In India users have gained cheap or free access to apps like Gemini from Google or ChatGPT from OpenAI; nearly one in five working-age Indians used generative AI in the second quarter of 2026, compared with a third of Americans, according to a recent Microsoft study. DeepSeek, a free Chinese alternative, is popular in Africa, where Microsoft estimates that in many countries about one in ten working-age people used generative AI in the second quarter. A narrow street in a busy suburb of Mumbai illustrates the benefits. Many shops on it use ChatGPT to generate advertisements. Dinesh Chandra, an optician, asked the chatbot to produce a “gravity-defying” photo for his brand. It duly created an image, now printed on brochures, of glasses floating above clouds while riding a feather. Next door Omkar Sapre, who sells dried fruit, masalas and pickles, posts “beautiful pictures” from ChatGPT on Instagram and WhatsApp, and has noticed his sales pick up. Ashlesha, who works at a dry cleaner on the same street, says, “We work hard and AI is extra support for us. Everyone is on Instagram.” All of them love the convenience of using AI; none worry about safety, privacy or data leaks, much less “AI slop”. The shaming of AI content seems less common outside America and Europe. Westerners “have historically monopolised knowledge and ideational production, but AI challenges that,” says Yuen Yuen Ang of Johns Hopkins University. “Is it a crisis only for those who lose from disruption?” As Mr Bae illustrates, even in some rich and middle-income countries where there seems more to lose from disruption, AI is surprisingly popular. Singaporeans are among the world’s top AI users, says Microsoft; nearly two-thirds told GlobeScan they thought the technology would have a positive effect on their lives. In Malaysia, which is experiencing a big data- centre boom, minor protests against the sites have not yet turned into a wider backlash. Some countries where AI-optimism runs high share common factors that seem to cut across socioeconomic lines. One is a looming shortage of workers. Parts of the world that have long had low fertility rates, like East Asia, are ageing rapidly. Many hope that AI (and AI-powered robots) can fill

in for workers who do not exist, helping countries to care for greying populations. Another feature of some AI-optimist countries is a living memory of technology radically transforming societies in the span of a lifetime. Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan went from poor to rich partly by rapidly adopting new technologies that originated abroad. In China and India technological leaps, including through digital payment and delivery apps, have brought extraordinary convenience and autonomy. “At our age, we’ve lived through countless changes,” says Ms Meng, who works in advertising in Beijing and who, at 40, feels ancient. “Things haven’t even settled in China before another huge shift comes two or three years later.” In India smartphones have offered hundreds of millions of people a “God in their hand” over the course of just a few years, says Ms Arora. In Western countries, by contrast, pessimism towards AI may reflect people’s perception that their lives are not getting much better, that AI could make their lives worse—and that politicians cannot be relied upon to protect their interests. Daniel Dobrygowski, author of the book “Technology Governance”, argues that this attitude is coloured by people’s experience of social media and Big Tech, which Western governments have struggled to rein in. The ways in which politicians and firms talk about AI may also make a difference. Bosses of American labs warn of job losses and human extinction as they race towards “artificial general intelligence”. Asian politicians and tech bosses rarely talk like that, perhaps in part because they are not developing frontier capabilities of their own. Instead they tend to focus on the practical uses of AI—what they will do with the technology, rather than what it will do to them. You are unlikely to hear the boss of Samsung talking publicly about AI doom. In China, where big advances in AI are being made, officials do worry about risks, from cyber-security threats to economic dislocation. But the general tenor of state media is boosterish.

