Mr Farage was not alone in his broad goal. Every government since 2010 was elected on a pledge to cut immigration. David Cameron, as prime minister, wanted to reduce the net figure to “tens of thousands”. So did his successor, Theresa May. Boris Johnson, the prime minister behind Britain’s immigration spike, said numbers “will come down”. Rishi Sunak promised a cut. Even Sir Keir Starmer, a former Labour leader, said: “Read my lips: I will bring immigration…down.” People are used to being failed by their political class. What happens if they get what they want? In some ways it is heartening. Britain’s political class is racked with learned helplessness. Cabinet ministers complain that the “levers of power” are not connected to anything. Migration figures say otherwise. The government pulled one lever and made it easier for people to move to Britain. Millions did. The government decided this was too much, pulled another lever and numbers fell steeply. True, they bodged it both ways: Mr Johnson did not expect millions to come; Mr Sunak’s changes were not meant to cut net migration to near-zero. Governing is hard. But it is possible. Any politician expecting a thank-you is in for disappointment. Some parts of the debate will stay the same. When headline numbers shrink, others seem bigger. Small-boat crossings may be falling, yet they will account for a heftier chunk of net arrivals. Progressives once huffed that they were only a “tiny proportion” of overall migration. That particular argument has run its course. A world of “net-zero migration” is one in which the face of immigration is, more than ever, a man in a dinghy. Other aspects of the immigration debate have already shifted, with concern about the flow turning to concern about the stock. Britain has undergone a sweeping demographic change. In 2004, when it opened its doors to migrants from eastern Europe, about one in ten people in Britain were foreign-born. Now, the number is one in five. Between 2021 and 2024 alone the number of foreign nationals rose by about 2m people, points out the Migration Observatory. Shabana Mahmood, the home secretary (and also the first to say “Boriswave” at the dispatch box), has made it difficult for recent arrivals to make their stay permanent. And so a migration debate about stopping people coming turns into one about kicking people out. Reform has promised mass deportations; Mr
Farage erected a mock airport-departure board for one press conference. Others go further: “Millions. Must. Go” is the slogan of Restore Britain, a far-right party. A lesson learned by Lord Cameron and Baroness May is now being learned by Mr Farage. Someone, somewhere is always harder. Enormous numbers shifted the debate, with concern about immigration shooting up after the ons confirmed quite how big the recent influx had been. Will tiny ones—or negative ones—have the opposite effect? While opinion barely budged among Leave voters for whom immigration is an existential topic, liberal opinion moved sharply when arrivals exceeded one million. A majority of Remainers, Labour voters and even Liberal Democrats now think immigration has been too high for the past decade. Maybe the bill coming due will change their minds. The government’s short- term fiscal projections see the economy as a simple machine: immigrants are poured in at one end and gdp comes out the other. Some economists worry the recent glut of often low-earning immigrants will be bad for the public finances over the long term. But for now immigration still determines how much the chancellor can spend. Voters are not really prepared to make sacrifices for lower migration, says Christabel Cooper of ThinkLabour, a Labour-friendly think-tank. They may have to. With a long-frozen immigration debate going into flux, Britain’s progressives will shape it as much as conservatives. Once-verboten ideas are already being aired. Andy Burnham, the prime minister, is teasing the prospect of a return to freedom of movement between Britain and the EU, which some still see as political poison. At the same time, Ms Mahmood is trying to stem a tide that is already turning. “We look at the present through a rear-view mirror. We march backwards into the future,” said Marshall McLuhan, a media theorist. The lesson applies as much to migration policy as to the new tech he was talking about. Perhaps even older neuroses can emerge anew. A country being flooded is one thing; a country being drained is another. For much of the 20th century, emigration was the public-policy ill of its age. “Stay here and fight it out,” declared Winston Churchill in a bbc address shortly after the second world war, imploring people to stay in Britain rather than escaping to Australia or Canada. Britons may re-learn the lesson that a country people want to come
to is better than one people want to leave. In short, there is always something else to worry about. After nearly two decades of trying, the British state has delivered what voters have long said they wanted. No one will be happy about it. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/britain/2026/11/12/is-britain-ready-for-net-zero- migration
Despite recent misses, political polling is more accurate than ever Global bullies have turned uncertainty into a weapon
Despite recent misses, political polling is more accurate than ever But elections in America and Brazil illustrate how hard the task is becoming Nov 12th 2026 “We should always be afraid of many things,” muses Andrei Roman. “There’s not much we can do about them, though.” His gloom is not for humanity in general, but for one of its less celebrated endeavours: election polling. Mr Roman’s polling firm, AtlasIntel, was spot on in its soundings of American voters before the recent midterm elections. But most pollsters underestimated the Democrats’ support. And AtlasIntel did get it wrong twice in Brazil’s recent presidential election, first suggesting that Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the left-wing incumbent, would win the first round of voting
and then that Flávio Bolsonaro, his opponent, was ahead in the run-off. Many other pollsters made the same mistake. Are polls getting worse? Our analysis suggests not. Building on a dataset created by Will Jennings and Christopher Wlezien, two professors of political science, The Economist analysed polls of 469 elections in 49 countries between 1946 and 2026. Over the past 80 years, we found, polls have become slightly more accurate. An average of polls conducted within ten days of an election predicts a given party or candidate’s share of the vote with a mean error of just two percentage points (see chart 1). That result is all the more remarkable given the methodological challenges besetting pollsters. There are many reasons why polling should not work, but it does. In fact, it works better than the alternatives. The principle behind public-opinion surveys is simple. If you ask a large enough sample of random individuals in a population for their view on a given topic, you can say with a reasonable degree of accuracy that the whole population shares their beliefs. Early polling pioneer George Gallup likened it to tasting a soup. Providing the soup is well-mixed, you need only one spoonful to know how it tastes.
In practice, it can be very difficult to ensure that a sample is truly random. Famously the Literary Digest, an American magazine, inferred in 1936 from 2.4m postcards sent in by readers—a sample size unheard of today—that Republican Alf Landon would be elected president. Instead, Franklin Roosevelt was re-elected in a landslide. The sample may have been huge, but it was not random. What followed was the first of many reinventions for the polling industry as it embraced “scientific” methods. In the 1950s and 1960s most pollsters relied on face-to-face interviews at random addresses. In the 1970s and 1980s many shifted to telephone interviews, calling numbers at random. But the willingness of ordinary voters to speak to pollsters has waned. “When I started doing this, the idea was you could do a phone survey and get a 50% response rate,” recalls Doug Rivers of YouGov, a polling firm that partners with The Economist. Now he reckons the response rate is 1-2%. As a result, a majority of pollsters have given up on using strictly random samples. Instead, the most common form of polling now involves self- selected panels of online survey-takers, who are paid for each survey they complete. Rather than randomness, pollsters rely on quotas of different types of respondents and post facto “weights”, which adjust a sample to make it representative of the whole population. In a recent poll of Americans by Léger, a Canadian firm, 60% of respondents were 55 or older, for example. After weights were applied, they made up only 41% of the survey—a far cry from the ideal of random sampling. Contrary to some conspiracy theories, pollsters have a strong interest in getting election surveys right. Rather than money-makers, election polls are in effect advertisements intended to persuade customers to commission research on other topics. If pollsters fumble an election, it hurts their reputation. “We always used to say political polling is 90% of the publicity and less than 1% of the revenue,” says Ben Page, a former boss of Ipsos, another polling firm. Pollsters’ judgment remains critical, however. In 2016, for example, the New York Times gave four pollsters the same raw data from Floridian voters in that year’s presidential election. After weighting, the groups came back