Crucially, AI can fix flaws after finding them. In DARPA’s AI Cyber Challenge last year, AI systems scanning open-source software of the kind that underpins critical infrastructure patched 43 planted vulnerabilities, and uncovered 18 previously unknown flaws, fixing 11 of them. For ageing equipment that cannot safely be patched, AI can give each flaw a specific workaround, such as a firewall rule or a settings change, tested on a digital twin before it goes live. And AI is cheap enough that small, under-staffed utilities can use it too. None of this happens by default. AI favours defenders only if they move with urgency. Governments should start with the infrastructure operators and shared suppliers whose failure would cause the greatest disruption, enlisting AI labs to find flaws in their code or firmware and produce fixes by set deadlines. Governments should share the cost for smaller operators. Success should be measured by how quickly threats are contained and whether essential services survive an attack. Critical-infrastructure operators could address the highest-priority systems within a year, judging by how quickly they met the cyber-security standards issued by the Biden administration. Findings should be shared with trusted partners using the co-ordinated- disclosure practices that keep fixes from tipping off attackers before systems are patched. The aim should be for a discovery in one country to strengthen every country running the same technology. Such practical partnerships are more urgent than AI treaties, and the foundations exist. NATO’s annual Locked Shields exercise brings together thousands of participants from dozens of countries to defend power grids, water systems and other networks against live attacks. The exercises could be expanded to include using AI to generate patches and controls, sharing the results across the alliance. Here, too, there is precedent. In 2021 America formed the International Counter Ransomware Initiative, now made up of nearly 70 countries. Members share threat warnings and forensic techniques, including how to trace ransoms laundered through the crypto ecosystem. They co-ordinate policy; for example, by pledging not to pay ransoms. Alongside law- enforcement takedowns of gangs and their money-laundering networks, the
effort has squeezed the business: after peaking at over $1bn in 2023, ransom payments have fallen each year since. The time has come to use AI as aggressively on defence as adversaries will use it in attack. A serious international agenda for AI safety should explain not only how it will contain the risks of a new technology, but how it will keep the lights on for the world’s citizens, and how soon. ■ Anne Neuberger is a general partner and the head of global affairs at Andreessen Horowitz. She previously served as Deputy National Security Adviser of the United States. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2026/11/12/ai-sceptics-focus-on-the-wrong- threats
Can the AI boom make enough money to sustain itself? Wall Street has started to worry Nov 12th 2026 Both artificial intelligence and the tricky business of valuing stocks boil down to questions of timelines. Establishing what a company is worth is a hazy exercise at the best of times, full of courageous assumptions about which cashflows will arrive when. Consider, too, timelines for AI—the years, few or many, until the technology’s capabilities surpass humans’— and the exercise veers into incoherence. Markets do not enjoy the luxury of coherence, though. Take the imminent listing of Anthropic, the first big pure-play AI developer to go public. Anthropic’s prospectus touts the many remarkable (and profitable) ways in which advanced AI could transform the economy, but also warns would-be buyers off. “Our decision-making may run counter to investors’
expectations,” it says, for instance with “forward investments…that may seem irresponsibly large at first glance”. Still, somewhere between Utopia and Armageddon, investors need to find a way to pick a number. Anthropic is aiming to float at a valuation of around $1.5trn, which would make it one of the 15 biggest public companies in the world. The listing comes at a precarious time for AI. Jitters about data-centre debt collided with midterm elections in America, where AI-sceptical candidates prevailed, and, bizarrely, with the revelation that Jensen Huang, the boss of the chipmaker Nvidia, was having an affair with an alleged Chinese agent. Before all that, Anthropic looked set for a valuation of $2trn or more (see chart 1). OpenAI, its main rival, has punted its own listing into next year. Nvidia’s share price was about 30% below its recent peak as The Economist went to press. The “neoclouds”, which borrow, often prodigiously, to run data centres, have done worse. But a comeback may be on. Shares in CoreWeave, one of the largest, rose by 25% on November 11th, following strong earnings. The stock had previously been down two- thirds from its high point this year in May. And Anthropic’s IPO is, reportedly, heavily oversubscribed.
