The strategy had been working well. Revenue grew by 170% from 2019, the year it listed its shares in Shanghai, to 2024 (see chart). But since then it has stagnated. Since April 2024 the firm’s share price has fallen by roughly half. In its newer markets, Transsion has encountered stiffer competition, including from global giants. In Brazil, Latin America’s biggest smartphone market, which Transsion entered in 2021, Samsung is pushing fancier devices with agentic AI. In the first half of 2026 the South Korean firm’s shipments to the country were 10% higher than a year earlier, while those of Infinix, Transsion’s main brand in Brazil, fell by 24%, according to Counterpoint Research, a firm of analysts. Rising chip costs—a problem across the industry—are also biting. Memory chips accounted for nearly half the cost of making Transsion’s products in the first four months of the year, up from a fifth in 2023. The share has probably risen further since then. As a result, the company has jacked up handset prices, which has shielded its gross margin but caused a decline in the volume of smartphone sales in the first half of the year. Users are holding on to older devices for longer. In response to these twin problems, Transsion is branching out. It is now selling customers not only smart watches, earbuds and kitchen appliances, but also energy-storage products, including portable battery modules, and even two- and three-wheeler electric vehicles. That may sound like a stretch, but in the global south consumers often stick to familiar brands, and it helps that Transsion’s operating systems are integrated across its products. Sales of products other than handsets made up 16% of revenue in the first half of 2026, double the share two years earlier. But Transsion’s biggest long-term bet is on AI. Last month it raised $390m in a Hong Kong stock-market listing; it plans to use two-fifths of that to work on AI models and applications. Already some of its devices incorporate digital assistants and other AI features. The business is also collaborating with Chinese research institutions to work on things such as visual foundation models and voice recognition. A fifth of its employees are engaged in research and development. As Transsion transitions to AI, there will be plenty for them to do. ■

This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/business/2026/11/19/the-global-souths-smartphone-king- goes-big-on-ai

Business · Business | Route ’26

The world’s carmakers are revving up in America Donald Trump’s policies are only part of the explanation Nov 19th 2026 America’s car market, like the pickups that are the profit engine of Detroit’s “Big Three”, is large, reliably solid and a bit old-fashioned. As global carmakers struggle in China against the onslaught by domestic electric- vehicle (EV) firms, and lose sales to them elsewhere, America’s market looks attractive. A growing list of carmakers are laying plans to boost manufacturing there. President Donald Trump may claim that his policies are the reason why. But other forces are also at work. To be sure, the administration’s tariffs on imported vehicles have played a role. A desire to avoid them, and then hide behind a protectionist wall, partly explains the understated unveiling on November 9th by Honda of a $3bn investment in a factory in Ohio. Other plans have been revealed with more show. Gernot Döllner, boss of Audi, appeared at a campaign rally with Mr

Trump shortly before this month’s midterm elections to trumpet a $4bn factory in Georgia. The stunt did little to help Republican candidates, who suffered at the polls. And it earned Mr Döllner an ear-bashing from politicians and unions back home in Germany. But the new plant should help Audi. “Establishing a local manufacturing presence would bring us closer to American customers, strengthen our competitiveness and make our global business more resilient,“ Mr Döllner says. As part of the deal, Audi hopes as well to negotiate reduced levies on car imports, which cost it $1.4bn in 2025. American factories also give carmakers a hedge against uncertainty over the usmca, America’s free-trade deal with Canada and Mexico. Relying on lower-cost Mexican plants to supply the American market is far more risky while tariff-free access remains unsure. Hyundai, Toyota and Mercedes-Benz have also announced big investments over the past year or so. In May Stellantis, which is struggling in Europe, promised that of the €36bn ($40bn) earmarked for its brands in its five-year investment plan, 60% would go to North America. (The carmaker’s biggest shareholder, Exor, part-owns The Economist’s parent company). Mr Trump might also brag about turning Americans against evs by removing subsidies and rolling back emissions standards. As the rest of the world goes electric, the chance to sell more profitable gas-guzzlers for longer in America is a big draw for carmakers labouring to meet EV targets elsewhere. Where Bloombergnef, a research group, once reckoned EVs would make up 48% of American sales by 2030, it now puts the figure at 17%. America, in other words, is going its own way. In September Antonio Filosa, Stellantis’s boss, said of car markets: “One is the United States…and then we have the rest of the world.” Yet the country would be alluring even without the actions of Mr Trump—and Audi’s and Honda’s factories are not due to start production until after he has left the White House. Carmakers decided on the scale, if not the location, of their investments several years ago. Since then the rout of foreign carmakers in China and fierce competition in a sluggish European market have made America the only choice, says Tu Le of Sino Auto Insights, a Detroit-based consultancy.

