UBS, another big bank, there were six days in the previous month on which funds had unloaded more. Hedge funds sometimes get the blame for market falls. This time they were innocent, though they have been given food for thought. The industry has been coasting on the AI boom: the Bloomberg returns index still ended October 4.1% higher then it began the year. But October exposed the dangers of being caught on the way down. One category, multi-strategy funds, has more to ponder than most. Whereas a typical hedge fund implements the vision of a single portfolio manager or a few working together, multi-strategy funds recruit several, all of whom are free to pursue their own trades. The central fund constrains them only by controlling capital allocation among its various “pods” of traders and imposing a strict risk policy to limit losses. In theory the managers’ independence makes their trades unrelated, raising the whole fund’s risk- adjusted performance compared with that of one manager. In booming markets returns are also less volatile than in single-manager funds. Multi-strategy funds were pioneered by such luminaries as Ken Griffin of Citadel and Izzy Englander of Millennium. Others have enjoyed remarkable success, too. PivotalPath, a research firm, estimates that just ten large ones control gross assets worth $2.2trn. . But in recent years their rise has levelled off—and in recent weeks the tight risk policies have begun to pinch. Many force managers to start unwinding positions when losses exceed only 5%. Lose more than 7.5%, and a pod may be shut down. With leverage, even small movements are enough to derail trades. October’s movements were more than enough to force liquidations. By November 9th, when investors had cooled on the financial instruments enabling the buildout of data centres by giant technology companies from Nvidia to Meta, 32% of hedge funds’ books were exposed to AI, down from 47% in June. Managers became timid. Funds, which borrow from markets as well as using their investors’ cash, reduced their net leverage by eight percentage points in the week to November 6th, reports Morgan Stanley, another bank. This may reflect more than caution: it has been a bumper year for attracting new investment, the best since 2007. But mindful of scaring investors away, fund

managers are also eager to limit damage to their returns with too much deleveraging. The episode raises questions for the multi-strategy model. Its supposed advantage is the managers’ independence. With several supposedly making insightful independent decisions, the fund should be protected should some calls not pay off. Gains from a trade on steel, say, could cushion losses from a bet on neocloud firms. But it is increasingly difficult to avoid AI. In July a plunge in chipmakers’ share prices forced funds to sell stocks and bonds whose value depended on the technology’s success. Burned, many managers promised not to load up again. Just a few months later, they must have déjà vu. There are two reasons for this. The first is the sheer amount of the financial system now within the reach of multi-managers. Finding a broad enough range of instruments with which to deploy $2trn-worth of firepower is hard even in normal times. The second is that now almost no corner of the world economy is untouched by AI. A portfolio manager buying copper futures is of little use to balance the risks taken by a colleague backing neoclouds if the price of copper depends on AI’s future development. The growing pervasiveness of one technology may ensure the multi-strategy hedge fund’s best days are behind it. ■ Correction: In an earlier version of this article we said that the ten largest multi-strategy funds controlled assets worth $2.2trn. The figure refers to ten large funds, not necessarily the biggest. Sorry This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/11/10/lessons-from-a- miserable-month-for-hedge-funds

Finance & economics | Free Exchange The return of the snatch-and-grab state A new history of confiscation sheds light on modern economic warfare Nov 12th 2026 AS A QUAKER, A. Mitchell Palmer did not relish conflict. In 1913 the American congressman turned down an offer to serve as secretary of war. But conflict in Europe challenged his pacifism. Six months after America joined the fight against Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1917, Palmer was appointed Alien Property Custodian. The job put him at the forefront of the economic battle against the two aggressors. Tasked with seizing enemy- owned assets across the American economy, his office hoovered up factories, stocks, buildings, patents and more. Soon it began auctioning these to raise money for the war effort. By 1918 Palmer was helping to finance the fighting with the enemies’ own wealth. Germany began the war as the world’s third-biggest foreign investor, after Britain and France. By the time the guns fell silent, more than half of its foreign assets had been confiscated.

