Congo. But there are still three concerns. The first is that Congo is a large country— with an ongoing war in the east involving M23, a Rwandan-backed force. There is a lot of room for further spread. The second is that Ebola could take off in the most fragile of Congo’s bordering states: Burundi, South Sudan and the Central African Republic. The third worry is that the longer the outbreak persists, the greater the secondary effects. In the west African outbreak thousands more babies and mothers died than would have otherwise been the case because of disruptions to health services. Doctors working in Congo say fewer children are being immunised and malaria is on the rise. The good news is that there are efforts to find an effective vaccine against Bundibugyo. On October 23rd the first participants in clinical trials in eastern Congo received shots of Ervebo, a vaccine that protects against a more common strain. Scientists are also working on a bespoke jab. But it will be months, at best, before a proven vaccine is produced. For many people that will be far too late. ■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/11/04/the-latest-ebola- outbreak-could-be-the-worst-ever
Middle East & Africa | Digital ghosts Hackers are exploiting Africa’s digital identities Governments are embracing new databases. So are criminals Nov 5th 2026 EARLIER THIS year hackers targeted Senegal’s agency for issuing passports and identity cards. The attackers claim to have stolen sensitive data from the west African country, including biometric information and immigration records. The authorities told citizens that their data were safe. But some of the loot seemingly ended up on the dark web. It was not the only successful recent cyber-attack on the state. In May, criminals targeted the national treasury. Last year hackers demanded a ransom of $10m after breaching the tax authority. Senegal is not alone. As African governments digitise government services and grow their national-identity databases, they are struggling to protect citizens’ data. Incidents such as the recent discovery of a vulnerability in PHP, a programming language commonly used by governments, show that
the problem is not limited to Africa. But the continent has less money and talent to bolster its cyber-security. And as artificial intelligence (AI) expands attackers’ toolkits, African governments will urgently need to find ways to secure their systems. Their problems often stem from efforts to improve public services. Of the 800m people worldwide who have no legal proof of who they are, more than half live in sub-Saharan Africa. Without a formal identity many find it impossible to join welfare programmes or health-insurance schemes, send children to school, own land, open bank accounts or activate sim cards. Countries like Uganda, where almost 80% of people have a digital ID, can now more easily track their people and close gaps in provision. (Around a decade ago fewer than 10% of Ugandans had some legal proof of their identities.) A digitally savvy state is better equipped to spot fraud, collect taxes and safeguard elections. Yet governments are failing to secure the growing number of access points for hackers. That is mainly because there are not enough qualified people who can help them do it. Mastercard, the payments firm, reckons that Africa has 200,000 unfilled cyber-security jobs, equivalent to about a quarter of the current workforce. Banking and telecommunications firms snap up the few qualified engineers and security analysts. As ai accelerates, Africa’s skills gap is widening. Money is another problem. According to a survey by Interpol, nearly all African members cited “resource constraints” as an obstacle to improving cyber-security. Protecting databases is expensive. Software is often installed and managed by foreign firms because there are too few qualified local engineers. Importing these services uses scarce foreign currency. Computers need reliable power, which many African grids do not provide. Some countries are trying to bolster their defences. In Ghana, firms must report major breaches to the Cyber Security Authority within a day of spotting them or risk fines or the imprisonment of bosses. Kenya has an incident-response centre that regularly publishes reports on cyber threats. But other countries are lagging behind. Only 16 on the continent have ratified the African Union’s Malabo Convention, which is supposed to encourage pan-African digital standards.
In the short term, governments are trying to encourage citizens to be more careful. Ghana’s “Be cyber smart” campaign urges people to protect their passwords, avoid dodgy links and keep private information private. Rosemary Kisembo, who runs Uganda’s identity register, says that “people share more about themselves on Facebook” than with the government, a sign she takes as Ugandans’ lax approach to data security. The gaps in funding and skills are difficult to close. Wide variation in connectivity, compute capacity and digital literacy among African countries hinders collaboration. But governments could do more to work together. Sharing intelligence about attacks could help them anticipate vulnerabilities. But weak supranational institutions—and national pride—have hampered efforts. Some countries deny there is an issue. Nigeria’s identity-management body, for example, still claims that its database was not compromised, even though journalists have found national-identification numbers for sale on the black market since 2024. It is hard to solve the problem unless it is identified first. ■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/11/03/hackers-are-exploiting- africas-digital-identities
Middle East & Africa | Nervous neighbours America’s allies oppose more war in Iran. They may not get a say Economies are shrinking and a deal remains elusive Nov 5th 2026 THE DIPLOMATS and military officers gathered last week for the Manama Dialogue, an annual talkfest in Bahrain’s capital, all had the same questions —and no answers. As they nibbled puff pastry at the Ritz-Carlton, their conversations invariably came back to Donald Trump’s threats to resume his war with Iran after the midterm elections. Would he do it, and when? Might the Iranians strike first? There were almost no Americans on hand to ask: the Trump administration sent only a pair of mid-ranking officials, and both were tight-lipped. To some Gulf officials, the unusually small delegation seemed like a snub. “They could at least try to reassure us,” grumbled one.
Gulf states are reluctant to offer such blunt criticism in public, lest they antagonise the president. But they are unanimous that they do not want another round of fighting—unlike in February, when some were equivocal. This time even the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has taken the most hawkish stance towards Iran, is urging Mr Trump not to strike. “We in the UAE don’t believe that a military solution is viable,” says Anwar Gargash, a diplomatic adviser to the Emirati president. Behind the scenes, diplomats are scrambling to find a deal. Envoys from Qatar shuttling back and forth to Tehran have encountered two big obstacles, however. One is Mr Trump’s seeming insistence that a new agreement include at least some concessions related to Iran’s nuclear programme. The Iranians refuse to discuss it. Instead they are gloating at Mr Trump’s drubbing in the midterms. The other is how to sequence an agreement. America and Iran both want to avoid a repeat of the memorandum of understanding, the vague agreement they signed in June and which collapsed within weeks. Each side wants the other to move first. Iran insists that America start by lifting its naval blockade and removing a range of sanctions. Only then will it reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The Americans fear Iran would simply rush to export a glut of stored oil, easing some pressure on its economy, then fail to take reciprocal steps. Participants in Manama were split on how soon America might act if talks fail to yield a deal. Some suggested Mr Trump may wait several weeks. America is still building up its forces. It has also announced talks between Russia and Ukraine in Abu Dhabi on November 10th, a curious thing to do if it were planning to imminently restart a war that would make Abu Dhabi a target. Citizens and expats alike are nervous: the Gulf has not felt this tense since April, when Mr Trump was threatening to wipe out Iranian civilisation. Some residents are stocking up on food, water and cash. If the war resumes, “you might start to question, why do I stay here?” says Laith Alajlouni of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a British think-tank.
Gulf states would be less able to defend themselves, having depleted their air-defence interceptors. They would also have smaller fiscal buffers to cushion the economic blow. Saudi Arabia had expected to run a deficit of 3.3% of GDP in 2026; it hit that mark by July and may now exceed 6%. Five of the six Gulf economies are expected to shrink this year. Three will see a double-digit contraction. The IMF thinks the Gulf could bounce back quickly next year: its latest forecast pencils in 9.1% growth. But that depends on a lasting peace. Some big events are already being scaled back or postponed. The Asian Cup, a football tournament, was meant to start in Saudi Arabia in January. It has been booted to December 2027. The region will also have fewer escape routes than it did last time. Saudi Arabia was relatively safe earlier this year: Iran attacked it less fiercely than most neighbouring countries. That let Bahrain’s national carrier shift operations to the kingdom. Planes landed in nearby Dammam, and buses carried passengers the rest of the way. Now, though, Dammam’s airport is being targeted by the Houthis, an Iran-backed militia in Yemen. Two people were killed there in a drone attack last month. Since the midterm elections Mr Trump has sent mixed messages. He told one journalist that he might order a “heavy hit” and another that he was in no rush to do so. Rulers throughout the Gulf would like to believe the second one—but February taught them to beware. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/11/05/americas-allies-oppose- more-war-in-iran-they-may-not-get-a-say
Middle East & Africa | Out of rounds Gulf states brace for war with Iran—again Their air defences are dangerously depleted Nov 5th 2026 DRIVE ALONG Bahrain’s King Khalifa causeway into Manama, the capital, and the war damage to America’s main naval hub in the Gulf is apparent: destroyed communication antennae on one side; blackened buildings on the other. Gashes in high-rise buildings are boarded up.