third quarter they fell by 3.1% year-on-year, the largest such fall since the covid lockdowns. Those assembled in Antalya, Turkey for the UN’s annual climate summit, COP31, would doubtless love to see this happy circumstance as an outcome of their unceasing efforts. Dream on. The principal reason is that the foolhardy war with Iran launched by America and Israel has pumped up the price of oil and natural gas. When fuel becomes more expensive, people burn less of it, and carbon emissions fall. Normally such changes get reset when prices subside and consumption rebounds. This time that should happen less. If your response to expensive petrol is buying an electric vehicle, rather than driving fewer miles in your existing car, then your need to buy petrol has been cut whether or not it becomes cheap again. And a lot of people are buying EVs, both in China and elsewhere; petrol-powered cars now account for less than half of all new-car sales worldwide. Another reason for the drop in Chinese emissions is that the generosity with which the state has treated makers of solar panels and wind turbines is paying off. China is getting more and more terawatt-hours from wind and solar, both because more kit has been installed and because grids are better at getting what is generated to where it is wanted. Growth in renewable- electricity generation has outstripped growth in total electricity demand; emissions from coal-fired power are down. The industrial policy that has made renewables cheap in China has done the same for the world at large—as long as it buys Chinese. Throughout South- East Asia and in much of Africa, Chinese solar panels and batteries are replacing diesel generators and eating into the revenues of national grids. They are also providing the huge advantages of electrified life to people previously denied them—all without adding to emissions. None of this was done specifically for the benefit of those exposed to the hazards of climate change. The main reasons have been industrial policy, economic policy and a quest for energy independence. Since these motives remain strong, emissions may continue to fall.

To speed up the process, policymakers should amplify the changes already happening and keep up pressure on non-carbon-dioxide emissions. There are some reasons to be careful about importing cheap Chinese clean tech, which include worries about back doors in the software that they rely on. In general, though, if past Chinese subsidies are offering the world technologies to generate cheap power and help with the climate, do not let protectionism spoil a good thing. Also, governments should do what they can to encourage the switch to electricity. Enabling power prices to vary as much as possible by location and time of day would keep overall costs down. Encouraging the replacement of things which burn fossil fuels—cars, boilers and the like— with technologies that achieve the same goals electrically, such as electric vehicles and heat pumps, is also wise. Electrification is not the be-all and end-all of climate policy. Making a stable climate possible requires more. Not everything can be plugged in; not all systems can be made entirely fossil-free. A deeply damaging degree of climate change remains plausible. But the clearest path to avoiding it is a world in which the trends driving electrification are given free rein and a following wind. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/11/12/chinas-emissions-are-falling-thank- self-interest

Leaders · Leaders | Hollywood’s twin peaks

To triumph in show business, take a lo-fi or hi-fi approach Skydance is stuck in the dangerous middle ground Nov 12th 2026 TWO TYPES of movie stand out in America’s box-office revival this year. The first is indie fare such as “Obsession” and “Backrooms”, made by two YouTubers who spent peanuts on films that grossed over $920m between them. The second is extravaganzas like “Spider-Man: Brand New Day” and “The Odyssey”, which cost hundreds of millions of dollars and grossed a combined $4.3bn. Such extremes reflect a new topography of Hollywood: the twin peaks of lo-fi creator content and hi-fi premium stuff. As with the rest of show business, anything stuck in the middle is in trouble. On one extreme sits YouTube, Hollywood’s most potent disruptive force. As we report it has become America’s dominant TV platform, with a share of streaming almost as big as those of Netflix, Skydance and Walt Disney

