All this is hastening efforts to develop alternatives. The day after Ukraine said restrictions had been placed on Starlink, shares in its closest European competitor, Eutelsat, surged by 23%. The European Union then moved to speed up the glacial pace of regulatory approval for merging the satellite- making businesses of three large European aerospace companies, hoping to create one big enough to compete with Mr Musk’s SpaceX. And on October 19th four of the region’s largest telecommunications firms said they wanted to partner with a satellite company to compete with Starlink. Yet Europe has a long way to go before it can hope to achieve “autonomy in space”, as the jargon has it. In three crucial areas, it depends on America. The first is satellite-internet service for civilians and the armed forces. The second is space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and early warning for defence. And the third is launch capacity: the rockets and spaceports needed to put a large number of satellites into orbit. For decades, the space gap between Europe and America was widest in defence. America kept Europe dependent in part by letting its allies freeload on programmes such as SBIRS, an $18bn missile-warning constellation. But America also opposed Europe’s efforts to develop its own capabilities. It initially tried to block Galileo, a satellite navigation system, on the grounds that it would compete with America’s own GPS satellites, and could be used by its enemies.
Now, however, the biggest gap is in satellite internet, where America has rocketed ahead. Europe’s closest answer to Starlink is OneWeb, whose parent company, Eutelsat, is partly owned by the French and British governments. (Britain bailed the firm out after it collapsed in 2020, and both countries injected more capital last year.) OneWeb was founded in 2012, three years before Starlink, but was rapidly eclipsed by it: as a division of SpaceX, Mr Musk’s world-beating rocket company, Starlink had plenty of cash to fuel its massive expansion (see chart). The entry of other private firms may widen America’s lead. Amazon’s Leo aims to offer satellite internet later this year. OneWeb has a number of terminals in Ukraine, some paid for by Germany, and is used by several European armed forces, including the French and British navies. It is also deployed on some aerial and naval drones. But it is not a direct replacement for Starlink. OneWeb has about 600 satellites; Starlink has more than 10,000. The European system cannot carry as much data or serve as many users in any one area. And because its satellites are in a much higher orbit, users need bigger terminals, the cheapest of which cost around $9,000—roughly 45 times more than a basic Starlink terminal. Kaja Kallas, the EU’s top diplomat, acknowledged this before meeting Mr Zelensky on October 16th: “Starlink is really necessary for Ukraine and unfortunately in the short term Europe can’t replace this capability.”
The EU plans to spend €15bn ($17bn) on IRIS2, a constellation of 348 communications satellites to be used by its members’ governments and armed forces. But the first will be launched only in 2029. Germany, meanwhile, plans its own network of 100 military-communications satellites at a cost of around €10bn. That has led to concerns of duplication and fragmentation. There is more encouraging news when it comes to the second area of concern, space-based ISR, mainly thanks to private European newcomers that produce small surveillance satellites much faster than legacy firms such as Airbus. Admiral Anders Sundeman, the head of Sweden’s space force, says that if asked a year ago how long it would take to launch his country’s first spy satellite, he would have estimated 2030. “We launched it instead this year,” he says (though the launch happened on an American Falcon 9 ride-share flight). It was made by Iceye, a Finnish startup that has figured out how to shrink radar satellites that were once as big as a car down to the size of a washing machine. Iceye has put 80 into orbit and plans to double its production rate to 100 next year. Sweden has also signed a deal to buy small spy satellites from Planet Labs, an American startup that recently opened a factory in Germany.
