which are provided by SpaceX, have made Europe keen to beef up its domestic space industry. SpaceX’s ambition to develop fully and rapidly reusable rockets came a big step closer when the returning upper stage of its Starship rocket was caught by mechanical arms at the launch site for the first time. SpaceX has caught Starship’s booster before (though an attempt to capture the booster failed this time). Getting Starship fully operational is vital to the company’s plan to expand its Starlink satellite-broadband service and to put AI data-centres into space. The years of waiting were at last over for gaming fans, as “Grand Theft Auto VI”, described as the most anticipated video game ever, was finally released. It has been over 13 years since the previous title in the GTA series was published. A cost-cutting exercise at Disney is expected to generate $3bn in savings, the company said. It intends to reinvest that money in providing more content for its streaming platforms, tailored especially for its faster-growing markets outside America. GDP in Japan unexpectedly shrank by 0.1% in the third quarter at an annualised rate. Comparatively high inflation has caused Japanese consumers to tighten their belts, leading to a decline in private consumption, which accounts for roughly half of output. Energy costs remain high and import prices have risen because of the weak yen. Indonesia’s central bank increased interest rates. The bank has been battling all year to defend the rupiah, which has come under pressure from concerns about Indonesia’s public spending and fiscal transparency. The country’s stock market plunged in October when MSCI said it was dysfunctional and threatened to downgrade Indonesia’s emerging-market status. The annual rate of inflation in Britain nudged up again in October, to 3.6%. The average price of petrol was at its highest level since August 2022. The Trump administration asked Congress for $50bn to fix outdated air- traffic control systems after thousands of flights were grounded across

America; legacy equipment had become unstable after being flooded with data. Around the same time Microsoft’s office software and communications platforms went offline. And customers at several banks reported access issues. There was no evidence of foul play in the cluster of glitches, but that didn’t stop speculation swirling of a global technological meltdown. Reports suggested that some consumers were panic-buying; Costco was said to have sold out of generators. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/the-world-this-week/2026/11/19/business

· The world this week

Cartoon: The meeting of Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin A lighter take on the news Nov 19th 2026 Dig deeper into the subject of this week’s cartoon: Deeper collusion between hostile powers threatens the WestA new axis of malice threatens the global orderThe incredible shrinking legacy of Donald J. TrumpIran is functioning without a supreme leader You can see previous ones here. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/the-world-this-week/2026/11/19/cartoon-the-meeting-of- donald-trump-xi-jinping-and-vladimir-putin

The World Ahead The World Ahead 2027 Future-gazing analysis, predictions and speculation Nov 19th 2026 EVERY NOVEMBER we publish our annual predictive guide to the coming year, The World Ahead. In this year’s edition, our correspondents and invited experts consider the global outlook in geopolitics, economics, technology and culture; anticipate the consequences of the Iran war, America’s midterm elections and the rise of artificial intelligence; and analyse upcoming elections, innovations and social trends. See the full edition. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2026/11/19/the-world-ahead-2027

· Leaders

Deeper collusion between hostile powers threatens the West Can Britannia rule the waves again? America must get serious about Chinese chip spying America’s neglect of global science is backfiring Bangladesh, an underappreciated success, faces an economic crisis

Leaders · Leaders | Our cover

Deeper collusion between hostile powers threatens the West China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are bent on making a world safe for autocrats Nov 19th 2026 In February 1945 Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin met in Yalta to decide the planet’s future. As their armies pressed for victory against Nazi Germany, the leaders of Britain, America and the Soviet Union carved up Europe into what became communist and capitalist blocs. Historians differ as to whether the Allies could have struck a better deal, but no one doubts that the meeting was historic. Unlike this week’s photo opportunity in Shenzhen for Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. Described by some as the new Yalta, it is nothing of the sort. President Trump, fresh from humiliation in the midterms, wants to look strong again on television. Russia’s despot, humiliated by years of failure to conquer his