combined. Its business model makes it easy to spend on content, since it pays according to performance rather than buying shows up front, as legacy studios do. Its creators, the best of whom are superstars in their own right, upload an average of 20m videos a day. In an indirect form of flattery, streamers such as Netflix are poaching them. On the other extreme is content so lavishly produced that watching it is an event in its own right. Take America’s top two blockbusters. They generated about a fifth of all box-office revenues this year; some IMAX tickets for “The Odyssey” sold out a year in advance. Sport and live entertainment also fit the bill. Last year 96 of America’s top 100 telecasts were sports-related. Lo-fi is a volume play. Hi-fi is a value one. But they have something in common: human connection. YouTube’s creators establish an intimacy with their audiences, born of years of fandom. Driving people to glitzier fare is the thrill of sharing something special, such as the spectacle of the imax or the tension of the Super Bowl. Such experiences need not cost megabucks. A24, an independent studio, has mastered the art of making people not only watch its films but talk about them. Even one of its documentaries—Nathan Fielder’s “You Can See Everything”—is close to blockbuster status. Each peak is relatively AI-proof. Owned by Google, YouTube offers AI tools to creators. It is the biggest distribution platform for AI-made video content. At the other end, people watch World Cup football matches, and perhaps also films like “The Odyssey”, precisely because they are triumphs of human endeavour. This makes them hard for bots to copy. Unfortunately most show business lies between Hollywood’s two peaks. For years studio executives have made a virtue of offering all things to all people —with mixed financial results. Skydance, newly created by the merger of Paramount and Warner Bros, two Hollywood studios, is a case in point. Its two streaming platforms, HBO Max and Paramount Plus, cater respectively to film buffs and middle America. Its 50 cable channels range from CNN to the Food Network. Its sports rights straddle American football and tennis. From next year onwards, to satisfy one of the antitrust conditions of the merger, it aims to churn out a new film every fortnight or so. A similar spray-and-pray approach is common across mainstream music, gaming and publishing.

Combine all Skydance’s broadcast, cable and streaming services, and they still draw less attention than YouTube. Bundle together HBO and Paramount Plus, as planned early next year, and they will still be less than half the size of Netflix. As for producing upscale movies, it would be easier if Skydance’s acquisition spree had not saddled it with $87bn of debt. Netflix may be big enough to survive as a stand-alone streamer. Disney is buoyed by its theme parks. Skydance looks stuck in the mid-size trap. It could join forces with the American arm of TikTok, part-owned by Oracle, to counter YouTube (the chairmen of Oracle and Skydance are father and son). It could use AI to cut operating costs and invest more in premium films and TV. What it cannot do is muddle through. The valley between the peaks is a dangerous place to be. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/11/12/to-triumph-in-show-business-take-a-lo- fi-or-hi-fi-approach

Letters · Letters | A selection of correspondence

Does porn change behaviour? Also this week, the midterms, Rastafari, describing the OECD, tongue- scraping, amoebae Nov 12th 2026 Letters are welcome via email to letters@economist.comFind out more about how we process your letter Britain’s ban on some pornography is based on flimsy evidence, you said, and you questioned the basis of the new offences that have just come into force (“Gagging order”, November 7th). As the author of the government’s independent review of pornography, I approached the task with an open mind. Academic literature was reviewed and I heard extensive evidence from researchers, regulators, abuse charities, safeguarding professionals, police officers, teachers, parents and young people. The weight of that evidence demonstrated that some categories of pornography are causing

harm, particularly to women and children, and that legislative action was justified. It is alarming that much online pornography is dominated by depictions of violence against women. Were comparable levels of violence directed at almost any other group there would be little debate about society’s legitimate interest in restricting its commercial distribution. Policymakers must always pay attention to what is being observed on the front line. Around a third of women report having been choked during sex. Child-on-child sexual abuse has risen sharply, often involving acts of strangulation. Of course, young people learn about sex from many sources, including peers. But why are behaviours that were once relatively rare and confined to niche pornography increasingly being reported as routine? The suggestion that this transformation occurred independently of an online pornography industry that normalises and monetises such content is implausible. Nor is this primarily a free-speech debate. Britain has regulated the commercial distribution of harmful sexual material for decades. Much of the content now prohibited online could not legally have been sold on video, DVD or through other regulated channels. Parliament long ago accepted that some material is sufficiently harmful to justify restriction. The internet did not suddenly make those harms disappear; it merely placed them beyond the reach of existing regulation. Nor am I persuaded by the argument that the law is too difficult to enforce. Regulators and courts have decades of experience distinguishing lawful from unlawful sexual content. There will inevitably be borderline cases, as there are in many areas of law, but that is hardly grounds for abandoning regulation and the rule of law altogether. Regulating the internet is challenging. Yet if the test for legislation is perfect enforcement, few laws would survive. These reforms do not mark the end of pornography, nor do they regulate the private lives of consenting adults. They tackle the rise of violence, choking, incest and depictions of children in unregulated internet porn. Or is it the