the state’s governor. On October 28th the Federal Trade Commission ordered some of the country’s best-known firms, including Delta, Uber and Walmart, to hand over information as part of an investigation into personalised pricing. Regulators across the Atlantic are also swarming around the topic. This is both unsurprising and misguided. It is unsurprising because the public hates the idea. Dynamic pricing, the practice of varying the price of things like airline seats or ride-hailing fares over time in response to demand, is controversial enough. Personalised pricing, which means you might pay more than someone else who is buying an identical product at the same time, sounds even more galling. When people are asked how they feel about this possibility, they give it a big thumbs-down. Given the march of AI and widespread concerns over “affordability”, it’s no great shock that policymakers are rushing to curtail the practice. That doesn’t make them right to do so. In the proper circumstances, personalised pricing is perfectly acceptable to people. If you make bids on an auction site like eBay or negotiate a deal on behalf of your company, you are reaching a price based on your own willingness to pay. If you take part in a loyalty programme, you actively want your previous behaviour to affect prices. Entire industries depend on risk-based pricing that reflects information about individuals: the laws in Connecticut and New York, for example, have exemptions for insurers and lenders. Personalised pricing would make products cheaper for some. In a paper published in 2022, Jean-Pierre Dubé and Sanjog Misra of the University of Chicago conducted an experiment with ZipRecruiter, a jobs marketplace, to see how differential pricing plays out. They found that adjusting prices based on employers’ willingness to pay yielded both higher profits overall for ZipRecruiter and lower prices for a majority of its subscribers. In June Colorado’s governor, Jared Polis, vetoed a state law on personalised pricing for fear that it would make life less affordable for most consumers. Competition increases the likelihood that consumers would be better off in a world of individualised pricing. In an earlier paper, Mr Dubé and his colleagues looked at what happened when two Chinese cinemas started to offer discounts to consumers based on their smartphone location data. Each

chain had an incentive to offer deeper discounts when people were closer to a rival chain, encouraging the other to respond with defensive price cuts of their own. There are good reasons to worry about personalised pricing. Without robust privacy rules, firms will be tempted to use consumers’ personal data without their consent. There is a real benefit to having reference prices; if every price were tailored to individuals, customers might never be sure whether they were getting a good deal. But these concerns, combined with consumers’ instinctive aversion to the idea, is also reason to think that lots of firms will tread carefully. Amazon suffered a public backlash way back in 2000, when some DVD buyers were aggrieved to find that they were being charged a different price for the same title. The firm pledged then not to use customer demographics to set prices. In September John Furner, the boss of Walmart, made the same promise in an open letter. “We price the product, not the person,” he wrote. The crackdown on personalised pricing is understandable. But it risks hurting lower-income shoppers and piling on compliance costs in order to prevent something that may not materialise. That’s a bad deal. ■ Step inside the world of work with our Bartleby newsletter. Each week our white-collar oracle muses on the agonies of office life. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/business/2026/11/12/the-panic-over-personalised-pricing- is-overdone

Business · Business | Schumpeter

There has never been a scandal like the Jensen Huang affair A journey through the annals of corporate crises Nov 12th 2026 Editor’s note (November 12th 2026): This article has been updated to take account of Jensen Huang’s resignation. In the gossip columns it is the story of a steamy affair between an American billionaire who wears a leather jacket and a younger woman who allegedly works for Chinese intelligence. On Wall Street it illustrates a three-fold concentration risk: the danger of a stock market which depends on one technology, which depends on one firm, which depends on one man. In Washington they talk of a rotten Commerce Department, the closeness of President Donald Trump to tech bosses, and divisions in the Republican Party over China. “Two clichés make us laugh. A hundred clichés move us,”

