Public pensions are changing, too. Reforms in the 1990s had, bizarrely given ageing populations, reduced the average age at which people in the OECD retired, from about 65 to 61 (see chart 5). Pension systems thus had to support old folk for longer. Now governments are encouraging people to stay in work. In the past decade the average age at which an Italian man retires has increased by four years. Even in France, which has one of the world’s most generous pension systems, the age at which people hang up their boots is rising. A new database of pension reforms, maintained by the IMF, suggests that after years of giveaways, policies are becoming somewhat more hardnosed. Britain’s prime minister, Andy Burnham, recently said that his government would reform the “triple lock” on the state pension that raises it by inflation, earnings growth or 2.5%, whichever is highest. In 2025 China, where most men retired at 60 and women in blue-collar jobs could do so as young as 50, began implementing its first increase in the retirement age in over 70 years (to 63 for men and 55-58 for women by 2040). Even as they have tried to contain spending on the old, governments have become less stingy with the young. Many have increased handouts to families, often in an attempt to boost fertility rates. Since 2024 Germany, Ireland, Japan, Poland and South Korea have introduced or expanded child
allowances. Parental leave has grown more generous, too. Uncle Sam is chipping in $1,000 to seed investment accounts for children born in 2025- 28. Whether or not such policies meaningfully boost birth rates (and economists are sceptical), they certainly increase the incomes of young parents and their existing offspring. Perhaps some regression towards youth was inevitable after decades when everything seemed to go oldies’ way. Daniel Stockemer and Kamila Kolodziejczyk of the University of Ottawa and Aksel Sundström of the University of Gothenburg manage a data set which tracks the ages of political cabinets across the world. Our analysis of their data suggests that in the 2000s and 2010s, old people were increasingly overrepresented. More recently, however, this trend appears to be turning. In America’s House of Representatives the average age at the start of the current Congress in 2025 was 57.9 years, down from 58.4 in early 2021. It may be younger still next January, given the results of the midterm elections on November 3rd. The Senate will certainly get less geriatric: newly minted senators are nearly 15 years younger than the incumbents they replace. In Britain the average age of MPs elected in 2024 was 49, down from 51 five years earlier. In recent years the share of French ministers who are 40 or under has jumped from about one in ten to one in four. President Emmanuel Macron is 48, and first took office at the age of 39. Policy almost everywhere remains biased towards pensioners. The old hold a formidable stock of property and financial assets, and the coming pressure on health and long-term care will be severe. But for the first time in decades, governments are beginning to recognise that they do not exist to serve the needs of a single constituency. Slow growth and high public debt make it impossible to increase pensions indefinitely. Low fertility makes the cost of excluding parents from work more obvious. And to the extent that politicians look out for their own kind, these shifts may continue. The golden age of the golden oldie may be nearing its end. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/11/10/for-boomers-economic- boom-times-are-over
Finance & economics | Fight or flight Italy’s proposed exit tax causes ructions Taxing rich emigrants’ capital gains may be good in theory. Practice is harder Nov 12th 2026 Only a few days after Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, said her draft budget bill for next year would contain an “exit tax” on wealthy emigrants’ capital gains, she was back-pedalling. On November 5th her deputy economy minister, Maurizio Leo, said the government was “open to changes”. From tax lawyers to politicians, critics have been vocal. They include Matteo Renzi, who as prime minister proposed a flat tax of €100,000 ($111,000) on rich immigrants’ income from abroad. Introduced in 2017, it has been credited with making Italy attractive to foreign professionals. A populist measure, he says, will waste a decade of work. In principle an exit tax has something to be said for it. It removes the incentive to move abroad to dodge capital-gains tax on, say, shares or bonds