America is an enduringly big and lucrative place. Even if sales look unlikely to grow much in the coming years, competition from Chinese EVs is kept out by 100% tariffs (introduced by Joe Biden). And America has further attractions. As Mr Döllner notes, it is “one of the world’s most important premium car markets”. Profit margins for upmarket cars are typically fat. Soaring fuel costs (for which Mr Trump modestly refuses to take credit) have popularised hybrid vehicles, which are more profitable than petrol equivalents and where Japanese and South Korean carmakers such as Toyota and Hyundai are leaders. Sales of these should grow by 6% a year to 2033, far outpacing the market as a whole, says Bernstein, a broker. Yet carmakers should beware. Retreating from global competition risks complacency, as America’s domestic firms discovered in the 1980s. In the end, they were punished for turning out shoddy, expensive vehicles by the competitors that trade restrictions couldn’t keep out for ever. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/business/2026/11/19/the-worlds-carmakers-are-revving-up- in-america

Business · Business | Bartleby

Just how central should one person be to an organisation? From founder mode to bounder mode Nov 19th 2026 IT has not been a great few days for the idea of “founder mode”. The term was coined by Paul Graham, an essayist and venture capitalist, but the concept came from Brian Chesky, the founder of Airbnb. Mr Chesky gave a speech in 2024 laying out his belief that founders mistakenly delegate too much authority to managers below them as their firms grow bigger. He proposed a much more hands-on approach in which they dive relentlessly into the details, set the tempo of the company and make it clear where everyone should be focused. Instead of silos, a shared sense of purpose; instead of a leader insulated from the work, someone steeped in it. Until a few days ago, this argument was strengthened by the example of Jensen Huang. The erstwhile boss of Nvidia had presided over an

extraordinary success story, and had his tentacles everywhere. He flattened the organisation: around 60 people reported to him directly. He hoovered up information, by encouraging everyone in the chipmaker to send him emails about what was on their minds. He eschewed one-to-one meetings, arguing that it was better for lots of people to hear what he thought. He, and his wretched leather jacket, embodied the firm. How could one person manage to be across so much, he was sometimes asked. I do nothing but work, he would say. Well, not exactly. Mr Huang’s energy levels were even more impressive than people imagined. His abrupt downfall after an affair with an alleged Chinese agent, and subsequent campaigning for reinstatement, raise questions about whether one person should ever be so essential to a big organisation. Whether founder mode makes sense depends partly on how far the idea is taken. An all-in bet on the sustained genius of a single individual is always going to entail risks. But some of the precepts of founder mode are benign. In a new bonus episode of “Boss Class”, The Economist’s podcast on management, recorded before Mr Huang’s resignation, Mr Chesky describes his role at Airbnb as being akin to an editor’s. He reviews much of the work at Airbnb himself, using meetings with people several levels down the firm. Whether a chief executive is a founder or a salaried manager, there is a lot to be said for this “skip-level” approach. Employees usually respond well to the chance to spend time with the boss. People waste ludicrous amounts of time second-guessing CEOs; it is often more efficient just to hear from them directly. And it’s good for bosses to see the quality of the people down the organisation. A ubiquitous chief executive does risk micromanagement and disempowerment, but layers of bureaucracy have drawbacks, too. A study by Tristan Fitzgerald of Texas A&M University looked at what happens when founder CEOs either die or suffer serious illness, and have to be suddenly replaced by a professional manager. By comparing firms that go through this kind of abrupt transition with similar firms that continue to be led by founders, Mr Fitzgerald concludes that each type of manager brings distinctive skills. The switch to a professional chief executive means less internal innovation, more dealmaking, more leverage and more decentralised management structures. The financial performance between the two groups