Having lots of small, cheap satellites like these makes it easier to cope with losing a few to jamming, or to attack. That is a real risk. In mid-October a Russian satellite manoeuvred into a very close orbit with one made by Iceye that provides intelligence for Ukraine. Yet even if Ukraine’s satellite is disabled, the country has two more, along with access to intelligence from a number of European ones. Other American capabilities will take far longer to replace. One is a ballistic-missile warning system. France and Germany are teaming up to build such satellites, but they will not come online until the early 2030s. Neither can Europe match the sensors and orbital weapons America deploys to protect friendly satellites and destroy hostile ones. Finally, none of Europe’s plans will work if it does not have enough launch capacity to put its satellites in orbit. Arianespace, a European company owned mainly by Airbus and Safran, can fly heavy payloads into orbit. But it launches far fewer rockets than SpaceX and at much higher cost, which explains why many Iceye and OneWeb satellites were carried into space by the American firm. Even setting geopolitics aside, this dependence is worrying: there is a looming shortage of capacity as SpaceX gradually retires the Falcon 9 rocket, its workhorse. If European countries hope to drive down the price of their rockets, they will need to commit to long-term spending plans to allow incumbents to invest, while also encouraging competition. The European Space Agency has a €900m “launcher challenge”, which pays companies if they achieve milestones such as a successful orbital launch. But once they prove they can do it, they need orders. “If you want your launcher to be as cheap as possible you need to launch it very regularly,” says Olivier Lemaitre, the secretary- general of Eurospace, a trade body. If demand remains small, he says, the industry will never achieve economies of scale. Europe’s countdown towards space autonomy will not last forever. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/10/20/europes-dependence-on-america-in-space- is-hard-to-escape
The America-Ukraine link grows even spottier The Starlink cut-offs were a test, and worse may follow Oct 22nd 2026 Editor’s note (October 22nd 2026): This article has been updated. IN WASHINGTON last week’s move to cut Ukrainian drones’ connections to Starlink, Elon Musk’s satellite internet service, might have seemed like a diplomatic warning. In Ukraine it was felt on the battlefield. In a single sortie, one unit saw $1m-worth of drones fall from the sky after limits were imposed on any that flew faster than 160kph. (By October 22nd the links were functioning again without speed limits, according to Ukrainian commanders.) No one in Donald Trump’s administration admits to making the decision. It appears to have come from a small circle around the president, Mr Musk and Steve Witkoff, the special envoy to Russia. Reports suggest Mr Musk wanted to punish Ukraine for striking Russian refineries.
One official says he contacted the White House only after imposing the restrictions. Mr Musk has a complicated relationship with Ukraine. In 2022 he used a similar mechanism to stop a naval drone attack near Crimea. He has frequently railed against President Volodymyr Zelensky. But his decision to provide satellite connectivity in the first days of the war was critical to Ukraine’s survival. One insider insists Mr Musk is sympathetic to Ukraine, “though you do get the impression that Putin sometimes gets to him first.” For Vladimir Putin, the cut-offs capped a wonderful fortnight. On October 9th Mr Trump announced a dubious deal to buy Russian diesel. The Americans then demanded an “energy ceasefire”, but explained this meant that only Ukraine must stop hitting Russian refineries, not that Russia must stop hitting Ukrainian power plants. Reports that Mr Trump restricted intelligence-sharing, though, were misleading. A failure by American satellites to warn Ukraine of incoming ballistic missiles may have been due to Russian jamming and bad weather. An American government source insists Mr Trump is not trying to force Ukrainian capitulation, but is the victim of “a successful Russian info-op”. The president, the source says, is panicked by terrible polling ahead of the midterms. Mr Zelensky is a convenient scapegoat. Mr Trump’s envoys, Mr Witkoff and Jared Kushner, incorrectly see Mr Putin’s motivations as economic and territorial rather than nationalistic, making them vulnerable to Russian manipulation. “Trump creates a horrible situation,” says a former official, but he is also “dependent on idiots”. The American arm-twisting coincides with a rush to resurrect a lopsided peace deal. On October 21st Mr Witkoff went to St Petersburg, where he praised Mr Putin as a “humanitarian”. Ukrainian officials lack full details of the latest proposals, but the outline is familiar. There would be a demilitarised zone in Donbas. Russia would get American business deals, sanctions relief and political normalisation. Ukraine would get an investment package and EU membership in exchange for renouncing NATO membership. The newest sweetener for Mr Putin is an offer to restart Russian gas sales to Europe, which were due to be phased out entirely by year’s end, and to restart the Nord Stream pipeline.
This is not America’s to offer, and violates EU law. Nor does Russia seem inclined towards peace as it heads into its most destructive winter campaign yet. It will most likely stall while banking immediate concessions on sanctions. Ukraine’s negotiators fear the American envoys will front-load lucrative business deals before the war has ended. From their perspective, “why wait and lose time?” as a Ukrainian official puts it. “Time is money.” A conversation on October 19th between Mr Zelensky and Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, offered Ukraine a glimmer of hope. His renewed involvement in Ukraine suggests a fightback by the administration’s Russia hawks. But damage has been done. Mr Trump has again shown a preference for Mr Putin over Mr Zelensky. The Ukrainian president’s confrontational responses have deepened tensions. Mr Zelensky’s turn to denouncing Mr Trump for “weak” decisions seems based on a gamble that an electoral drubbing will weaken him. That may be misplaced. The more a Democratic Congress investigates him, “the more aggressive he’ll be”, says a sympathetic congressional staffer. “This is not good for a country like Ukraine.” ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/10/22/the-america-ukraine-link-grows-even- spottier