As for Qatar, it has yet to restart its liquefaction plants. This suggests it does not think peace is around the corner. If its supplies do not return soon, Europe will need an extra 20m tonnes of LNG to restock before winter next year. Its hunt for supplies would push prices up during all of 2027. The Gulf crisis has put paid to the notion, entertained by most LNG- watchers before the war, that the global market would tip into surplus in 2026. Yet many of the new LNG projects on which that idea was based remain on course. Perversely, the more severe the crunch now, the bigger the potential oversupply later, says Aimie Parpia of Six One Commodities. Hints of an eventual mega-glut could be discerned at Gastech, an annual gabfest held last month in Bangkok. Over four days an A-list of exporters— developers, energy majors, state-owned giants—showed off new projects using flat-screen mosaics and tanker replicas. Traders roamed the floor locking in future cargoes. Equipment-makers filled their order books. Importers were chasing new contracts now, and worrying about overbuying later. The watchword was “diversification”. Expectations of persistent price volatility have emboldened developers to press ahead with new supply that seemed less certain earlier this year, says Massimo Di Odoardo of Wood Mackenzie, a consultancy. American liquefaction capacity alone is expected to nearly double by 2030. Canada’s will soar, too. The advent of smaller, modular liquefaction units is opening gas deposits in countries—from Argentina to Senegal—that once lacked the infrastructure to host LNG projects. All told, new projects could boost global supply in 2030 to 630m tonnes, nearly 60% more than last year. At the same time, demand will be below pre-war forecasts (see chart 4). Some countries, including China, have cancelled plans for new import terminals, worried that another geopolitical crisis could leave them high and dry. Many are restarting coal-fired power plants, launching ambitious renewable-energy tenders and reconsidering nuclear power. Rystad Energy, another consultancy, forecasts annual demand of 574m tonnes by the end of the decade, down from 583m tonnes before the war.
If Qatar restarted pumping at full tilt and all the planned projects were to materialise, supply would exceed demand by 55m-75m tonnes. Balancing the market would then mean someone producing below capacity, someone buying in excess of need, or both. Either way, LNG prices could fall below $6 per mmBtu, analysts believe. That is less than the cost of lifting cargoes under most long-term contracts. Wary of a testing few years ahead, buyers and sellers are chasing “optionality”. Large utilities, such as Japan’s JERA and Germany’s Uniper, are acquiring trading staff, storage and regasification units so they can sit on excess purchases and resell when the price is right. Project developers, wanting to capture more margin, are cutting out middlemen and setting up their own trading desks. Oil-and-gas majors are signing deals left and right to become one-stop shops for smaller clients. The result could be legions of traders selling to each other, or to end-users already amply supplied. Some would be left holding cargo they cannot sell, racking up losses. Capital providers may grow overly cautious. The immediate consequences of the gas crisis are potentially bad enough. The knock-on effects could keep the market out of whack for years to come. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/10/04/the-world-is-facing-an- almighty-lng-crunch
Finance & economics | The dollar smirk The bond market sell-off is helping the dollar But the strength of the greenback is not as reliable as in the past Oct 8th 2026 NO FORECAST IS ever a complete consensus in financial markets. But some get close. At the end of 2025 the idea that the dollar would weaken was one. Dollar bulls were few. Most big investment banks and asset- management firms made bearish predictions. So did The Economist: in February we suggested that the greenback might extend last year’s miserable run, as its safe-haven status continued to fade. So far, so wrong. The DXY index, which measures the dollar against a small basket of rich-world currencies, has risen by 4% in 2026 (see chart). It is at its highest since Donald Trump began his trade world war in April last year. Several factors, not least global enthusiasm for American stocks, have helped frustrate the dollar doomsters. But these factors will not support the greenback for ever.