It would be wrong to conclude, though, that people in more AI-positive countries have no worries at all. Some are more resigned to the advance of technology as a fate that cannot be avoided. “AI’s impact might be different from every previous shift. But the Earth has its own rhythms,” says Ms Meng in Beijing. “When it’s not meant for you to survive, you won’t. You can’t live every day worrying, right?” Cho Kyu-jin of Seoul National University reckons that South Koreans are embracing AI despite their concerns because the “fear of being left behind is higher than that of losing stability”. Kim Ah-ran, a 40-year-old labour lawyer, says, “When changes came in the Industrial Revolution, there were positive and negative effects. We’ll find a way to live.” Her young son, standing next to her at the Galaxy Robot Park outside Seoul, is mimicking a humanoid that is practising Muay Thai moves, while clutching a workbook that explains how to use AI to code such robots. Such pragmatic acceptance suggests that positive attitudes like Mr Bae’s could yet be fragile. Kim Jeong-nam of KAIST, a tech-focused university, serves on South Korea’s Presidential Council on National Artificial Intelligence Strategy. He thinks that South Koreans’ tolerance is conditional on “competently built” policy. If AI starts to “produce visible losers”, such as in exam fairness or jobs, he worries that leeway could vanish. The same could hold true elsewhere. “How are you going to invent an AI that can drive a motorbike?” asks Anderson Santos, a delivery driver in São Paulo, Brazil, who is later dismayed at a mention of driverless cars. There are some nascent signs of data-centre backlash in other parts of the world, too, if nothing like the outright rebellion seen in many parts of America. In the Philippines people are marching against “Pax Silica”, an American-led initiative to develop AI and semiconductor supply chains. In Thane, a city near Mumbai, hundreds have protested against an Amazon hyperscale data centre that is planned for their neighbourhood. Rage is not yet all-consuming, though. “It’s just like any other factory,” says one resident. “AI is the future.”■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/international/2026/10/22/the-surprising-popularity-of-ai

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MAGA foreign policy is a mess Democrats disagree on what comes next Oct 22nd 2026 “INEVER MEANT to start a war…I just closed my eyes and swung,” sings Miley Cyrus in “Wrecking Ball”, a break-up ballad that seemed to play on every American radio in 2013. Though melodically a bit relentless, the pop song deserves a revival as a guide to the second-term statecraft of President Donald Trump. It is clear that traditional foreign-policy theories are a poor guide to Mr Trump. That offers both risks and opportunities to anyone running to be America’s next president. This newspaper has noted Mr Trump’s wrecking-ball tendencies before, but in the two years before the next presidential election his yen for demolition has a specific impact. It has broken the “pendulum theory”, a once-reliable tool for predicting American foreign policy. Going back to Richard Nixon

and his successor Jimmy Carter, most presidents have (over-)corrected for the biggest flaws of the guy who came before. In reaction to Tricky Dick’s devious realpolitik, the Carter presidency offered hairshirt moralising. Before long, voters felt that America was disrespected and chose can-do Reaganite optimism. When Americans wearied of George H.W. Bush, a wise but stiff statesman, they elected feel-your-pain Bill Clinton. After shoot- from-the-hip George W. Bush, Americans fell for cool, cerebral Barack Obama, before souring on haughty brainiacs and betting the country on Mr Trump. Today the theory is less use, because Mr Trump swings every which way. When bullying Ukraine to settle with Russia, he is a might-makes-right realist. In Venezuela his rule-by-proxy would impress a 19th-century imperialist. In the Middle East he scorned regime change right up until his bungled war to bend Iran to his will. He declares that communism menaces America, but calls China’s party boss, Xi Jinping, his friend. The one constant is an impulse to smash the status quo. Cue mental images of Mr Trump atop a demolition ball (hopefully, unlike Ms Cyrus’s music video, the 80-year-old is wearing more than Dr. Martens boots). It is quite plausible that this president will be hooted from office after wrecking America’s good name (though AI dominance could create riches and clout). Successors wishing to do the opposite will be spoiled for choice. For the foreign-policy pendulum to swing through a full arc, the 48th president could put the national interest ahead of personal profit. Alternatively his successor could avoid reckless wars and shun regime change. The next administration could work to rebuild alliances, pledging to help Europe confront Russia and friends in Asia deter China. All these options would break with some version of Trumpism. The range of options is especially wide for Democrats. Whether Mr Trump’s vice-president, J.D. Vance, clears the field or faces a contested primary, Republicans will be wary of angering the MAGA faithful by repudiating Mr Trump. Because Democrats are a self-indulgent bunch and—for a political party— surprisingly bad at politics, they are responding to this moment of opportunity with a navel-gazing argument. Conversations with foreign-