dependence will be on display in November. Democrats are favoured to win a House majority. The Senate, which looked safely Republican last year, is now in play. If control of either chamber changes hands, Mr Trump will have to bargain with Congress to fund his priorities and face its oversight for the rest of his term. Midterm elections are a routine check the constitution imposes on every president. Whatever else has weakened, that guardrail holds. ■ Frances E. Lee is a professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton and the author of “A Case for Congress”, “The Limits of Party” (with James M. Curry) and “In Covid’s Wake” (with Stephen Macedo). This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2026/10/19/ignore-the-doomsayers-american- democracy-is-in-good-shape

By Invitation · By Invitation | Midterm melancholy

A former ally asks why Donald Trump abandoned his own legacy The president is undermining the few advantages Republicans still have, writes Marc Short Oct 22nd 2026 MIDTERM ELECTIONS are a referendum on the party in power, and Republicans took power promising to defeat inflation, restore a roaring economy and usher in a new American golden age. But they have not delivered, and on November 3rd voters will punish them at the ballot box. The first Trump administration brought a new style but largely embraced traditional free-market policies: lowering taxes, cutting regulations and encouraging the government to leave the American people alone and let them prosper. The result—over the first three years of the administration, before covid-19 struck—was almost 7m new jobs, a $6,000 average increase in the income of middle-class families and an unemployment rate of 3.5%, a

50-year low. Had it not been for the pandemic, Donald Trump may have won re-election in 2020 on the strength of the economy. I was the White House director of legislative affairs in the first Trump administration, leading our congressional outreach, and I will always be proud of our conservative record. When he returned to the White House in January 2025, however, Mr Trump embraced some of his most protectionist and populist economic instincts. Needless trade wars with Canada and other allies have pummelled American farmers, including in key swing states. Six of the Senate swing seats alone account for more than a fifth of America’s $880bn a year in goods-and- services trade with Canada. But all Americans have suffered from the uncertainty and higher prices brought on by the president’s on-again, off- again tariff policies. Meanwhile, Mr Trump has shaken business confidence by embracing a litany of other interventionist policies, including securing stakes and even “golden shares” in private companies. The economic results will be even worse if he follows through on promises to expand unsustainable entitlement programmes, order banks to cap credit-card interest rates or impose price controls. Beyond the economic risks, these policies have frustrated and alienated voters who expected the Republican Party to defend free markets and small government, and to “drain the swamp” following the corruption that swirled around the Biden administration, from the president’s inner circle to his pardon selections (including his own son, Hunter). Between real economic consequences, Democrat-lite rhetoric and administration officials from top to bottom bathing in the swamp rather than draining it, Republican control of the House and possibly the Senate is now in question. Some voices in the Trump coalition argue that tariffs and a populist agenda are necessary to win elections. The evidence suggests otherwise. Today only 28% of voters approve of the president’s handling of the economy. Yet when his first administration embraced conservative economic policies, 63% did. Independent conservative voices were widely denounced by Mr Trump’s loudest supporters for even suggesting that the second administration’s

tariffs and other trade policies—the largest tax hike in decades, had they come fully into effect—would hurt the economy and the Republicans’ electoral chances. They now stand vindicated. The president is already setting low expectations ahead of the midterms and the knives are out among his closest political advisers. Mr Trump appointed the justices who overturned Roe v Wade, the 1973 Supreme Court ruling that established a constitutional right to abortion, and pro-lifers rejoiced when Planned Parenthood, a nationwide reproductive- health-care organisation, was defunded. But Congress failed to extend the measure beyond one year, and Planned Parenthood’s taxpayer funding has returned. The president continues to side with Planned Parenthood and the abortion industry against pro-life states that want to restrict access to the chemical abortion pill. Pro-lifers are growing more disenchanted with the Trump administration by the day. Conservative critics raised the alarm and the administration ignored us— gleefully so at times. Congress ceded its power to the executive and chose not to act. The one saving grace for Republican candidates may be the Democratic Party’s swift pivot to the socialist left. Republican candidates are rightly criticising these radical and sometimes antisemitic candidates: look no further than Michigan, where the Democratic Senate candidate views Israel’s government as no less evil than Hamas; or New York, where another congressional contender participated in rallies at which protesters celebrated Israeli deaths. Yet their messaging falls flat when the president is offering up $5,000 “Trump dividend” cheques if Republicans win in November and promises to muscle into more private companies. The administration has already taken stakes in 34 companies, most prominently Intel and most recently two critical-minerals groups, Elmet and Hertha Metals. Mr Trump returned to the White House by contrasting his first-term economy with the high prices and malaise wrought by the Biden administration’s inflationary, anti-growth policies. Then he abandoned his own legacy. The results have been predictable. ■

