source of strategic advantage, and that those companies’ defences fell well short of the value of what they held. North Korea now treats ordinary commercial activity as a revenue stream. Cut off from the international financial system by sanctions, it makes money in three ways: stealing cryptocurrency, getting workers into Western companies under false identities, and running trading and front companies abroad to move the funds. These often blur into each other, with the same networks doing all three. For most chief executives, security still means the firewall. That is only half the job. The other half is knowing who is approaching your engineers, who your new hires really are and who is behind the staffing agency or supplier you pay each month. Those questions reach every boardroom, well beyond crypto exchanges and tech firms, and no sanctions list will answer them. Recruitment has become a front line in this war. At Binance the way in was a job offer to one of its employees: a friendly recruiter, a couple of convincing video interviews and a coding test that carried malicious software into the organisation. Nothing about it looked unusual; this is how millions of people find jobs every year. It works in reverse, too: companies need to be aware of whom they are really hiring. Many North Korean workers are deployed by the state across industries such as IT, restaurants, medical clinics and building sites. They operate under close surveillance and are made to send their wages home, so a company that hires one is not only putting its data at risk, but helping to fund North Korea’s regime. Shockingly, the hiring checks and sanctions screening that American and European boardrooms rely on would wave the bulk of North Korea’s agents straight through. Employees are not the only risk. Many companies are also often unaware that by using the wrong supplier or making the wrong payment they could unwittingly be sending money to Pyongyang. Firms like mine now use agentic AI to trace who owns and deals with whom across thousands of organisations, combing through more public records than any compliance team could check by hand. Using these techniques,
Strider has flagged 875 businesses outside North Korea that are linked to dealings with the regime that may break international sanctions. Less than 3% of them are on any government sanctions list or export blacklist. In practice, a business could sign a contract, hire through an agency or pay a supplier linked to North Korea, and its sanctions checks would raise no alarm. It is unsurprising that 408 of these organisations are based in China and Russia, North Korea’s closest partners. What is surprising is that the rest are spread across more than 70 countries. Eighty-eight are in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia or the United Arab Emirates, financial centres that Western trade and money pass through every day. North Korea might be shut out of the world economy, but it has found a back door. Crucially, these are not just companies that exist on paper. More than 300 are flagged as employing North Korean workers abroad, a practice banned by the UN in 2017. Seventy-nine are flagged as having bought or sold North Korean military goods. These shells and missiles are now being fired at Ukrainian cities. Money linked to Kim Jong Un’s regime can pass through respectable institutions, often without them knowing. A supplier or recruitment agency can look entirely above board, carry all the right paperwork and pass every standard check while being one or two steps removed from a network working on North Korea’s behalf. A sanctions list records only those networks that governments have formally designated, so it shows the threat as it stood on the day each name was added. The networks behind those names are shifting far faster than most governments can update a list. Shutting out international talent or treating every overseas firm with suspicion would be unrealistic. The aim should be to make openness more secure. In practice, that means three things. First, rigorous due diligence, actively focused on state risks: look past the name on the contract to a partner’s ownership, funding and links to state bodies, before signing rather than after. Second, put that intelligence in front of decision-makers at the point of decision, whether in hiring, procurement or an investment committee. Third, give someone real authority: a C-suite executive with
responsibility for enabling the right deals and halting those where the risks are evident, or too opaque. The biggest theft in crypto history began with a job offer. For decades, economic security was left to governments; North Korea has made it a boardroom problem. Every hire, every supplier and every payment is now a potential way in for a hostile state, and Kim Jong Un’s techno-stooges have shown it needs only one.■ Greg Levesque is the chief executive and co-founder of Strider Technologies. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2026/11/18/north-koreas-cyber-antics- should-worry-every-chief-executive
