church’s expansion in Africa, which is home to many conservative Christians, to position Russia as a haven for traditional values, in contrast to a supposedly decadent West. Russia promotes media outlets on the continent. RT, a state-run service, has struck content-sharing deals with outlets such as Afrique Media from Cameroon. African Initiative, launched in 2023, claims to be an independent news agency but has close links to former members of the Wagner Group, a state-funded Russian mercenary outfit, and Russian intelligence, according to a report published by the French government last year. The report alleges that the outfit is behind false stories that blame America for spreading dengue fever in Burkina Faso and has probably spread the claim that France supports the jihadists who plague the Sahel. Like many Russian efforts it works in tandem with African creators. Gandhi Malien Web TV, which is supported by African Initiative, has a talk show with a Malian presenter and a Russian journalist. In Burkina Faso “L’Heure Russe” is presented by MC Ruskof, a Russo-Burkinabe rapper. Russian media are seeking influence over African journalism. RT and other state-funded outlets have held at least 20 training events for African journalists from at least 29 countries since July 2025. These courses include practical tips. But the material is tendentious. Ukrainian prisoners of war are labelled “neo-Nazis”. The massacre in Bucha at the start of the Ukraine war is used as an example of “fake news” that needs to be fact-checked. Other falsehoods are pushed by a mix of online and offline campaigns. This year Forbidden Stories, a coalition of journalists, reported that a Russian- backed influence network known as “the Company” paid reporters throughout the global south for fake stories which ran in local media. To take one example, the campaign sought to undermine the Lobito corridor, an American- and EU-funded infrastructure project in Angola. Russia also creates fake journalists. In a report published in August, Code for Africa, an NGO, and Graphika, a firm, identified as many as 35 ghost “reporters” with fake profiles. Their “articles” were published in real media outlets, whose content was picked up by others, creating a cycle of

“information-laundering”. AI was often used to create personas and write stories and translate them into local languages. Similar ghosts are appearing in other areas, says Justin Arenstein of Code for Africa. He notes the creation of fake academic research by fake academics that is uploaded onto preprint repositories, as well as fake think- tanks publishing reports that lend credibility to Russian narratives. The impact of Russia’s efforts is hard to gauge. Few Africans watch RT or visit the website of African Initiative. Polls suggest that Russia is on average seen as a less positive influence on Africa than America, China or former colonial powers. That may reflect the fact that Russia has less to offer economically. Russia’s recruitment of African soldiers is a reminder of its war’s real costs, including to Africans. Yet it would be wrong to take comfort from that. Mr Arenstein compares the impact of Russia’s campaign to termites eroding the structures of African societies. The Kremlin, he says, is unusual among disinformation merchants in that it deliberately tries to weaken social cohesion, rather than only promoting its own agenda. After all, the more fragile the country, the more Russia can exploit it. ■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/10/19/russia-is-escalating- its-information-war-in-africa

Middle East & Africa | Rebel, rebel Joseph Kabila moves against his successor in Congo By seeking to unseat Félix Tshisekedi as president, he could upend politics Oct 22nd 2026 Back in 1974 Kinshasa, the capital of what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo, hosted a lavish boxing match known as the “Rumble in the Jungle”. Today the city is gripped by a different heavyweight clash. In one corner is Félix Tshisekedi, the president. In the other is Joseph Kabila (pictured), an ex-president, who on October 12th stunned the country by announcing that he would lead a rebel coalition against his successor “by all means, including the use of force”. Mr Kabila’s move threatens to worsen the conflict in the war-riven east. It also complicates Mr Tshisekedi’s bid to change the constitution to stay in power past the end of his second term in 2028. If either man can land a

knockout blow it will shape the future of Africa’s second-largest country— of great interest to America, given its quest for critical minerals. The feud has a long history. The latest chapter began in 2019, when Mr Tshisekedi was declared the winner of an election with more rigging than a giant sailboat. In the aftermath he struck a power-sharing deal with Mr Kabila that recognised the former president’s majority in parliament. That pact was torn up acrimoniously in 2020. Kabila loyalists were purged and Mr Kabila ultimately went into self-imposed exile, where he complained privately to other African leaders about what he saw as a power grab by an illegitimate successor. Events in Kinshasa were inflamed by the conflagration in the east. In 2021 M23, a Rwandan-backed force, resurfaced after a dormant eight years, taking Goma and Bukavu, two regional capitals, in early 2025. To Mr Kabila, who was born in the east, the conflict was a reaction to his successor’s “tyrannical regime”. To Mr Tshisekedi, who won re-election less dubiously in 2023, the war was an invasion by Rwanda. When Mr Kabila moved to Goma in 2025, Mr Tshisekedi saw confirmation that his successor was a Rwandan stooge. In September 2025 Congo sentenced Mr Kabila to death in absentia for treason. Over the next year Mr Kabila and M23 denied any links. “Kabila is not our boss,” Corneille Nangaa, the head of the group’s political arm, told The Economist in May. But he is now. Mr Kabila’s coalition includes M23. He wants to use the rebellion in the east to bring change to Kinshasa. Will he succeed? NGOs in Goma are watching for troop movements south to the mineral-rich Katanga region. Yet M23’s fighters are more reluctant to expand the battlefield than their political peers. Rwanda has shown no sign of wanting to broaden the conflict either. It may have endorsed the elevation of Mr Kabila because it makes the conflict across the border look more of an intra-Congolese fight. Uganda, another player, wants to preserve a deal that lets it station its forces in the north-east of Congo. America, which put sanctions on Mr Kabila this year for his links to M23, is unlikely to welcome any effort to destabilise the regime of Mr Tshisekedi, with whom it has struck mineral deals.

Other Congolese opposition figures may prove decisive. An unwieldy coalition known as C64 (after the 64th article of the constitution rather than the popular 1980s computer) opposes Mr Tshisekedi’s power grab. Some previously called for Mr Kabila to be included in a “national dialogue”. But supporting him will be harder now. Mr Kabila’s best hope might be that Mr Tshisekedi is so spooked that he becomes more paranoid and autocratic. That could prompt strategic errors— some in Kinshasa say the death sentence for Mr Kabila is an example of such a mistake—and prompt a backlash by political elites. Mr Tshisekedi is already under pressure. On October 14th Belgian authorities raided his relatives’ houses in connection with an investigation into money-laundering. That would amount to Mr Kabila adopting the political equivalent of the “rope-a-dope” strategy used by Muhammad Ali in 1974. By leaning on the ropes to absorb blows, Ali let his opponent, George Foreman, punch his way to exhaustion. Then he delivered a knockout blow. “It’s not bragging if you can back it up,” Ali apparently said. Congo is waiting to see whether Mr Kabila can back it up, too. ■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/10/22/joseph-kabila-moves- against-his-successor-in-congo

· Europe

France’s devastation and its aftermath Unruly protests have shaken Albania, Italy and beyond Europe’s dependence on America in space is hard to escape The America-Ukraine link grows even spottier Germany’s young conservatives are angry with their own party How France became ungovernable at home yet unstoppable in Brussels

Europe · Europe | Riots and politics

France’s devastation and its aftermath The violence will benefit the extremes Oct 22nd 2026 In Limoges the clock tower and roof of the 19th-century town hall collapsed after it was set alight. In Marseille casseurs, or hooligans, broke into the town hall. In Bordeaux hooded looters smashed the glass windows at Louis Vuitton and nearby shops, grabbing handbags, trainers and other stash. Pyres of electric scooters burned on street corners. Plumes of black smoke billowed in the air. Across the country over 2,000 people were arrested. “This evening we are all feeling anger, and shame,” declared President Emmanuel Macron in a televised address, before jetting off for a trip to the Gulf. France is no stranger to upheaval. But even in a country hardened to street revolts, the events of October 17th were shocking. What set off this outburst of destruction? Mr Macron faced months of violent demonstrations by gilets