They warn that exaggerating the threat could push the four countries closer together. Although China has had a mutual-defence treaty with North Korea since 1961, China’s commitment to that is questionable. Russia signed a new one with the North Koreans in 2024 and a more limited “strategic partnership” with Iran last year. This collection of bilateral links thus falls well short of a formal alliance like NATO, each member of which is formally committed to defend any other that comes under attack. A closer parallel might be the Axis powers in the three years before the second world war began. They co-ordinated on foreign policy, intelligence and military affairs but largely on an ad hoc basis until Germany and Italy signed their “Pact of Steel” in 1939. A tripartite defence treaty including Japan followed in 1940. Another analogy is a syndicate of mafia bosses, who co-operate and compete simultaneously. What unites them is disregard for the law and reliance on underground networks of transport and finance. Although quadrilateral axis meetings are not thought to occur, the four often vote in unison at the UN, helping to shield each other from sanctions or other actions. China, Russia and Iran also co-ordinate formally via international organisations such as the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation and the BRICs (which includes Brazil, Russia, India and China). But more often the four countries support each other in transactional, bilateral and covert ways. Spying on and stealing from each other is routine. And they often withhold their best military technology, sharing enough to prevent defeat, but not to secure victory. Binding them together is a common desire to challenge American global leadership and to dominate their respective regions. “I don’t think they have in their minds an alternative order. They’re just trying to disrupt the US order, and then they’re trying to capitalise on that,” says Victor Cha, a former American national-security official now at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank in Washington. But what began as transactional alignments has laid “the infrastructure for something that could last longer”, he says. That like-mindedness can show in their propaganda as well; state media in Russia and China in particular routinely share content with one another and, when it suits them, spread each other’s messages.
Axis members still have different and often conflicting goals. China, for instance, worries that Russia’s growing influence in North Korea is emboldening its leader, Kim Jong Un. In return for his help on Ukraine, the Kremlin has provided economic support and military tech that have helped him bolster his conventional and nuclear arsenals. That troubles China, which has long sought to avert another war on its north-eastern border. Were North Korea to obtain a fully fledged nuclear arsenal, China fears that it could provoke an American attack or prompt South Korea and Japan, both American allies, to develop nuclear weapons that would target China, as well as Mr Kim’s territory. And yet, in the last year, China has revitalised its relations with Mr Kim, dropping public objections to his nuclear weapons programme, expanding cross-border transport links and lifting trade restrictions. As North Korea’s economy revives, it has more to spend on nuclear weapons. And its conventional forces are becoming more of a threat to South Korea as battle- hardened North Korean troops return home and adopt technology and tactics honed in Ukraine and the Middle East. China and Russia have divergent aims and strategies in the Middle East too. China wants to stabilise the region, where it now has close relations with Gulf Arab states that Iran has bombed. Many of them supply China with oil or gas. Concerned that high energy prices are worsening its economic slowdown, China also hopes to open up the Strait of Hormuz. Russia, by contrast, seeks to destabilise the region, push up oil prices and gain leverage in negotiations with America over Ukraine. But Messrs Xi and Putin share enough common interests in the Middle East for their actions to be complementary. Neither wants a fully nuclear-armed Iran. Yet they are anxious to ensure that its regime does not collapse (and possibly be replaced with a Western-leaning alternative). They also see the war there as a useful way to divert America’s military resources and undermine public support for its military intervention abroad. The axis’s security interests appear to be compatible enough that their co- operation across a range of military technologies is deepening. When Russia started using North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles in 2023, they often missed targets or exploded mid-air. Russia has since made them more
