Muslim feminist influencers are building followings online, even if they are not yet mainstream. In Nigeria, Wardah Abbas, a Muslim writer, has gained popularity by challenging more conservative views on gender, which she argues are rooted more in culture than in Islam itself. “We don’t care what you have to say about this religion. We want to do our own personal research,” she says. Amina Wadud, an American theologian nicknamed “The Lady Imam”, describes herself as an “ally” to gay and transgender Muslims. Some lifestyle influencers encourage Muslims to break the mould in more subtle ways. “Ayahsvoice”, a Briton with more than 14m likes on TikTok, describes herself as a “scholar of pink cherry Islam” and says that her account is for Muslim women who “struggle to fit in the religion”. Her make-up tutorials are generally light on theology. But she openly rejects Hadith, the collected sayings and doings of the Prophet Muhammad—a fundamental departure from orthodox Islam. She argues that the misogyny espoused by some male Muslim influencers stems more from the Hadith than from the Koran. Muslim lifestyle influencers are also popular in Indonesia. Many promote or sell their own modest clothing on Instagram. Ummu Alila, one such influencer, who has around 500,000 followers on the app, offers head coverings and denim dresses designed to comply with Islamic principles. Ummu Alila founded the firm with her husband, Felix Siauw, a preacher who built a big following online in the mid-2010s. He was a member of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, which agitated for a transnational Islamic caliphate (it was banned in 2017). Now he and she opine online together about everything from touring Istanbul to infidelity. Social media also offer believers perspectives from parts of the Islamic world far from their own. Mr Suleiman, the Texan imam, has plenty of followers in the Middle East. Ms Lim says in the past “people received only one side”, but she now gets ideas from influencers such as Mufti Menk, a popular scholar from Zimbabwe. There is, inevitably, plenty of incendiary content, too. Muhammad Hijab, who is associated with a group of young British Muslim influencers nicknamed the “Dawah Bros”, has 1.3m subscribers on YouTube. He likes to
debate atheists and non-Muslim religious leaders, producing pugnacious videos with titles like “Anti-Islam preacher humiliated”. Some commentators talk of a Muslim “manosphere”, which blends Islamic theology with macho chauvinism. When Andrew Tate, an influencer wanted in Britain on charges of rape and human trafficking, converted to Islam in 2022, Mr Hijab interviewed him to welcome him to the faith. In 2022 Mr Hijab travelled to the city of Leicester, where there had been clashes between Hindus and Muslims. He told crowds of Muslim men, many of them masked, that Hindu nationalists were “pathetic, weak and cowardly”. It is not clear whether online influencers have steered Muslims in a more liberal or conservative direction overall. But they have fostered a sense of digital community. Ishtiaque Ahmed of the University of Toronto argues that Muslims’ access to a wide range of information has spurred the emergence of “a spirit of global Islam” online. Those who are opposed to Israel’s war in Gaza, for example, have a place to unite and discuss their cause. The diaspora from Muslim-majority countries can also access teachings from back home more easily, says Ali Riaz of Illinois State University. Some mainstream imams denounce the more novel teachings spreading online. “I have been excommunicated a number of times and I’ve been accused of being a sell-out, a heretic,” says Ms Abbas, the Nigerian feminist. But most forms of Islam have always been decentralised, without an institutional hierarchy or a supreme leader like the pope. Years of study at well-known institutions, such as Al Azhar in Cairo, do not guarantee digital prominence. In the age of the internet, notes Ibrahim Abusharif of Northwestern University, “Authentic scholars and pathetic pretenders can compete for audiences.”
The profusion of interpretations of Islam circulating online makes some governments wary, too. In 2024 Manahel al-Otaibi, a popular Muslim online fitness instructor, was sentenced to 11 years in prison in Saudi Arabia for sharing pictures of herself in immodest clothing and for supporting an end to Islamically inspired laws that allow men to control the movements of their wives and some female relatives. In 2017 Salman al-Ouda, a prominent Saudi cleric with more than 9m followers on X, was arrested just days after he tweeted a prayer of reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, in apparent opposition to the Saudi government’s blockade of Qatar. In democracies the popularity of Islamic influencers has prompted a different sort of response from politicians. Bernie Sanders, an American senator, got Mr Suleiman to speak at a rally when he ran for president in 2020. In the run-up to Indonesia’s presidential election in 2024, politicians sought the support of popular Muslim influencers such as Haikal Hassan, who has about 2m Instagram followers. Such figures are also prominent in Bangladeshi politics. After Tarique Rahman became prime minister earlier this year he sought the advice of Sheikh Ahmadullah, a preacher with 3.5m YouTube subscribers, about amending laws on donations to charity—a pillar of Islam.
