Alyona is one of the few. Births in Ukraine are falling, in part because there are fewer adults. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 the population inside government-controlled territory has fallen from about 37m to 27m- 28m (see chart 1). Around 3m-5m Ukrainians now live under Russian occupation, and millions more have emigrated. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, puts combat deaths at over 50,000; an independent estimate is closer to 150,000. Thousands of civilians have been killed, and Russia has deported over 20,000 children to Russify them. Wartime, moreover, is not good for starting families. The fertility rate has dropped from 1.2 children per woman in 2020 to 0.8-0.9, lower than any big country but South Korea. The replacement rate, needed to keep the population stable, is 2.1. In the first half of 2026 deaths outnumbered births by more than three to one. Ukraine’s birth rate has lagged behind the mortality rate every year since independence in 1991, when the country (including Crimea and Donbas) had about 52m inhabitants. The war has turned that gap into a chasm. Russia’s population is getting smaller too, but Ukraine’s predicament is far worse. For a country under attack by its imperial neighbour, a demographic collapse is an existential worry (see chart 2).

The refugee exodus accounts for the largest decline. Over 5m Ukrainians live abroad, mostly in Europe. Russia’s redoubled drone and missile attacks this winter could drive thousands more to leave. Worse, fewer refugees now say they plan to come home. The share has fallen from 74% in late 2022 to 43%, according to the Centre for Economic Strategy (ces) in Kyiv. Most refugees are children and women under 44, compounding the damage. “We are also losing our future,” says Ella Libanova, director of the Mykhaylo Ptoukha Institute for Demography in Kyiv. At home, mobilisation, combat casualties and wartime uncertainty are shrinking the pool of prospective fathers and mothers. Most Ukrainian couples are putting off childbearing, says Svetlana Aksyonova, another demographer, adding: “The longer you postpone having children, the greater the risk the child will never be born.” Ukraine’s exemption of men under 25 from conscription was intended to cushion the demographic decline. But hundreds of thousands of young men have gone abroad; since August 2025 Ukraine has allowed men under 23 to do so. Many who remain have no intention of starting a family. Recent projections see at best a slower decline—assuming the war ends within a few years. The generation born in the 1990s and 2000s is Ukraine’s

smallest in modern history, so it cannot expect a post-war “baby boom”, says Olga Dukhnich of the Frontier Institute, a Ukrainian think-tank. The government’s demographic strategy, adopted two years ago, envisaged a slight population rebound by 2030. But it also envisaged peace in 2026 and returning to 1991 borders, which no longer looks possible. A more realistic scenario from the United Nations projects an annual decline of 0.7-0.9% for the next couple of decades. That would leave Ukraine with about 25m people in 2040, assuming no recovery of occupied territory. If war stretches into the 2030s it would exacerbate the crisis, leading millions born in the 1990s to forgo having kids altogether. The fertility rate could go as low as 0.6 children per woman, says Ms Aksyonova, with most births in the country’s safer west. Frontline areas would be on a path towards depopulation. To slow the decline, Ukraine is offering incentives. A new law pays parents 50,000 hryvnia ($1,100) per newborn, plus 7,000 hryvnia per month for the first year. Other programmes help pay for child care. Since 2024 Ukraine has covered infertility treatment for women. Soldiers can freeze their eggs or sperm free of charge. Yet subsidies have a limited effect on birth rates even in peacetime, experts say, let alone in war. “How can you encourage having children in such conditions?” asks Ms Libanova. Russia is celebrating Ukraine’s decline. “This is not just a crisis,” Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, said in May, “but evidence of the biological death of a nation.” Anton Kobyakov, an adviser to Vladimir Putin, advocates settling Russians in Ukraine as Catherine the Great did in the 18th century. “All that remains [for Ukraine] is extinction, and only Russia can save the country,” he said in September. That is nonsense; Ukraine can survive as a smaller country. But such remarks suggest Russia is starting to view depopulation as a war objective. When the war finally ends, immigration could help. Ukraine’s economy is already starved of workers. The country faces a labour shortage of 2.5m people, says the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Only about 9,500 migrant workers are registered in Ukraine, and companies keen to hire foreigners complain of bureaucratic obstacles. But the government