accurate and manoeuvrable by adding new components, including a Chinese-made receiver connecting it to Russian and Chinese satellite networks. The explosive charge has also changed to hexogen, which is more potent and made in Russia, according to Ukrainian experts. And the KN-23 can now carry cluster warheads, which inflict damage over a wider area. Those and other improvements appear to have flowed back to North Korea, which conducted a series of missile tests in recent weeks. Iran’s missiles have been getting more accurate too. The ones that hit Qatar’s gas-liquefaction facilities at Ras Laffan precisely destroyed two “cold boxes”, the most vital and hard-to-repair parts of the plant. Iran was also able to strike American radars, aircraft and facilities across the Gulf. The British-American base of Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, has been targeted too, as have American warships off Iran. Although many of Iran’s missiles are based on old North Korean designs, it no longer needs outside expertise in building them and has developed its own generation of solid-fuel missiles that can be fired quickly. Even so, their recent accuracy may derive from Chinese and Russian intelligence helping to identify targets, according to Western officials. They believe Iran has access to a Chinese surveillance satellite. And perhaps more important, Iran (like Russia and North Korea) is now able to use China’s BeiDou satellite- navigation system to help guide its missiles. Iran also still depends on specialist machinery, components and materials from abroad, especially China. The clearest support is through Chinese supplies of precursor chemicals for solid fuel, notably sodium perchlorate. A Chinese ship carrying the chemical exploded last year in an Iranian port. And Chinese ships continued to deliver it this year. There is also evidence of Chinese components being supplied to Iran’s proxy militias, including Hizbullah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Valuable details came from the contents of four containers seized in July in Aden, with Chinese cargo bound for a Houthi-controlled port. Analysis by Conflict Armament Research, a think-tank, shows it included parts for Iranian missiles. Those components appear to have been custom-made by a Chinese firm. Whether China’s government is complicit in such exports is hard to determine. It denies supplying weapons to Iran, Russia or North Korea. But
much of what it exports to all three are dual-use items, such as electronics and industrial machinery. Those exports sustain their military programmes and their broader economies, while Chinese consumer goods help to pacify their domestic populations. Russia, in particular, relies on imports from China, which are expected to reach $120bn-130bn this year, an 80-90% increase since 2021. While Western governments forbid the sale to Russia of dual-use items needed to make weapons, China is believed to supply as much as 90% of them. Even if some of this trade is done without the Chinese government’s knowledge, many Western officials believe that (given its formidable surveillance capabilities) it either secretly approves or consciously turns a blind eye to exports that it knows will be used for military purposes. The Geran-4’s original engine, for instance, was made by a Chinese firm whose website specifies that it can be used in cruise missiles and drones. China tightened export controls on drone engines in October. But Ukrainian officials believe that Russia has already localised production at Alabuga. Russian and Iranian weapons also often contain Western electronic components. But they are mostly imported via a complex network of trading firms and proxies, many of which are based in China or Hong Kong. China refuses to enforce Western sanctions imposed on dozens of such firms for
supplying items for military use to Russia, Iran or North Korea. This year, China introduced rules that would penalise foreign companies and individuals for observing export controls or sanctions imposed on Chinese firms by other governments. China’s big banks still generally comply with Western sanctions, fearing suspension from US dollar payments and clearing systems. But China has built a network of alternative financial institutions and mechanisms that is largely insulated from Western sanctions. It has also accelerated efforts to “de-dollarise” its trade with Russia, Iran and other targets of sanctions. More than 95% of Russia’s trade with China is now conducted in yuan or roubles, compared with about 25% five years ago. That enables the oil trade that sustains the axis (see chart). China imports about 90% of Iran’s oil exports and roughly half of Russia’s. Since China mostly pays in yuan, Iran and Russia can use those revenues to finance purchases of Chinese dual-use tech. And the oil is mostly transported via a “shadow fleet” of ageing tankers, many of which are owned and managed through shell companies in Hong Kong and mainland China (as well as Dubai). Those tactics were pioneered by Iran but are increasingly used by Russia. As a result, the shadow fleet has expanded to more than 3,000 ships from about 200 in 2022. North Korea, meanwhile, imports almost all of its oil overland from China and Russia. Transport links are thickening too. China and Russia are building a new cross-border gas pipeline that is due to open in 2027; they have opened new road and rail bridges and are planning new railway crossings. And they co- operate closely on expanding the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic. Since September, Russia and China have both opened new cross-border road bridges to North Korea. Russian and Chinese links to Iran, meanwhile, provide a window on the outside world. Iranian airlines still fly between Tehran, Moscow and Shanghai. Shipping between Russia and Iran via the Caspian Sea has surged this year. So has rail freight from China to Iran via Central Asia. Closer axis collusion is not inevitable. If the wars in Iran and Ukraine end, demand for military technology may wane, along with the trade in oil under sanctions. With fewer incentives to co-operate, mutual suspicions could