How China continues to evade America’s tech- export rules And is also developing a semiconductor industry to render them moot Nov 19th 2026 “WE WILL NOT let anybody have them other than the United States,” declared Donald Trump last year of Nvidia’s most advanced chips—an essential tool in the race to develop superpowered AI. To enforce the pledge, his administration maintained rules restricting sales of certain types of semiconductor. Anything less, a Republican congressmen said, would be as foolhardy as handing Iran weapons-grade uranium. Yet all the while, it turns out, a torrent of Nvidia’s nattiest chips was flowing to China or to middlemen who made them available to Chinese AI firms. Although America is now trying to plug the sieve of leaks, China’s efforts to obtain the latest technology are continuing by other means. What is more,
China’s own chipmaking industry is advancing so fast that it may soon render America’s controls moot. The scale of the leakage has been revealed by the downfall of Jensen Huang, Nvidia’s boss. While he was having an affair with a suspected Chinese agent named Alice Huang, the firm she worked at, Megaspeed, became the biggest buyer of Nvidia’s chips in South-East Asia. Many of these seem to have ended up in China, in breach of America’s regulations; others power data centres in the region used by Chinese clients—a set-up that had been legal, although this week American officials hastily revised their rules to curb it. Alibaba, a Chinese tech giant, is Megaspeed’s biggest customer and one of its biggest creditors. Since America first started restricting the export of advanced chips in 2020, Chinese firms have devised an ever-shifting set of workarounds to access “compute” (processing power). Huawei, a Chinese tech giant, was singled out by American sanctions that year, cutting it off from components made by TSMC, Taiwan’s biggest chipmaker. Yet when TechInsights, a research firm, dissected one of Huawei’s Ascend 910B processors, which are intended for use in AI, they found chips made by TSMC. According to SemiAnalysis, a consultancy, Huawei bought some $500m-worth of advanced TSMC chips through Sophgo, a Chinese chip-designer. (Sophgo says it had no dealings with Huawei.) When the restrictions were broadened to all Chinese firms, many resorted to smuggling. In 2024 the Wall Street Journal detailed a “barely concealed” chip-trafficking network, including a student paid $600 to sneak Nvidia chips into China in his suitcase. But it was not just small-time bootlegging. America’s Department of Justice claims a co-founder of Supermicro, an American server-maker, and two other men conspired to sneak billions- worth of AI kit into China between 2024 and 2025 (the co-founder denies it). The trio allegedly ordered chips through a South-East Asian shell company, then repackaged them into unmarked boxes that were sent on to China. Security footage shows one of them placing fake equipment in the original packaging to make it seem like the chips had never left South-East Asia, to trick both compliance staff at Supermicro and American officials.
No one is quite sure how much smuggling there has been. SemiAnalysis thinks roughly 1.5 gigawatts of compute, which is equivalent to about 1m restricted Nvidia chips, have ended up in China. This stockpile is especially useful for Chinese firms since access to it “can’t be cut off”, notes a former China analyst at the CIA. But it is not big enough to satisfy China’s ever greater hunger for compute. Smuggled chips provide around 22% of its AI data-centre capacity, according to the Institute for Progress (IFP), a think- tank. Moreover, smuggling routes are becoming inconvenient. Since Malaysia tightened permitting rules for high-end semiconductor shipments last year, smuggling to China plummeted, Malaysian officials insist. An alternative workaround is to exploit loopholes in the rules. AI processors depend on high-bandwidth memory (HBM), stacks of memory chips that China cannot yet make in large numbers. Before America banned their sale to China in late 2024, Huawei stockpiled some 13m HBM stacks, enough for 1.6m of its advanced AI chips, reckons SemiAnalysis. Since then, it says, Huawei has kept up supplies by getting HBM chips grafted onto other, outmoded chips. The combined product does not exceed the technical thresholds specified in America’s rules and so can be shipped to China legally, where it is disassembled again to get at the HBM chips. An even bigger loophole has involved renting, rather than buying, computing power. Instead of trying to spirit restricted chips across borders, Chinese firms have simply been making use of them from afar. Remotely accessed capacity makes up a quarter of China’s total AI compute, estimates IFP. This, too, flows through South-East Asia. After Singapore limited data- centre construction for lack of space and power, projects gravitated to Malaysia, where data-centre capacity has grown 100-fold in the past five years. It now boasts 55 big data centres, with another 62 in the pipeline. Taiwan, the source of most of the world’s high-end chips, exports a majority of them to America and Mexico (where they are assembled into goods bound for America). Exclude those two countries, and Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand absorb more than half of the rest (see chart 1), an astonishing share of global demand that is clearly not catering simply to domestic consumers.