in preserving Iran’s industrial base. As Tehran’s mayor, he did more property deals than Mr Trump, boasts an Iranian businessman. It earned him a reputation for money-seeking and corruption. Mr Qalibaf remains sympathetic to the pleas of businessmen who counsel against escalation. Bombardment has crippled pharmaceutical, steel and petrochemical plants and stripped many workers of their jobs. The naval blockade is compounding the damage. The rial has more than halved in value since last summer’s war. With stockpiles dwindling, the price of essentials has soared. Economists expect inflation in goods to hit services, too. Mr Qalibaf would prefer to steer around the blockade while preserving the ceasefire. His ties to both the irgc and commerce give him access to smuggling rings on the border. Formal overland trade has surged since the Gulf closed. Iraq and Turkey—already key trading partners—have become more vital still. Commerce with China, Iran’s biggest market, is being rerouted by land. Pakistan has opened six new crossings; traders speak of Gwadar, in Pakistan, as an alternative to Jebel Ali, a vast port in the United Arab Emirates (uae). Iran is trying to send some oil to China by rail. Small boats zip across the Caspian Sea, bound for ports in Russia and Turkmenistan. Build two walls from New York to Los Angeles, suggested Mr Qalibaf on social media recently, and their length would still fall about 1,000km short of Iran’s total frontiers: “Good luck blockading a country with those borders.”
Yet he faces stiff opposition. “There’s a power struggle within the irgc,” says another Iran-watcher. The speaker’s most fearsome opponent is Ahmad Vahidi. A career soldier, former defence minister and the current head of the IRGC, he represents the hardliners. “He’s an end-of-days man,” says a former Israeli intelligence officer who worked on Iran, a reference to the Shia millenarianism that some reckon guides him. Mr Vahidi believes America will only tighten the noose. Iran should resist while it can. The current economic hardship, he argues, could spark renewed unrest of the sort seen in January. “They’re not sure they can survive another round of protests,” says a manufacturer. War, by contrast, would keep people indoors —and could rally some behind the regime. If the hawks prevail, escalation will follow. Local commanders would revert to the tactics adopted at the war’s outset, reinstating a prepared list of targets. Strikes on tankers could resume, keeping Hormuz closed. They might also do the same in the Red Sea. American warships and Gulf cities could come under more fire. Iran’s bitterest local foe seems to be the uae, which now hosts Israeli hardware and personnel. But Qatar remains a potential target, driven by grievance over its gas extraction from South Pars, a field it shares with Iran. “People are underestimating the power of Iran in the region,” says Reza Bundy, an Iranian-American asset-risk manager. “They’ve barely begun to roll out the escalatory system they have prepared for the last 40 years.” ■ Sign up to the Middle East Dispatch, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop on a fascinating, complex and consequential part of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//middle-east-and-africa/2026/05/07/diplomacy-or-more-war- irans-leaders-are-split
Middle East & Africa | Out of sync Arab rulers have little sympathy for Iran Their people are not always so hostile May 7th 2026 The rulers of the Arab world, its emirs, kings and generals-turned- presidents, have done their best to tell their people what to think about the American-Israeli war with Iran. State media churn out denunciations of unprovoked Iranian aggression. People who express sympathy for Iran have been arrested and in some cases charged with treason. The region’s leaders have dusted off old Arab tropes about perfidious Persians. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (uae) have detained people for filming Iran’s attacks, or their aftermath. Bahrainis have been stripped of their citizenship for ostensible support for Iran; on May 7th parliament expelled the deputy speaker and two other mps for questioning the king’s power to do so. “They don’t want anyone querying the official narrative,” says a Bahraini former mp.