The movements of other currencies are part of the explanation. Investors have soured on the euro, in particular. It has slid from $1.17 to around $1.12, owing to growing worries about political and fiscal stability in Europe’s currency union. The yield on French ten-year government bonds has risen from 3.5% to 4.9% this year amid fears of fiscal mayhem, and is now around 1.3-1.4 percentage points above the German equivalent. Investors dumping euros have only so many places to go: the dollar is an obvious choice (the euro is down against sterling and the yen, too). Another reason for the dollar’s rally is darkly ironic: the rise in energy prices caused by America’s war with Iran. In the past high oil prices typically weakened the greenback. Oil was something that America bought from abroad, and although crude is priced in dollars, many of those it handed over to foreign sellers would eventually be converted into some other currency. Since America became a net energy exporter in the late 2010s, thanks to the shale-fracking boom, this mechanism has gone into reverse. Pricey petrol and diesel may be a political headache for Mr Trump’s Republican Party a month before midterm elections, but they are a salve for the dollar. A deeper source of the dollar’s strength is the American economy, which continues to surprise even optimists. Late last year economists expected growth of between 1.6% and 1.9%, at an annualised rate, in each quarter this
year. In fact growth hit 2.5% in the first quarter and 2.2% in the second, fuelled by household consumption and business investment in infrastructure for artificial intelligence. The third quarter may have been stronger yet: the Atlanta Fed’s “nowcast” points to 3.7%. A hot economy may force the Federal Reserve to keep raising interest rates, which makes owning Treasury bonds and other interest-bearing American assets more lucrative. In the year to July foreign buyers bought a net $450bn or so of American corporate debt, the most in any such period in nearly 20 years even after adjusting for inflation. Foreigners are hungrier still for American equities: in the same 12 months they purchased a net $900bn- worth of American stocks and investment-fund units. That is a record for any 12-month stretch—and 80% above an earlier peak in 2021. The problem for the dollar is that these sources of strength are narrower than in the past. Historically America’s currency rallied both when the country’s economy was going strong and when the world, even including America, was falling to pieces. Stephen Jen, a currency strategist and investor, dubbed this the “dollar smile”. Now the smile is more of a lopsided smirk. Although the dollar’s movement against the euro shows that its appeal as a safe haven remains, this matters much less than the allure of America’s risk assets. Should those assets disappoint—if, say, the boom turns out to be a bubble and pops—return- chasing investors will dump them, and the dollar, as quickly as they snapped them up. Currency traders had better get used to bigger mood swings. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/10/05/the-bond-market-sell- off-is-helping-the-dollar
Finance & economics | Paper millions Why shares are the new bricks and mortar Household wealth is flowing from property to stocks Oct 8th 2026 Freshers’ Week, the initiation into British university life, is often a blur of cheap pints and sticky dance floors. For German-born Sophie Blank, it was an introduction to another British rite of passage: getting on the property ladder. Her new classmates, barely out of school, were already plotting their paths to homeownership, she says. Now 33, working in AI and content creation, and posting about money matters on social media, Ms Blank says she is “happily renting” in Notting Hill, in west London. She is putting her savings into stocks instead. The property ladder, she declares, can wait. In Germany people tend to rent their homes. But those in the Anglosphere buy if they can afford to—and have long built the bulk of their wealth that way, encouraged by the post-war proliferation of policies to promote home- buying. In America and Canada, homeowners are wealthier than renters, a
gap that has widened over time. In Britain, estimates the Yorkshire Building Society, a lender, by retirement age homeowners are on average nearly £800,000 ($1.1m) richer than renters, with property accounting for almost half the gap. In Australia around one in seven taxpayers owns an investment property. Now it seems less clear that property is the path to wealth, especially for the young. Although housing markets in many countries have softened lately, they are still close to all-time highs after adjusting for inflation, according to The Economist’s latest estimates. For many, getting on the housing ladder is too costly to contemplate: in Ireland three-fifths of 18- to 34-year-olds live with their parents. But property is also looking less attractive as an investment. As higher interest rates cool house prices, households are generating more of their wealth from stocks than from property, reversing a two-decade trend. Of the $40trn added to global household wealth in 2025, 57% came from stocks and 15% from property—a marked contrast with the previous 25 years, in which property’s share averaged 52% and that of equities 26%, according to the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), a think- tank within a consultancy (see chart). America sits at the extreme end of the realignment. In July stocks overtook property as a share of household wealth for the first time since the second