smaller neighbour, wants to rub shoulders with real superpowers. China’s leader is happy to appear as the gracious emperor welcoming squabbling foreigners to his villa. But little of substance is likely to emerge. Mr Trump's technique of winging it will not sway the tightly scripted Mr Xi. The real story in geopolitics is the deepening collaboration between four autocratic, anti-Western regimes: China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. This is not new: Mr Trump’s first defence secretary identified the threat in 2018. It is not a formal alliance, either, and its members are very different. China is an economic and technological colossus, as the dancing robots and ubiquitous delivery drones of Shenzhen make clear. Russia’s is a middling economy; Iran and North Korea are midgets. Iran is a theocracy; China and North Korea are godless, unless you count Kim Jong Un. In Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang, one man rules; in Tehran it is unclear who does. But all four regimes share a core interest: they want a world safe for autocrats, specifically themselves. And as Mr Trump weakens America’s wider and deeper network of alliances, America’s foes are quietly helping each other. The most obvious collusion is military. When Russia ravages Ukrainian cities, it does so with Iranian drone technology and Chinese components. Iranian engineers study how Russia fine-tunes their murderous designs. North Korea has sent some 16,000 soldiers to fight and die for Mr Putin, in return for cash and military technology. China stops short of direct military aid, but is soaking up data on how Russian drones perform in combat— handy for a superpower that has not fought a serious war since 1979. Meanwhile, the missiles Iran aims at American forces in the Gulf can be fired quickly (thanks to Chinese precursor chemicals for solid fuel) and accurately (thanks to Russian intelligence and Chinese satellite data). Economic collaboration is deepening, too. Trade with China keeps the other three economies afloat. Chinese payments systems offer ways to dodge Western sanctions. More than 95% of Russia’s trade with China is now in yuan or roubles, up from around 25% five years ago. Russian oil flows to China and North Korea; Iranian oil is shipped to China, largely via a “shadow fleet” of sanctions-busting ships that has grown by 1,500% since 2022. North Korean workers toil in Russian factories, easing the labour

shortage caused by Mr Putin sending so many Russians to their deaths in Ukraine. Axis diplomats scratch one another’s backs. They vote in harmony at the UN, where Russian and Chinese vetoes block any serious moves to restrain Mr Putin’s wars. Axis propagandists amplify one another’s narratives on screens everywhere, and promote stories that undermine Western democracies. Those who doubt the importance of the axis of malice note that the interests of its constituent regimes often fail to align. Iran, North Korea and Russia are rogue states; China is far more cautious. Having prospered hugely from globalisation, it does not want the American-led rules-based order to be replaced by chaos. It has long frowned on North Korea’s destabilisation of its backyard. And unlike oil-producing Russia, it suffers when Iran’s war with America drives up oil prices. Yet although they do not always pull in the same direction, these four regimes increasingly find ways to benefit from their shared antagonism towards America. China can cope with the irritation of costly oil, and sees great advantage if American aircraft-carriers are stuck in the Gulf instead of patrolling the Pacific. It does not want Mr Putin to start a wider war in Europe—Europeans are valuable customers for Chinese goods—but it is happy to see the West bogged down defending Ukraine with resources that might otherwise go to support Taiwan. And as Mr Putin deepens his ties with Kim Jong Un, China is less inclined to scold North Korea for its nuclear troublemaking; Mr Kim is adept at playing one friend off against another. There are precedents for informal collusion between geographically dispersed and culturally disparate authoritarian regimes. The most alarming is the original axis in the 1930s. Fascist Germany, Italy and Japan did not love one another, but they all felt aggrieved by the dominant powers. Germany and Japan did not fight arm in arm, but by expanding their empires at the same time, they offered the West two huge challenges at once, thus improving their own chances of victory. Today, if China decides to invade Taiwan, there is a good chance that Russia, Iran or North Korea will provoke a simultaneous crisis elsewhere, or in cyberspace.

This analogy goes only so far. Mr Putin, despite the hundreds of thousands of deaths he has caused, is not Hitler. But it would be rash for today’s democracies to ignore the threat posed by the axis of malice. Their systems of government seem unlikely to change soon. (Their citizens do not get a say.) With each passing day, their hackers have access to more powerful AI tools, and it is uncertain whether the West’s defences will keep up. Authoritarian systems are not as good as liberal democracies at generating wealth, fostering innovation or allowing their people decent lives. But when they collude, they can make the world darker and more dangerous. Democracies must recognise the peril in order to confront it. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/11/19/deeper-collusion-between-hostile- powers-threatens-the-west

Leaders · Leaders | Hearts of silicon

Can Britannia rule the waves again? A risky bet that could transform the nature of sea power Nov 19th 2026 Britain’s armed forces are in a tight spot. Cash is short; danger is not. Iranian threats against British air bases, made credible by cheap attack drones, are becoming routine. Russian naval activity around the country’s waters has risen by 40% over the past year. America demands that Europe pay for its own security, and is backing away from commitments to defend it. Former army chiefs warn that Britain is ill-prepared for conflict. Its only truly successful living naval commander, James Bond, is fictitious. The good news is that necessity is the mother of invention. The Royal Navy is placing a huge, risky bet on a futuristic new fleet: a “hybrid navy” mixing crewed, uncrewed and autonomous vessels, integrated in part by AI. Much of the technology is unproven and the bet could backfire. Yet the navy is