Yet query it people do. Across many Arab countries a martial anthem praising Iran’s defiance of America has gone viral. “Take me to the streets of Tehran,” it urges. “The banner of honour has been raised by Persian hands.” Distrustful of their state media, some Arab viewers have turned to Al- Mayadeen, a Lebanese satellite-television channel sympathetic to Iran. Few voice such sentiments openly, but in private some wonder whether the region’s American bases do more to invite Iranian strikes than deter them. “The Gulf states were once American vassals; now we may become Iran’s,” says an academic in the Qatari capital, Doha, who has shared such thoughts with colleagues. “We will pay and call it investment reconstruction, not reparations and extortion.” Sympathy for Iran among Arabs is driven largely by two things. The first is their anger with Israel, particularly after its slaughter in Gaza and its pounding of Lebanon and Syria. “Ask any Egyptian and they’ll tell you we back whoever backs the Palestinians,” says a young doctor in Cairo, visiting a cinema to watch an Iranian film. “Iran may be repressive, but it has stood up to the Greater and Lesser Satans.” Some relish the discomfort of the Gulf states which have in recent years forged closer ties with Israel. In Bahrain, members of the Muslim Brotherhood, though Sunni, have privately welcomed Iran’s strikes on Israel. The other impulse is sectarian. Many Shia Muslims who live in the Gulf share religious ties with Iran. In Bahrain’s Shia-majority villages, mourners staged processions for Ali Khamenei, Iran’s late leader, who had a large following in the little kingdom, after Israel assassinated him. Hundreds of thousands of Iranians also live in Dubai. Iranian schools, clubs, a hospital and a mosque have already been closed. The uae’s expulsion of thousands of Shia Pakistanis feeds Shia grievance. In Egypt, a Sunni stronghold, there is even talk of a revival of devotion to the Prophet Muhammad’s family— figures especially venerated by Shias. “Egyptians have a soft spot for Iranians,” says a former presidential adviser. “We share reverence for the Prophet’s household and for shrines such as those of Hussein and Zeinab (the prophet’s grandchildren) in Cairo.” But those who have borne the brunt of Iran’s support for militias and military ventures—in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria—urge America and Israel to
keep bombing. Some Sunnis, particularly in Bahrain, fear a fifth column and bridle at sympathy for attacks on their city-states. Egyptian Salafists, who seek a return to Islam’s original traditions, have stirred sectarian hostility, warning against empowering the rafida—or rejectionists—a rude Sunni word for Shias. Even so, such sectarian bile appears to resonate less than it once did. More striking is the readiness of many to follow their hearts over their pockets. Many Arab migrant workers have returned home after losing jobs in the Gulf; remittances have plummeted. Fuel prices are rising, even in oil-rich states. Might this mood have consequences? Some Arabs contrast their own compliant leaders with Iran’s commanders, who, against heavy odds, seem willing to fight. “Iran’s response makes them look capable and resilient,” says one. In comparison, Arab supposed strongmen seem weak. “Our bullies are cowards,” snaps the Egyptian doctor. For now such views are whispered. They may not always be so. ■ Sign up to the Middle East Dispatch, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop on a fascinating, complex and consequential part of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//middle-east-and-africa/2026/05/07/arab-rulers-have- little-sympathy-for-iran
Middle East & Africa | Desert doldrums Mali shows the growing strength of jihadism in the Sahel There is little to stop militants from expanding their influence May 7th 2026 In a patch of jungle in Ivory Coast, African special forces practise beach landings and dawn raids under the watchful eye of Western commandos. In the air-conditioned classrooms of a military camp, FBI officers teach regional police how to conduct intelligence operations. This is Exercise Flintlock, a counter-terrorism training bootcamp that America has been running in Africa almost every year since 2005. At a time when America is slashing its commitments to the continent and its relations with Western allies are rocky, the event makes American-led multilateralism look alive and well.
Unfortunately, that is of limited use when it comes to the big crisis on west Africa’s doorstep: jihadism in the Sahel. Decades of counter-terrorism efforts by America and its allies failed to halt its spread; more recent interventions by Russia in tandem with the region’s military juntas have worsened the threat. The Trump administration’s new transactional approach also holds little promise. A recent wave of attacks in Mali by JNIM, the region’s dominant jihadist group, in alliance with ethnic Tuareg separatists, shows just how bad things are. On April 25th the defence minister was killed by a suicide-bomber; two days later the Malian army and allied Russian troops began retreating from towns and bases across the north (see map). The grip of the ruling junta looks increasingly shaky. Next door in Burkina Faso and Niger, also run by juntas, things are not much better. All three declined to take part in Flintlock. On security in the Sahel, “all the indicators are downwards,” says a Western general. Counter-terrorism co-operation between America, its allies and countries in the region, which combined military support with aid and some democracy promotion, did too little to halt the spread of jihadism. Yet Western disengagement has arguably made things worse. Starting in 2020, the Sahelian trio cut ties with Western and west African allies and drew close to