Other federal contractors do not inspire as much personal animus among Democrats. But they can still expect scrutiny now that the opposition party controls the purse strings, especially in industries that lefties find objectionable. Private-prison operators such as CoreCivic and GEO, both of which have assisted Mr Trump’s heartless mass-deportation effort, shed value on fears that the incoming Congress would squeeze the immigration budget. Democrats are also unlikely to accept Mr Trump’s request to spend $1.5trn on defence, hitting Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, RTX and other armsmakers. The second group of losers comprises firms whose fortunes depend wholly on the buildout of artificial-intelligence data centres. These installations were supported by many Republicans—until they provoked a backlash which the Democrats ruthlessly exploited. Three of the four states which accounted for half of planned new capacity—Georgia, Ohio and Texas— have Republican governors. From next year all four will have Democratic ones. In Texas, the top destination for data centres, the governor-elect, Gina Hinojosa, campaigned on a promise to impose an immediate moratorium on their construction. The share price of CoreWeave, a big independent data-centre operator, duly slumped by 10%. Micron, which makes memory chips that go into AI servers, lost 7% of its value. Nvidia, the $5trn behemoth of AI-chipmaking, slipped by 3%. Manufacturers of electrical components—lots of which are needed in data centres and in power plants that supply them with electricity —have also taken a knock. Before the elections the two parties had reached a tentative deal on a bill that would make it easier for big energy projects, such as pipelines and wind farms, to secure the necessary permits. Democrats may now wish to drive a harder bargain. The shares of GE Vernova, Vistra and Vertiv each lost around a tenth of their value. Conversely, the blue wave has lifted industries that can count on Trumpian budget cuts being unwound (health care and clean energy) and large spenders on data centres. Big tech’s “hyperscalers” may now spend less, preserving their margins, while facing less competition for their existing capacity from CoreWeave and the like. Amazon and Microsoft were up by more than 6%. Alphabet gained over 3%. Even Meta, led by the manospheric Mark Zuckerberg, edged up. The tech bosses can expect to be

hauled before Congress for adversarial hearings, both about AI and their obsequiousness towards Mr Trump. But at least their next earnings calls may turn out to be more amicable.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/11/04/what-markets-make-of- the-midterms

Finance & economics | Collateral damage Indebted tycoons haunt China’s banking system Lenders are feeling the hangover from years of Wild East capitalism Nov 5th 2026 ON OCTOBER 31ST Bank of Shanghai gave investors a nasty shock. It said its net profit had collapsed by 93% in the third quarter, year on year, to 350m yuan ($53m); its non-performing loans shot up by 75% in the first nine months of 2026; and the capital set aside to cover unexpected losses hit the lowest in a decade. Its share price plunged by over 10%. The main source of the lender’s troubles seems to be its relationship with one man, Yao Zhenhua. Mr Yao has been stalking Chinese finance since 2015. That year his conglomerate, Baoneng, made a hostile bid for Vanke, a giant property developer. This was a triple surprise: such takeovers are almost unheard of in China; they are entirely unheard of when the target is, like Vanke, partly state-owned; and Baoneng financed the deal in an unconventional way,

using premiums from several insurers it owned. This brazenness earned Mr Yao the nickname “barbarian”, in tribute to American corporate raiders of the late 1980s. The takeover failed and Mr Yao’s use of premiums was found to be illegal (China tightly regulates how they can be invested). In 2017 he was banned from the insurance industry for ten years. But he expanded his empire in other areas. This included a 6.6bn yuan debt-fuelled investment in Qoros, a maker of electric cars. As Bank of Shanghai has disclosed, commercial conquest has not gone well for the barbarian. As part of a long-running lawsuit against Mr Yao and Baoneng, the lender has sought to recover loans extended to his companies worth at least 12.9bn yuan. The loans were secured in 2020 with property and with personal guarantees from Mr Yao. This collateral took a hit when China’s property sector imploded. Qoros, meanwhile, sold too few cars and folded. In January this year Mr Yao, whose poor credit score bans him from commercial flights and luxury hotels, appeared in a social-media post claiming that local government officials had cheated him out of his investment in the car firm. The most stunning revelation from Bank of Shanghai is that Mr Yao and his companies have “no executable assets” from which to recover those debts. This would explain photos posted to social media of someone looking remarkably like him riding the metro in Shenzhen, a big southern city, rather than taking a limo. More importantly for Bank of Shanghai’s investors, it explains what happened to the lender’s profits, which were eaten up by huge impairment losses. Many other Chinese banks that have done business with Mr Yao and Baoneng may be next. Mr Yao is not the first tycoon to rattle the banking system. In 2019 another, Xiao Jianhua, caused a mini financial crisis. He is in prison. A fellow indebted plutocrat, Lai Xiaomin, was executed in 2021. Despite the Communist Party’s efforts to rid Chinese finance of such rogues, the Baoneng barbarian is probably not the last.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/11/05/indebted-tycoons-haunt- chinas-banking-system