The story of Germany’s expropriation is an important episode in “The Age of Confiscation”, an insightful new book by Nicholas Mulder of Cornell University. Armies have often financed themselves by looting their enemies. But because so many German-owned assets were located in Allied jurisdictions, many of them could be taken with little more than a pen stroke. As Mr Mulder writes, Germany was the first country in the 20th century to have its assets expropriated on every continent. Today the West’s enemy is Russia. After its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western governments moved quickly. By 2023 they had blocked some $60bn in Russian oligarchs’ assets, from villas in Saint- Tropez to yachts in the Caribbean, and frozen some $300bn-worth of Russian central-bank reserves held in the West (mostly at Euroclear, a Belgian depository). Yet Western leaders have remained divided over what to do with these assets. Some of the bling and boats were auctioned and in 2024 Ukraine’s allies agreed to use the interest earnings on Russia’s reserves to extend a $50bn loan to Ukraine. But Belgium complained that confiscation of the Euroclear reserves could leave it liable for damages equal to a third of its GDP. Others worried about the risk to Europe’s reputation as a bastion of strong property rights, which could make the continent less attractive as an investment destination. Christine Lagarde, the head of the European Central Bank, warned that seizing Russia’s assets would “start breaking the international legal order”. As Mr Mulder explains, such debates have a long history. For centuries governments’ confiscatory capabilities developed hand-in-hand with property rights. Once states grew strong enough to protect claims to property, they also took powers to abrogate them. When Hugo Grotius, a 17th-century Dutch jurist, argued that all societies were formed to protect property rights, he was careful to create an exception. Sovereign rulers, he wrote, maintain the right of “eminent domain”, allowing them to seize private property for the public good. The idea caught on. Grotius’s theory was adopted by the Founding Fathers in America and by Napoleon in post- revolutionary France.

Because property rights tend to support economic growth, observers have often understated the role of confiscation in the history of rich, prosperous states. In 1989 Douglass North and Barry Weingast, two economic historians, argued that Britain’s Glorious Revolution of 1688 brought on “the elimination of confiscatory government”. That was an oversimplification. The power of confiscation moved from the monarchy to Parliament, but the state wielded it to redistribute land, raise money for wars and the like. Some 83% of constitutions adopted between 1850 and 2008 enshrine the right to expropriate property for the public good. Things get especially messy in times of war. In America Palmer seized not just factories and businesses from rich Germans in New York, but also the possessions of poor immigrants. Thousands of American women who had married German and Austro-Hungarian men also lost their property. Britain pursued a similar campaign against enemy-owned businesses across the empire. But it also forced British investors to sell the British state American securities, which it needed as collateral for loans from America. It bought them supposedly at market prices but paid the investors in sovereign bonds rather than cash. Confiscation is also contagious. Europe’s embrace of it during both world wars was carefully studied by the leaders of the continent’s former colonies. During the 1950s a wave of nationalisations spread across the Middle East and Asia. In 1956 Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s president, snatched the Suez Canal from the British and French. Law 285, which initiated that seminal expropriation, was modelled on the Trading with the Enemy Acts that Britain and America had used during the first world war. The contagion is spreading again. The Kremlin responded to the seizure of Russian assets by taking over Western firms’ concerns in Russia and distributing them among Vladimir Putin’s cronies. Four years into the war the country has more billionaires than it did in 2022 (even if it is harder for them to flaunt their wealth in Mayfair or on Avenue Montaigne). Autocracies, including post-colonial ones, are also catching the bug: in recent years juntas in the Sahel have seized Western-owned gold and uranium mines. America is not immune, either. This year Donald Trump, who called eminent domain “an absolute necessity” during his first

presidential run in 2016, has ordered the capture of Venezuelan oil tankers and threatened to seize the Panama Canal and Greenland. The brief spell of globalisation and peace around the turn of the millennium, when foreign assets ballooned and seizures all but stopped, was a historical anomaly, Mr Mulder thinks. It also left the world replete with property there for the taking.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/11/12/the-return-of-the- snatch-and-grab-state

· Science & technology

Scientists are at last starting to understand endometriosis The blood-brain barrier may contribute to cognitive function AI has proved that a theory underpinning fundamental physics is trustworthy Cameras in space could help spot invasive plants on Earth Is grip strength a useful indicator of health?

Science & technology | Vicious cycles Scientists are at last starting to understand endometriosis That should lead to quicker diagnosis and better treatment Nov 12th 2026 The endometrium is a layer of tissue in the uterus which typically thickens during the menstrual cycle. If a fertilised egg doesn’t implant, this lining typically thins and sheds. But in women with endometriosis, tissue similar to the endometrium starts growing outside the uterus. The condition can warp and bind together pelvic organs, including the ureter, bladder and bowel, and even spread into the abdominal wall. Over time it leads to nausea, vomiting and intolerable pain. It is estimated that 190m women have the disease. Modern medicine cannot cure endometriosis, and treatments are inadequate. Its causes are still largely unknown. Obtaining a diagnosis can take almost nine years, requiring such invasive surgical procedures as laparoscopies (in which small cameras are inserted through a slit in the abdomen) and biopsies