That scenario is now coming true. On October 9th Marco Rubio, America’s secretary of state, announced the latest stage of a campaign to “dismantle the ICC, brick by brick”. The Trump administration says the ICC is threatening American sovereignty because it claims the power to investigate and prosecute American citizens for war crimes or crimes against humanity committed on ICC member states’ territory. The sanctions freeze ICC assets in America and block American firms and banks from engaging with the court. They will take effect after 180 days, a period during which Mr Rubio expects member states to rein in the court. This puts Japan in a quandary. It is the largest funder of the ICC, contributing 15% of its budget. And for decades Japan has made the international rule of law a pillar of its foreign policy. But Japan also depends on America for its security; so the government was muted in its initial response when Ms Akane herself was put under sanction in August. Takaichi Sanae, the prime minister, said the sanctions were taihen zannen, “very regrettable”; but she pointedly did not call for their withdrawal. Her careful wording sparked a backlash. Nakatani Gen, a former defence minister from Ms Takaichi’s party who now heads a cross-party group focused on human rights, accused her of being “docile and not saying what needs to be said at a crucial time”. In Nagoya, where Ms Akane taught law in 2005-08, her former students have gathered more than 174,000 signatures in her support. “It’s not idealism for Japan, it’s security,” says Shamoto Yosuke, one of them. “Japan cannot rely on military power alone to protect itself. That is why we need an international order based on rules, not just power.” Since then Ms Takaichi has been bolder, calling the sanctions incompatible with Japanese policy. She raised the issue with Mr Trump in New York in September. After the latest sanctions, Japan signed a joint statement in support of the court with other ICC members, including all G7 countries bar America. Some suggest that Japan could discuss ICC reform over matters of jurisdiction to appease Mr Trump. But talk is unlikely to change his administration’s position. A better use of the 180 days, suggests Christopher Lamont of Tokyo International University, would be to plan how to keep the court running: by setting up funding that isn’t exposed to the American financial system, for instance.
This, though, could anger America further. Japan does not want to choose between two components of its security, one based on international law and the other on American protection. Regrettably, it is being pushed to do so. ■ For exclusive coverage of Asian politics, economics and security, sign up to Asia Bulletin, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/10/22/americas-attack-on-the-international- criminal-court-is-a-headache-for-japan
India is pouring money and concrete into its border with China Can roads and villages secure a state that China claims? Oct 22nd 2026 JUST 10km from India’s north-eastern border with China, the village of Zemithang lies in the heart of territory claimed by the Chinese. Everyday life feels unmistakably Indian. Locals chat in Hindi, listen to Bollywood songs and fly Indian flags. But occasionally there is an unwanted Chinese presence. “My phone keeps changing to Beijing time [two and a half hours ahead], because I lose my Indian network and pick up the Chinese one,” says a local official. His complaint captures the challenge facing India as it tries to transform its remote frontier, and match a massive infrastructure roll- out on the other side. India is pouring concrete and money into Zemithang and other parts of Arunachal Pradesh (AP) to strengthen its hold over the Himalayan state.
Home to fewer than 2m people, it is claimed by China, which calls it Zangnan, or southern Tibet. The state was also the main theatre of the only war between the two countries. In 1962 Chinese soldiers descended through the mountains, overran Indian forces and occupied parts of it. They eventually withdrew, but the defeat has ensured that relations have been edgy ever since. Today the frontier is far calmer. The two armies face each other across the “line of actual control”, a disputed border that runs through spectacular mountains and valleys (see map). Barring a few scuffles, there has been no clash in AP since 1975. Even during hand-to-hand fighting in 2020 between Indian and Chinese troops in Galwan, 1,500km to the west, the border in AP remained quiet. But this is an ugly stability, says Ajai Shukla, a security analyst based in Delhi. The road to the border on the Indian side is lined with military camps: an estimated 90,000-120,000 troops are deployed in the region. In August local political groups alleged there had been Chinese intrusions near Taksing, in eastern AP, though India’s government dismissed the reports as rumours. The fiercest contest is over infrastructure. For decades Indian officials eschewed building roads in AP, fearing it would give an invading Chinese army an easier route south. That is now considered a mistake: poor
connectivity hindered India’s ability to supply its own troops and kept its citizens isolated. Meanwhile China built an extensive network of roads on its side, as well as hundreds of “dual-use” villages that combine civilian settlements with military infrastructure. India is rushing to make amends. “Until the clashes in Galwan, India assumed that the relationship with China would improve in a linear fashion. That incident was a real wake-up call,” says Jabin Jacob of Shiv Nadar University. These days India regards connectivity as essential to deterrence. Much of the work is led by the defence ministry’s road-building arm, which has constructed hundreds of kilometres of roads in the region, including the Sela Tunnel, which keeps Tawang, the biggest town in the area, accessible even during winter. The building drive extends far beyond roads. AP’s rivers have huge hydropower potential. To harness it, India is planning several dams, including its biggest-ever on the Upper Siang river. Securing the border also involves breathing more life into the settlements near it. Indian officials have become increasingly alarmed by satellite images revealing the rapid expansion of Chinese border villages. In 2023 the Indian government launched the Vibrant Villages Programme. Around 27bn rupees ($286m) has been set aside for projects in the state, 6% of the state’s GDP. The aim is to stem migration from the region, draw people in, and improve administration. Much of the focus is on construction. But the army is also helping to turn the area into a tourist attraction (for Indians only), offering visitors access to border posts and history lessons on the 1962 war. At Bum La pass, at around 4,600 metres, soldiers accompany tourist groups right up to the frontier and lead chants of “Bharat Mata ki Jai” (”Victory to Mother India”) while facing the Chinese side. All this is welcomed. The state has always been one of India’s poorer and more isolated corners, but in 2024-25 (the latest year for which data are available) its economy grew by 10%, the third-fastest rate in the country. Still, residents crave more development and of better quality. Locals fret that funding takes too long to arrive and gets tangled in bureaucracy.
Such complaints reflect the chasm between China and India that shapes their rivalry. China enjoys greater economic and military resources and also the advantage of unfettered state capacity. It is said to have forcibly relocated people to border villages. The Indians, meanwhile, must contend with local concerns—such as opposition to the construction of dams. ■ Stay on top of our India coverage by signing up to Essential India, our free weekly newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/10/22/india-is-pouring-money-and-concrete-into- its-border-with-china
Indians’ rights have been chipped away for decades But interfering with the sanctity of elections is a step too far Oct 22nd 2026 THE CONSTITUTION of India is filled with all sorts of noble ideas. The preamble promises every citizen justice, liberty and equality, to say nothing of dignity. The body lays out a dizzying array of institutions designed to secure those rights. And then, almost as soon as the ink had dried on the document, India’s new leaders started having second thoughts. The first amendment to the constitution imposed “reasonable restrictions” on the right to free speech. The 24th made explicit that Parliament can alter even the parts about fundamental rights. Things reached a nadir with the 42nd amendment, passed in 1976 during a state of emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi, when, not satisfied with further curtailing Indians’ rights, Parliament also created something called “fundamental duties”.