Finance & economics | Buttonwood China’s AI stock-market struggles are a warning What happens when the supply of new tech catches up with demand? Nov 5th 2026 IN THE GOOD old days China appealed to investors as the world’s greatest convergence story. Its living standards would catch up with those in the West, its economy would multiply in size and the value of its stock market would grow in tandem. Or so the story went. Investors just needed to position themselves on the right side of history before everyone else arrived. In more recent years China’s residual appeal to global investors has rested on the opposite logic—not convergence, but diversification. There is less talk of China’s destiny, more recognition of its idiosyncrasy. China, it has become clear, dances to the beat of the Communist Party’s own drum. That means it can defy global trends, good and bad. One recent example is the stock market. Global equities have risen by 11% this year, according to the MSCI World index, despite recent jitters. Other

East Asian economies like South Korea and Taiwan have ridden the artificial-intelligence boom to far greater heights. China is also tightly stitched into the AI supply chain and boasts several innovative model- makers of its own, including listed companies like Z.ai and MiniMax, which both trade in Hong Kong. But China’s tech shares have plummeted in the second half of the year, onshore and off. And its blue-chip index, the CSI 300, is down by more than 11% so far in 2026. Chinese equities have put the sync into idiosyncrasy. China’s government seems fed up with this particular source of exceptionalism. The rout has prompted fresh buying from the “national team”, state-owned financial institutions that prop up the market when needed. China’s central bank has also lent a hand. On November 2nd it said it would dust off a scheme that helps institutional investors, such as insurers and brokers, obtain the liquid collateral they need to finance their equity purchases. It will also make it cheaper for companies to borrow to buy back their own shares. Why is the stock market sagging? Some of it has to do with those Chinese characteristics. Take fiscal policy. Other big economies would benefit from budgetary restraint but will see little of it. In China, by contrast, the government is tightening its belt when it should be loosening it. Its fiscal deficit, broadly defined, will narrow this year by 1.4% of GDP, reckons Goldman Sachs, a bank. An endless property slump is also still taking a toll. On October 29th Fitch, a credit-rating agency, said it might downgrade the bonds issued by Zhuhai Huafa Group, a state-owned conglomerate based in China’s Pearl River Delta. Known for a 72-storey tower overlooking the coastal cities of Zhuhai and Macau, the group also has lofty debts worth 413bn yuan ($62bn). According to Bloomberg, it recently delayed payment on two trust products (debt obligations that do not trade on exchanges) and asked for an extension on bank loans. The share price of its listed property unit fell by more than a fifth—never mind that the group’s main owner, the city of Zhuhai, is unlikely to let it default on a publicly traded bond. Another explanation for China’s underperformance is more worrying. It may be an early victim of an investment trend that seems to be spreading around

the world: the loss of enthusiasm for AI. In the West investors have begun to worry that AI models will eventually become commoditised. Pricing power will disappear as innovators struggle to maintain a durable lead over imitators. In China that grim end-game was more or less the industry’s starting-point. Chinese AI labs openly shared the mathematical “weights” that make models clever. That encouraged adoption, and helped the labs attract brainiacs motivated by intellectual glory as well as financial success. But openness comes at a commercial cost. The AI-related revenues of China’s six leading firms together amount to about a tenth of the combined revenues of America’s top two, OpenAI and Anthropic, according to Epoch AI, a research firm. China may also offer a foretaste of what happens when the supply of new tech shares finally catches up with demand. It has tested investors’ appetite with a crowded pipeline of initial public offerings. America may find that Anthropic’s highly anticipated listing provokes similar indigestion, even in its much bigger market. China’s oddities deter many global investors. A bigger worry in tech circles is that China’s lean present becomes the rest of the world’s future. China may be less an outlier than an omen.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/11/03/chinas-ai-stock-market- struggles-are-a-warning