wrote Umberto Eco of the film “Casablanca”. And so it is with the Jensen Huang affair: not one scandal, but many. The annals of corporate crisis contain nothing like it. Chief executives frequently face trouble in the boardroom over something that has happened in the bedroom. Every few years some more serious crisis fundamentally changes how the world views an important firm. These things do not happen simultaneously. John Browne was the oil industry’s “sun king”. In 2007 the BP boss resigned after telling a “white lie” in court about a relationship: a mark on the man, but not so much his firm. Conversely, there was not one individual to blame for, and nothing titillating about, BP’s oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico three years later. Rupert Murdoch’s media empire has been shaped by his five marriages and four divorces. But Wendi Deng, his wife at the time, never hacked phones for the News of the World. After the crisis comes the crisis response. This means a press release which attempts to maximise contrition and minimise legal risk. Mr Huang sent an all-staff email which mixed the panicked clichés of the disloyal husband (“cannot undo what I have done”) with those of the disgraced leader (“privilege of my life”). In all communications, the word “independent” must be used as frequently and liberally as possible: Nvidia’s “independent directors” tasked “independent counsel” to do an “independent investigation”. Sides are quickly chosen. Mr Trump jumped to Mr Huang’s defence. “He’s got to stay in that seat, at all costs” said one presenter of “All-In”, a bro-ish tech podcast, going all-in to defend Mr Huang and protect the stock market. Bad news often begets more bad news. Reports then emerged that Mr Huang may also have slept with a subordinate and on November 12th Nvidia announced that Mr Huang had resigned from the firm. He went quicker than most. Volkswagen’s boss resigned within a week after its emissions-rigging scandal in 2015. The boss of Wells Fargo lasted a month after the bank was fined for opening thousands of fake accounts in 2016. Boeing’s boss stuck around for a year after a 737 MAX crashed in 2018. The worst crises linger. Boeing’s next boss was felled by the same issue. The very worst become lengthy trials. In the early 2000s Roland Dumas, a French government minister, was tried (and eventually acquitted) over his

girlfriend’s lobbying for a state-owned oil firm. Some end up immortalised in salacious books. The same girlfriend recounted the affair in a tell-all entitled “The Whore of the Republic”. Mr Huang’s Chinese affair could go down as the most expensive shag in history. Nvidia is worth perhaps $500bn less than it was at the end of last week, which ranks this among the most costly corporate crises of all time. (The sum is greater still when you consider that the rest of the market is up.) The ultimate financial cost depends on two hard questions. How much was the influence wielded by Mr Huang in the White House actually worth? And can Colette Kress, the chief financial officer who Nvidia’s board said will run the company until a permanent successor is found, maintain the carefully balanced financial deals that Mr Huang assembled? Both matter not only for the chipmaker’s shareholders, but all of Silicon Valley. Mr Huang was the industry’s most vocal lobbyist and its keenest financial backer. The worst scandals are obvious in hindsight. Researchers drew attention to Volkswagen’s dodgy emissions figures a year before it was sued by the American government over “dieselgate”. A report by a short-seller on Mr Huang’s dealings with his mistress, Alice Huang, was published in May. That she might be a Chinese agent would have been obvious to Mr Huang had he inquired about her background: before going into business, Ms Huang worked at a Chinese state-run broadcaster known by its unimprovable acronym, “CCTV”. Mr Huang’s lack of inquisitiveness is bested only by that of Neil Bush, son of one American president and brother of another. When travelling in Asia during the 1990s, women would show up uninvited to his hotel room and have sex with him. “It was very unusual,” Mr Bush said later during his divorce proceedings. A great scandal is like a sponge, soaking up everything around it. The Huang affair is likely to become the focus of corruption inquiries by Democrats in Washington. How might it have been prevented? Investment restrictions have been adopted in recent years to prevent the Chinese from acquiring secrets by buying companies. But there are no good rules to stop them sleeping with executives. Never has the stock market depended on so few people so unaccustomed to being playboys.

The best precedent for the Huang affair has nothing to do with Silicon Valley, and it exploded all the way back in 1963, the year Mr Huang was born. John Profumo, an up-for-it British government minister with a national-security brief, had an affair with a young showgirl who was also said to be involved with Yevgeny Ivanov, a Soviet naval attaché. It mattered little that an official (indeed an “independent”) inquiry determined that no state secrets had been compromised by their relationship. Harold Macmillan, the prime minister, resigned soon after. Profumo withdrew from public life and spent the remainder of his days helping the poor of London’s East End. How will Mr Huang spend his? ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/business/2026/11/11/there-has-never-been-a-scandal-like- the-jensen-huang-affair

· Finance & economics

For boomers, economic boom times are over Italy’s proposed exit tax causes ructions Where to find the anti-AI trade The future of Trumponomics: compromise or failure Lessons from a miserable month for hedge funds The return of the snatch-and-grab state