The region also has a swift-growing constituency that encourages outspoken support for Israel: evangelical Christians. Many believe the Jewish return to Israel fulfils biblical prophecy. Born-again Christians have been effective in getting right-wing leaders into power. Before Colombia’s election evangelical voters held prayer vigils for Abelardo de la Espriella, the eventual winner, who was once an atheist but is now a fervent Catholic. Evangelicals also mobilised behind Mr Bolsonaro in the first round of Brazil’s election. Many of the region’s leaders took office promising to take a tough line on drug gangs. Governments are counting on weapons and advice from Israel to give their plans a boost. In 2022 Ecuador, which has a murder rate three times the Latin American average, said it would spend around $65m buying Israeli armoured vehicles. The violence in Ecuador has its roots in neighbouring Colombia, where Mr de la Espriella has recently been bombing armed groups. But the armed forces need Israeli intelligence and drone technology to act effectively, says General Alberto José Mejía, who led Colombia’s military services in 2015-18. In 2024 Gustavo Petro, the president at the time, severed ties with Israel and halted purchases of arms and other equipment that Colombia’s army had long relied on. The country’s weapons stocks were depleted, says General Mejía. Colombia’s various rebel groups now rally more than 28,000 fighters, almost double the figure when Mr Petro took office in 2022. “The Israeli defence complex will have a field day with this government,” says a Colombian intelligence expert. Will the love-in with Israel endure? America’s midterms, in November, are relevant. If Republicans come out wounded, leaders in Latin America may grow a bit less inclined to follow Mr Trump’s lead. In Chile, a friendlier policy towards Israel has prompted a backlash (it has a large Palestinian community). Supporters of Colombia’s formerly pro-Palestinian policies are also aghast. Israel’s own election, on October 27th, adds uncertainty. But for now, at least, Latin America and Israel are enjoying their tightest bond in years. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2026/10/22/latin-america-is-embracing-israel
Rastafarians in Jamaica want more rights The government is keen to atone for past abuses Oct 22nd 2026 SISTER NANNY is easy to spot. Sporting a red, gold and green dress—with a matching headpiece—the Rastafari campaigner is outlining an idea she thinks will help marginalised members of her faith. Jamaica takes advantage of the world’s interest in Rastas to “attract visitors” to the country, she notes. Yet those same people continue to suffer stigma. She thinks the Jamaican government should share proceeds with the community, whenever it profits from their culture. Dreadlocks, cannabis, reggae: think of Jamaica and aspects of Rastafari culture commonly leap to mind. On the island, however, the religious movement has often been maligned. Rastafari beliefs originated in poor Jamaican neighbourhoods in the 1930s. They revolve around a single God, Jah, said to reside within each person. Haile Selassie I, the Ethiopian
emperor crowned in 1930, is seen by some as the second coming of Christ (Selassie politely discouraged the idea). From the beginning, authorities took a tough line. Many Rastafari were arrested for possessing cannabis, which they view as a sacrament. Schools and prisons forced them to shave their dreadlocks, which violates a vow. Violence erupted in 1963, following an altercation at a petrol station in the city of Montego Bay. Security forces detained Rastas all across Jamaica; some were killed. In 2017 the Jamaican government formally apologised for the “Coral Gardens incident”, as it became known. This year it has gone further, formally handing the deeds to land in Montego Bay to a campaign group that Sister Nanny helps organise, as restitution. The land will be used for a Rastafari care home. The move fits into a broader trend of pro-Rastafari policymaking in the Caribbean. In 2015 Jamaica somewhat liberalised its drug laws, explicitly permitting Rastas to grow and use cannabis for religious purposes. St Vincent & the Grenadines passed a similar rule in 2018; Barbados the following year. When Antigua & Barbuda joined them in 2023, the prime minister, Gaston Browne, acknowledged that his country had once tried to “destroy” the faith. This year St Kitts & Nevis formally recognised Rastafarianism as a religion, which grants it stronger legal protections. Rastafari in Jamaica say discrimination has decreased, but not disappeared. “The police still harass Rastafari…for having herb,” says Ras Iyah V, chairman of the Westmoreland Hemp and Ganja Farmers’ Association. The movement is pleased with the progress, but it is pushing for more. Sister Nanny’s group has begun advocating for Rastas to get intellectual property rights that might protect “the colours, the language, the food...Anyone who wants to appropriate our culture, then they should pay”. The promise is that funds raised in this way would be used to build schools and more care homes. Talks with Jamaica’s government continue. A lack of unity hampers the fight. In 2023 several distinct groups formed Rastafari Mansions and
Organisations, an umbrella body, to help co-ordinate advocacy. Coherence remains a challenge, says Sister Nanny. “There is no one voice yet.” ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2026/10/22/rastafarians-in-jamaica-want- more-rights