Marc Short is the chairman of Advancing American Freedom, a campaign group. He was chief of staff to Vice-President Mike Pence from 2019 to 2021 and White House director of legislative affairs from 2017 to 2018. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2026/10/16/a-former-ally-asks-why-donald- trump-abandoned-his-own-legacy

Briefing · Briefing | The petty feud wrecking a region

Emirati-Saudi rivalry is spurring bloodshed on a horrific scale The rift is prolonging and deepening deadly wars in Sudan, Yemen and elsewhere Oct 22nd 2026 TO THE EAST of the Arabian peninsula, along the shores of the Persian Gulf, war is simmering, in the form of America’s on-again-off-again conflict with Iran. Iranian missiles have rained down on Arabian cities and infrastructure and continue to menace shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, the peninsula’s economic lifeline. But it is to the west and south, in the countries along the shores of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, that fighting is really raging. Yemen’s 12-year-old civil war is spilling beyond its borders, with rocket attacks on ships in the Red Sea and on oil terminals and airports in Saudi Arabia. On the far side of the Red Sea, the civil war in Sudan has claimed

hundreds of thousands of lives and forced some 11m of the country’s 50m people from their homes. Farther south, yet another civil war, in Ethiopia, threatens to become a regional one, as forces from Eritrea join the fighting. These wars, in turn, aggravate divisions in neighbouring countries such as Libya and Somalia. It is a vast zone of devastation (see map), with destruction and killing on a scale far exceeding that of the war on Iran, or even the conflicts in Gaza or Ukraine. The Arabian peninsula’s two biggest powers, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, tried to avert the war in Iran, fearing—rightly, it turns out— that they would get caught in the crossfire. But instead of trying to quell the wars to their south and west, they have fuelled them, taking sides and funnelling support to favoured factions. Extraordinarily, given their similar geopolitical interests, Saudi Arabia and the UAE sometimes support opposing forces in the same conflict, intensifying and entrenching wars that were already grotesquely bloody. Even when they are theoretically on the same side, as in Yemen, the pair often fail to co-operate, helping draw out the misery and bloodshed. Not even the existential threat posed by the war in Iran, which has throttled their oil exports and shredded America’s security umbrella, has convinced the two countries to put their differences aside. Instead, their petty rivalry is abetting the demolition of a vast region of 250m people.

The conflicts in question are vicious. In Yemen, as in Sudan, hundreds of thousands have died and millions have been displaced. The civil war in Ethiopia is on an only slightly smaller scale. All three have involved famine, massacres and other atrocities. Not all this bloodshed stems from Emirati and Saudi meddling by any stretch; all three conflicts reflect long-standing divisions within the countries concerned. Nor are the two Gulf monarchies the only meddlers: Egypt, Israel and Turkey, among others, have eagerly stuck their oars in. Yet the Saudi and especially the Emirati involvement stands out as destabilising and short-sighted. Saudi Arabia and the UAE could scarcely have more in common. They are neighbours, sharing the same language, religion and culture. They are both wealthy, absolute monarchies whose fortunes depend on the steady export of oil and the steady military support of America. They are both trying to diversify their economies away from hydrocarbons. They both face the same geopolitical threat, a hostile Iran, and the same domestic quandary, keeping their citizens happy without democracy. Muhammad bin Salman, the crown prince and de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, and Muhammad bin Zayed, the emir of Abu Dhabi and president of the UAE, also have a lot in common. They are both younger siblings, not initially raised in the expectation that they would rule. They both cast themselves as modernisers, bringing development to their countries. They both fancy themselves as statesmen, wielding influence in their region and beyond. Perhaps that is why MBS and MBZ, as they are often known, used to get on so well. In 2017, when MBS staged a palace coup at the age of 31 to become ruler of Saudi Arabia in all but name, he had help from MBZ, who had largely taken control of the UAE after his older brother, Khalifa, suffered a debilitating stroke in 2014. The Emiratis worked to promote MBS in America, where many officials had their doubts about the young, impulsive crown prince. Diplomats described the relationship between MBZ and MBS as that of mentor and protégé, or elder and younger brother. They worked together to impose their will on the region, sending troops to Yemen in 2015 and blockading Qatar in 2017.