prefers to seek new workers at home, among women, war veterans and displaced persons. That is difficult. Veterans struggle to find work, and though wartime data are unavailable, experts think female labour participation has not risen much. Limited child care appears to be the main barrier. Still, immigration is seen as a last resort. Ukraine would open up to foreign workers “only after we fully explore the potential” of Ukrainians at home and abroad, says Dariia Marchak, the deputy economy minister. But there will be too few of them to rebuild the country after the war, says Hlib Vyshlinsky of CES. “I’m a hundred percent sure Ukraine will need foreign workers.” Some Ukrainians are defying the obstacles to having children. Daria, strolling with her boyfriend in a park in central Kharkiv, says she has just moved to the city from Odessa to start a family. (Her boyfriend looks both touched and surprised to hear it.) Others are going to greater lengths. Liudmyla, a soldier in her late 30s near Dnipro, in eastern Ukraine, says she started freezing her eggs last year. Before the war she dreamed of two children, but now she wants three. “One for the dead,” she says, paraphrasing Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine’s national poet, “one for the living, and one for the yet to be born.”■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/11/05/war-battered-ukraine-risks-a- demographic-collapse

Europe · Europe | The means of habitation

The leftists who want to seize Berlin’s apartments Die Linke’s radicalism makes it hard for it to form a coalition Nov 5th 2026 FORMING COALITIONS in Germany is usually a pedestrian affair. Not in Berlin. On September 20th Die Linke, a populist-left outfit, won an election in the capital, one of Germany’s three city-states. But its attempt to build a leftist coalition with the Greens and Social Democrats has been hindered by scandal and strife. Conservatives say Die Linke is riddled with antisemites and pals around with terrorist-coddlers. Hardliners in the party rage against their leaders for conceding to Zionist principles. Senior Social Democrats are urging their comrades in Berlin to pull the plug. Undeterred, the three parties began negotiating a coalition deal on November 2nd. Its centrepiece will be one of the most radical expropriation plans ever proposed in western Europe: Die Linke’s signature policy to “socialise”, in the preferred lingo, the rental properties of big corporate

landlords. “Housing is a human right. And we want to take that right out of the hands of speculators,” said Elif Eralp, Die Linke’s mayoral candidate, before the election. The idea dates to a referendum held in 2021, after years of surging rents in the once-cheap capital (see chart). Only around 15% of Berliners own their homes, and a clear majority backed a plan to seize properties of corporations that own over 3,000 units, with compensation. The city government kicked it into the long grass. But the idea persisted, and last year the campaigners behind the 2021 initiative wrote a draft bill that could inspire the law to come. Die Linke placed the idea at the heart of its election campaign. The three notional governing partners have agreed to lift the threshold at which socialisation kicks in to 10,000 units. That means roughly 160,000, or 15%, of Berlin’s private rental homes would be taken into public hands (nearly 130,000 of these belong to Vonovia, Europe’s biggest corporate landlord). Compensation would be capped at €16bn ($18bn). Rental payments in the expropriated flats could service the loans the city or its housing companies incur to finance the compensation. Details will be worked out in coalition talks.

The proposal is all the more ambitious for resting on a never-used article in the German constitution which says “Land, natural resources and means of production…may be transferred to public ownership or other forms of public enterprise.” For decades this clause was ignored as a relic from a time when the young federal republic had not yet committed to market principles. But then the expropriation campaigners latched on to it. Most economists are deeply sceptical about the proposal. It would do nothing to inspire new construction, though the parties have separately pledged to build 100,000 homes. It would also protect existing tenants, many of whom are not in need, while doing little for newcomers or outsiders. Indeed it is likely to have a chilling effect on construction in the city, says Michael Voigtländer at the German Economic Institute in Cologne. And investors are horrified. German ministers have been peppered with questions from foreign firms and politicians worried that investment is no longer safe in Germany. Friedrich Merz, the conservative chancellor, has promised to pass a national law to forestall Berlin’s scheme: a striking intervention in state affairs by the federal government. Opinions differ fiercely on whether that is possible. Mr Merz’s proposal “is so obviously unlawful that it might not even need to be challenged in court”, says Niklas Schenker, a Die Linke member of the Berlin parliament and one of the brains behind the initiative. But opponents say a well-crafted law to protect private investments is perfectly plausible—and that the expropriation proposal itself violates the well-tested legal principle of proportionality. Germany’s constitutional court, in Karlsruhe, is likely to have the final say. A second hurdle for the plan is working out how to compensate landlords. Mr Voigtländer puts the full market value at around €25bn. But German law does not mandate compensation at full market value, says Isabel Feichtner, a legal scholar at the University of Würzburg. The draft bill suggested that Vonovia and the others could expect to get 40-60% of market value; its proponents say landlords should not profit from land-value appreciation. But Karlsruhe may take a different view. The court could also frown on the period of repayment: the draft bill proposed 100-year bonds. Berlin cannot afford to further burden its state