Everything is going wrong for Muhammad bin Salman A deeply divided Israel prepares to vote Russia is escalating its information war in Africa Joseph Kabila moves against his successor in Congo
Middle East & Africa | Saudi bets gone bad Everything is going wrong for Muhammad bin Salman This is his annus horribilis Oct 22nd 2026 IN ANY OTHER year, Muhammad bin Salman would be getting ready for his star turn. October 26th was supposed to have been the start of the Future Investment Initiative (FII), an annual summit in the Saudi capital that is sometimes dubbed “Davos in the desert”. The crown prince usually spends the week glad-handing heads of state, titans of finance and other dignitaries, all of them eager to do business with his kingdom. Not this year. The Houthis, an Iran-backed militia in Yemen, have spent weeks firing missiles and drones at Riyadh. The airport is still, in effect, shut after a series of deadly attacks. Many Western governments have warned their citizens not to travel to the kingdom. Executives were nervous that
hotels or other venues could be targets. After days of deliberation, organisers decided on October 19th to postpone the event until next year. As he rose to power a decade ago, Prince Muhammad made a few big gambles. He wagered that he could defeat the Houthis; that he could reshape the Saudi economy; and that Donald Trump would prove a reliable ally. All of them have gone awry at once. The decision to cancel FII is emblematic of Prince Muhammad’s annus horribilis. He faces a set of interlocking crises, none of which has a ready solution. The Saudis failed to defeat the Houthis, but they had hoped a ceasefire agreed on in 2022 would contain the threat. Instead the truce began to unravel this summer because of America’s broader war with Iran. The Houthis have seized additional territory in Yemen and battered Saudi Arabia. People close to the crown prince see only bad options. The kingdom can send ground troops into a bloody war; continue a campaign of air strikes that is unlikely to succeed; or make a deal that helps cement the Houthis’ rule in Yemen. A long conflict will derail the prince’s economic programme, which was sputtering even before 2026. Big projects were being shelved amid a strain on public finances. Wages have not kept pace with inflation. Annual foreign direct investment is only about one-third of the crown prince’s $100bn target. A year ago the IMF expected the Saudi economy to grow by 4% in 2026; now it expects a 3.3% contraction. Whether it rebounds in 2027 will depend on whether peace breaks out in the Middle East—and that will depend largely on Mr Trump. The kingdom thought it had influence over him. It wooed him by promising to invest implausible sums in America. It also made tawdry deals with the first family, paying Trump-owned golf courses to host Saudi-funded tournaments and investing $2bn with Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law. None of that stopped Mr Trump from embarking on a disastrous war. “He’s not loyal to anyone for long,” says one well-connected Saudi. There are no reliable public-opinion polls in the kingdom, but it is fair to say most Saudis trust their government. Some have found recent weeks unnerving, nonetheless: the war in Yemen has caused real disruption. Yet
since October 10th, when a Houthi missile killed 13 people at Riyadh’s airport, Prince Muhammad has been largely invisible. It fell to ministers to visit victims and offer reassuring messages. A few Western commentators have begun to ask whether this crisis-filled year poses an existential threat to the crown prince’s rule. The view among diplomats in Riyadh is that such talk is overblown. “He was in a much tougher place seven or eight years ago,” says one Western envoy. Back then the prince was a newly appointed heir, still consolidating his rule. The war in Yemen was already a quagmire, the blockade of Qatar was upsetting America, and much of the world was horrified when Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist, was murdered inside the kingdom’s consulate in Istanbul. Prince Muhammad’s grip on power is far more secure today: he has sidelined rivals and centralised power unlike any Saudi ruler since King Abdulaziz, the founder of the modern state. Though he certainly has his detractors, none could plausibly organise a putsch. Nor is he facing much criticism from allies. The response to the recent escalation in Yemen has been telling: even long-time critics of the war are now willing to acknowledge that the kingdom has little choice but to fight. “I do understand that this is a different moment than 2018 or 2020. They are facing these Houthi advances and Houthi rocket attacks,” says Chris Murphy, a Democratic senator who met the crown prince in Riyadh this month. “We should recognise that.” Seen in another light, though, this is a more challenging moment for Prince Muhammad. Because the woes of his early years were mostly self-inflicted, they were easier to fix. By 2021 he was steering Saudi foreign policy in a more pragmatic direction. He ended the blockade of Qatar and sought a deal with the Houthis. Even the Biden administration, which took office promising to make the crown prince a “pariah”, grudgingly praised his new direction. This year is harder. The biggest decision is out of Prince Muhammad’s hands. He has urged Mr Trump not to escalate the war with Iran. If the president ignores him and resumes bombing after the midterm elections in November, Saudi officials worry the kingdom will take blows from all sides: