Haiti’s situation is so desperate (half the population of 12m suffer acute hunger) that many in the region welcome Mr Bukele having a go. Haitians have to be “pragmatic”, says Jean Walnard Dorneval, a former Haitian defence minister. “We cannot simply sit idly by for fear of collateral damage while gangs have been traumatising the population.” There is a chance that Mr Bukele’s iron-fist reputation may scare gang leaders into negotiating. Yet the risks of getting bogged down are huge. Mr Bukele may underestimate Haiti’s problems: on October 29th he insisted that El Salvador “lived through a nightmare that was even more horrific than what the Haitian people are enduring right now”. Pacifying El Salvador required both tough law enforcement and negotiations with gangs. A large army, police force and a functioning administration were able to round up tens of thousands of men. In Haiti the gangs govern territory, levy taxes and hold military-grade weapons. Mr Bukele “does not know the terrain and tactical environment”, says Frank Mora, a former Pentagon official. The worry, if Mr Bukele’s ambitions in Haiti turn out to be large, is of a scorched-earth strategy that kills a lot of civilians. Human-rights groups are already reporting increased casualties in the area where the Salvadorans went missing. The UN force in Haiti operates cautiously; its troops rarely leave their base. Many observers, including in the Trump administration, mock its weakness: they think Haiti’s agonies are being drawn out by a “bunch of ninnies and losers not willing to use enough force to show who is boss”, says Mr Johnston. Their certainty may soon be put to the test. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2026/11/05/el-salvadors-president-thinks-he- can-eliminate-haitis-gangs
André “Mad Dog” Janones is a hero of the Brazilian left Can politicians elsewhere in the world replicate his online campaigns? Nov 5th 2026 The night he was re-elected as Brazil’s president, snatching victory from what seemed like sure defeat, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva spoke to supporters in the streets of São Paulo. Lula, as the left-wing leader is known, gestured to a guest by his side. “I want to thank this comrade here, our general, who played a pivotal role in this campaign,” he told the crowds. The man feted on October 25th was André Janones, a 42-year-old congressman for a small environmentalist party who some think was the architect of Lula’s surprise victory. He is the brains behind “Lula’s Army”— a channel on WhatsApp that acquired more than 10m followers in the three weeks before the run-off vote. Its success has made Mr Janones a cult hero on the Brazilian left. It has also caught the eye of leftist leaders around the
world—including Pedro Sánchez, Spain’s prime minister, and Claudia Sheinbaum, Mexico’s president—who wonder if they can emulate his strategy in their own countries. “It’s replicable and I think it’s necessary,” Mr Janones tells The Economist. “In all honesty, I think this could be what sweeps the far right off the map.” After Lula performed poorly in the first round of voting on October 4th, Mr Janones—a former lawyer whom colleagues dubbed “Mad Dog” for his scalding of right-wing candidates in advance of the elections in 2022— promised despairing left-wingers that if they followed his orders they could turn things around. At his request, Brazilians banged pots and pans when Lula’s rival, Flávio Bolsonaro, was interviewed on television. They flooded Instagram with images of themselves wearing Brazil’s national colours and making an “L” shape (a pro-Lula symbol) with their fingers. Mr Janones held late night livestreams on which he refused to speak until at least a million viewers had tuned in. “EVERYONE, URGENT! GET TAPPING, AND MAKE THIS VIDEO EXPLODE!” was a typical command. Behind all this, says Mr Janones, lay a studied plan to game the algorithms that drive social networks. He ordered his followers to comment on and “like” pro-Lula posts before sharing them, to boost their engagement. He told his “army” not to respond to misinformation about their candidate, on the basis that any engagement could widen a post’s reach. Actions of the army were carefully co-ordinated. “When four million people posted the exact same photo at the exact same time, the algorithm interpreted it like a plane crash or a terrorist attack like 9/11 and blocked the reach of any other posts. That’s how we glitched the algorithm,” he says. Lula’s Army was far from the only thing that helped swing the election. Having for weeks run an old-fashioned campaign, Lula himself began posting selfie-style videos online. In the weeks before the run-off, his government pushed through an amendment guaranteeing workers two days off a week, and forgave sole traders their federal tax debts. But Mr Janones’s channel “was a turnout machine”, says David Nemer at the University of Virginia, bringing out pro-Lula voters who had abstained in the first round. “It gave a campaign that had just proved it couldn’t talk to the internet a voice that could.”
WhatsApp groups inspired by Mr Janones’s effort are popping up around the world. Guides detailing his techniques are circulating online in French and Japanese. He has been invited to advise politicians in Colombia, Venezuela and the EU, among other places. The week after Brazil’s election he turned up in Argentina, where he met members of the Peronist opposition. And Mr Janones says he plans to continue mobilising Lula’s Army at home in order to press a conservative-dominated Congress to pass Lula’s bills. The lawmaker has some reservations about his digital playbook. He says he felt uncomfortable encouraging people to ignore pro-Bolsonaro posts, rather than push back against them. But like many in the Brazilian left, he believes social media have long handed their opponents an advantage—and that the ends justify the means. “My strategy is a strategy of war.” ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2026/11/05/andre-mad-dog-janones-is-a-hero- of-the-brazilian-left
Can the pope’s tour of Latin America win back disenchanted youth? Feminism and mysticism are providing reasons to question the faith Nov 5th 2026 Pope Leo’s tour of South America, beginning on November 6th, is a marathon. Over 12 days he is traveling some 31,000km, visiting Uruguay, Argentina and Peru and giving around 40 speeches. In some ways it is a homecoming: the pontiff spent two decades as a missionary in Peru. The roadshow, coming three weeks after the pope underwent surgery for lung cancer, will draw big crowds. A bigger question is whether it can help win back Latin America’s waning faithful. The region’s educated young, in particular, are gradually going off organised religion. In the decade to 2020 the share of people around the world who say they do not identify with any organised religion—call them the “nones”—grew by a percentage point, to 24%. This shift may appear small, but behind it lies
much change. Every religion other than Islam stagnated or shrank over that period, when taking population growth into account. The share of people who say they have no religious affiliation declined slightly in Asia and barely budged in Africa or the Middle East. But it soared in Europe and the Americas. And of the three countries where the share of “nones” grew the most, two (Chile and Uruguay) are in Latin America. To see what this looks like on the ground, trek to Uruguay—the country in which Pope Leo is beginning his grand tour. Its constitution has long enforced an exceptionally strict division between church and state. Easter week, known as “Holy Week” in the rest of Latin America, is called “Tourism Week”. Christmas is dubbed “Family Day.” Not by chance, Uruguay legalised marijuana, gay marriage and abortion much earlier than its peers. The share of Uruguayans who identify as Catholic has fallen by almost half since 1995, to 33%. Only 9% of Uruguayans say they practise the faith regularly. Many young people are unenthused by the pope’s visit, the first since 1988. “I just think: what a waste of money,” says Lucía Castillos, a 31- year-old caterer in Montevideo, the capital. “How much are we spending on this visit that we could be giving to people who have nothing to eat?”
Ms Castillos says her scepticism towards the church grew during a recent upswell of feminism all across Latin America. What began as mass rallies in Argentina in 2015 protesting against killings of women later swept into Chile and Mexico, where demonstrators also demanded access to abortion. “Catholicism springs from the premise that women are inherently flawed,” she believes. “That vision just doesn’t square with feminism.” Some of Latin America’s new “nones” are unapologetic atheists. “To me, it all seems crazy,” says Virginia, a 29-year-old primary school teacher in Buenos Aires, the capital of Argentina: “A dove impregnating a virgin, evangelical Christians speaking in tongues, Orthodox Jews dressed in wigs.” But the evidence suggests that many of these people are in fact swapping organised religion for a much looser kind of spiritualism. Many of them tell pollsters they believe in esoteric things, such as “energies”. Syncretism and folksy superstition is common. Some Brazilian “nones” dabble in Candomblé and Umbanda, two traditions that combine Roman Catholicism with west African religious practices. Mexicans of all stripes celebrate the Day of the Dead, a Mesoamerican spin on All Souls’ Day. Argentina’s president, Javier Milei, embodies this growing spiritual mish-mash. The libertarian has a strong interest in Judaism but has not denied rumours that he has also sought a medium’s help to speak to his dead dog. Organised religion remains a powerful influence on the region’s politics, even if its grip on hearts is loosening. Recent years have seen increasingly vocal interventions in many countries by evangelical Protestant groups, and politicians are putting in much more effort to court them. Evangelicals were firm supporters of Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil’s president from 2019-23, and of his son Flávio who recently failed in his bid to win the same job. The godless in Latin America remain more likely than those elsewhere to say that organised religion helps society, rather than harms it. The Catholic church is still the most trusted institution in Latin America, according to Latinobarómetro, a polling organisation, well ahead of outfits such as armies and the media. That reflects a history of (mostly) do-gooding, as well as the dim view many Latin Americans take of their secular institutions, such as