So the IPO will be a weighty moment. However many trillions Anthropic lists at, from then on it—and, increasingly, AI more widely—will be judged not with the gauzy optimism of venture capitalists but with the beady eyes of Wall Street. Investors will wonder whether the technology can possibly generate enough cash to justify these valuations or underwrite the colossal scale of data-centre construction planned over the next few years. The numbers are vast. The Economist calculates that AI needs around $3trn in revenue by 2030 for the planned data-centre buildout to offer a conventional rate of return. Other analysts, including Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh of Columbia Business School and a duo at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, have reached similar figures. To put that number into perspective, all compensation for all workers—wages, plus perks like health insurance—adds up to around $16.5trn in America, or $35trn across the OECD, a club mostly of rich countries. So AI would need to lay claim to almost a tenth of today’s rich-world wages for the data-centre boom to pencil out. Of course, that could happen in a more benign fashion if the entire economy grows swiftly—and AI evangelists do also expect dramatic growth from here. Safe to say, AI isn’t quite there yet. Anthropic has reported that its annualised run-rate revenue at the end of October was $81bn. OpenAI’s was $50bn as of the end of September. Toss in smaller developers, as well as Google’s, Meta’s and Microsoft’s revenues from their own models, and the AI model-makers might be generating around $200bn in total. All that cash sits at the top of a funnel, cascading downward into the rest of the ecosystem—keeping other AI businesses afloat and persuading investors to hand them more money. The models that Anthropic, OpenAI and the others sell must be run on chips, most often designed by Nvidia and manufactured by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. Those chips in turn rely on a bevy of components. A shortage of one, RAM, a type of memory, sent the stocks of the main South Korean memory-makers, Samsung and SK Hynix, soaring in the spring. Those chips must then be housed in a data centre, festooned with further complicated electronics. All that needs electricity to power it, too: a windfall for the makers of gas turbines, which generate much of the electricity behind the AI
boom. Everything in AI-world, in other words, relies on revenue at the top of that funnel continuing to flow in, ideally at an ever-increasing rate. Getting from $200bn to $3trn means a leap of an order of magnitude (or an OOM, in Silicon Valley-speak). Could that happen? Because so many of the largest players in AI have been privately held, tracing the exact path of their revenues is tricky. But the previous OOM did not take long. The combined revenues of Anthropic, OpenAI and a number of smaller developers (but not Google, Meta and so on) probably crossed $10bn around March of 2025. Today, that figure is $130bn. The next leap will be tougher. One cause of AI’s recent wobble was a fear that revenue growth may be slowing. Alternative-data proxies like Ramp, which tracks AI spending on company credit cards, and TickerTrends, which collates data such as social-media posts and spending patterns from panels of businesses and consumers, point to slowing revenue growth among the AI developers. A model fitting those data sets to the revenue figures that Anthropic, OpenAI and others have released suggests three-month revenue growth slowed from 80-90% in the spring to 12% in October (see chart 2). By usual standards, even the smallest of those numbers reflects extraordinarily rapid gains. And not every proxy is gloomy; figures from
OpenRouter, a tool which helps developers switch AI providers, now show spending on Anthropic’s, OpenAI‘s and Google’s models surging out of an earlier funk. Still, the more that revenue growth tapers off, the further out of reach the next OOM may slip. Once Anthropic and, eventually, OpenAI list, the reporting requirements of public markets will make any such slowdown far easier to spot. A trillion-dollar AI economy would change the world, in a way that today’s hundred-billion-dollar one has not. Right now, the technology’s economic impact is still limited outside the AI sector itself. Profit margins and revenue per employee have surged at the “Magnificent Seven” tech giants, but are close to flat for the “S&P 493”, the rest of America’s benchmark S&P 500 index of big companies. Software stocks have now largely rebounded from the clobbering they took at the start of the year, during the “SaaSpocalypse”, when investors worried that automated coding would make it easy to cheaply duplicate nearly any software product. Macroeconomic figures also have not moved much. Productivity growth has been strong in America, but not much stronger of late than in the early 2020s. Meanwhile, it remains painfully slow elsewhere in the rich world, even in countries like Britain whose firms have adopted AI at a similar pace