The internet is not everything. In many Muslim-majority countries beliefs are still primarily shaped by local scholars. Nurudeen Lemu, one such scholar, says that much of what is debated online is not very useful in Nigeria. “Religion is not copy paste. An online response backed by a Pakistani, a Saudi, an American, an Australian, to a Nigerian Muslim is contextless,” he says, pointing to differences in everything from eating habits to clothing. Mr Lemu even plays down the risk of extremists exploiting the digital world to foster Islamist terrorism. In surveys he has conducted of detained jihadists in northern Nigeria, he found that “less than 1% of recruitment was online” over the past decade. “They were using cassette tapes! There is a gentle rise as internet access has gone further and batteries last longer, but it usually requires a friend.” Moreover, online preachers can only supplement local ones, rather than supplant them, since taking part in communal services in person is important in Islam. Most Muslims consider attendance at Friday prayers compulsory for able-bodied men, for instance. About 40% of American Muslims attend services once a week. Bouziane Zaid of the University of Sharjah has found that Middle Eastern youths still tend to turn to a local imam first for serious advice on personal matters. Local imams and congregations will always be influential—but they are now just one of many forces shaping young Muslims’ beliefs. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/international/2026/11/05/the-digital-world-is-making- islam-more-diverse
Fear united Europe. Nationalism may tear it apart Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin made Europe serious about its own defences. That may not last Nov 5th 2026 FOR MOST of the past 800 years, the sight of German soldiers inspired dread in Lithuanian hearts. Today, as a small Baltic state with Russia as a direct neighbour, Lithuania is happy to host a permanently deployed German armoured brigade. The aggression of Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, and the might-makes- right callousness of his American counterpart, Donald Trump, have not only scrambled Europe’s calculations about power, but also the continent’s balance of fear. In 2029 Germany, Europe’s largest country, plans to spend 3.5% of GDP, or €162bn ($182bn), on defence. That is more than the combined defence spending of Britain and France last year. Far from being alarmed by German rearmament, many neighbours are counting on it.
Put bluntly, after decades of underinvestment in defence, mainstream European leaders have a horror of being abandoned by America before the region is strong enough to deter Russia on its own. Their fears mounted after Mr Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. They turned to near-panic after Mr Trump was re-elected in 2024, and he made clear his scorn for Ukraine and its allies in NATO and the European Union, and his preference for ending the Ukrainian war on terms favourable to Russia. European leaders broadly agree on the need to support Ukraine and prepare for America to become, at best, NATO’s offshore protector of last resort. That shared task helped Britain repair ties with allies that take defence seriously, including nuclear-armed France, big-spending Germany, and Ukraine’s most loyal supporters in northern and eastern Europe. A common foe puts Brexit squabbles in perspective. The balance of fear has changed, too, in Germany, where the public had to overcome its unease about military might. Though cold-war West Germany maintained one of NATO’s largest armies, politicians allowed citizens to indulge in a comfortable fantasy, portraying post-1989 Germany as a commerce-minded, pacifist friend to all. Some on the left treated Germany as something like a recovering addict to militarism, which if allowed even a sniff of gunpowder might go on a terrible bender before waking with a headache to discover it had occupied Luxembourg, once again. Such angst was cured by Mr Putin and above all by Mr Trump. German defence spending grew in earnest after Ukraine’s invasion in 2022, inspiring what Germany’s then-chancellor, Olaf Scholz, called a Zeitenwende, or “turning-point”. Spending surged after 2024 and the return of an America- First president. European unity is, however, more fragile than it appears. Over the next 12 months, elections will be held in Spain, France, Poland and Italy. In several cases, parties on the nationalist right are poised for power. Some right-wing populists have histories of sympathising with Russia, including Marine Le Pen, front-runner in the French presidential contest, and Roberto Vannacci, a former general and Russia-admirer challenging Italy’s conservative prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, from her right. If Poland’s feuding politicians agree on one thing it is on loathing Russia. Still, some Polish conservatives