that have risen in value. Several countries have adopted such taxes (see map). Under Italy’s draft law, which is subject to a vote next month, residents with more than €800,000 of financial holdings worldwide who leave the country will pay a 26% capital-gains tax, regardless of whether they sell their stash. It covers gross financial assets (ie, before liabilities or debts), including derivatives and crypto assets as well as equities and bonds —a broader base than in other countries. Anyone resident for six out of the ten tax years before leaving Italy will be liable. But the tax has its flaws. Gains are to be calculated from the purchase price of assets, even if they were bought before someone arrived in Italy. Emigrants might also grumble about getting a bill for unrealised gains, although if they move to another European Union country and hold on to their nest-eggs they will be reimbursed after five years. Tracking those liable and calculating what is due may also be fiddly. And the Italian government will reap little: it expects merely €3.4m next year, €6.7m in each of the following four and €3.4m a year from then on. Government insiders say that besides courting voters before next year’s parliamentary election, Ms Meloni has acted in the belief that Britain would introduce an exit tax, leaving Italy as the only G7 country without one. That fear seems misplaced. Last year Rachel Reeves, then Britain’s chancellor,
pondered a 20% charge on unrealised capital gains on emigrants’ business assets. But she ditched the idea after warnings that it would prompt rich folk to move to places with no such levy—such as Italy. In 2022 Germany switched to a system that, like Ms Meloni’s proposal, taxes gains on the paper value of emigrants’ assets. Hitherto tax had been due only if assets were sold within ten years. Ulrich Stoll, who heads the Stiftung Familienunternehmen, a lobby group for family companies, argues that the new set-up inhibits entrepreneurs’ mobility. Mr Stoll, who also owns one-sixth of Festo, a 101-year-old engineering firm, says that under the new regime it would have been prohibitively costly to work in America for six years, a spell that proved useful for his career. A well-designed tax might allay such concerns. Christian Kempges, a lawyer at Baker Tilly, a consulting firm, says he can think of no country that has got exit taxes right. He suggests they should kick in only if an asset is sold, but with no time limit—and that the OECD should devise a rule to apply to all its members. Ms Meloni may be pushed into changing her plan. But her worry is losing votes, not losing the rich. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/11/12/italys-proposed-exit- tax-causes-ructions
Finance & economics | Diya or don’t ya Where to find the anti-AI trade The worse chipmakers do, the better Indian equities perform Nov 12th 2026 MOST OF THE world’s traders were still enjoying a weekend break on Sunday November 8th after a rough few days in the markets—except those in Mumbai, India’s financial capital. Its two big bourses opened for a 70- minute special session to mark Diwali, the festival of lights, and to welcome Lakshmi, the goddess of wealth. Trades made during this so-called Muhurat session are meant to be particularly auspicious. Investors are supposed to make long-term purchases: buying gold and silver is common as are conviction bets for the sake of the grandchildren. Investors in India had plenty of reason to be optimistic. The Nifty 50, a benchmark, has risen by more than a tenth over the past month, becoming the best-performing stock-market index in Asia. In the week running up to Diwali, it stood out in a sea of red as investors elsewhere feared that an AI
bubble had finally burst. The index rose by 2.4% on November 5th as the NASDAQ fell by 5.5%. The rally even extended to the rupee, which on November 6th reached its highest level since April. Indian equities have largely sat out the AI boom. Investors saw the country as a victim of disruption rather than a disruptor itself. In February 2026 the market plunged after the launch of Claude Code, an AI tool. A viral note from Citrini Research, a firm of analysts, added to the gloom, concocting a scenario in which India seeks an IMF bail-out in 2028 as its coding industry falters. India earns about 10% of its GDP from services exports. (Predictions of doom are still far from being borne out: employment in IT has grown and total Indian services exports are up by 8.7% so far this fiscal year.) Now that investors are re-evaluating AI’s prospects, India has gained. Since May India’s tech stocks have traded in the opposite direction to AI hardware stocks (see chart). As investors have become concerned about overexposure to AI hardware (memory chips and the like), they have rotated to AI wetware, the coders who use the tools. The Nifty IT index, which includes consultancies such as Infosys and Wipro, has risen by 28% since July, having previously fallen by 36%. The seesawing is mostly about sentiment, points out Anmol Garg, of DAM Capital, an investment bank. Excessive