Health Organisation (WHO). Russia’s federal health watchdog claimed to have found “no evidence of microorganisms related to her professional activities”, and said the cause of death was “pneumonia of unknown etiology”. Beyond confirming the death Russian officials have provided little information, though they are urgently implementing regional control measures. On Monday Marco Rubio, America’s secretary of state, said that his government is “watching and monitoring it closely”. With the covid pandemic still a recent memory, it is no wonder the world has shown close interest. Inevitably, some have asked if the incident is connected to Russia’s biological warfare programme, which Western intelligence services say is still active. The bacterium Yersinia pestis, generically known as “plague”, manifests in two forms. Every year thousands of cases of bubonic plague occur naturally when people catch it after contact with wildlife such as rodents. Bubonic plague is treatable with antibiotics if caught early, but untreated it can become pneumonic plague, which can be transmitted via respiratory droplets. This is harder to treat and has a higher mortality rate. Legitimate reasons exist for study of the pathogen, such as to understand how it causes disease, and to develop vaccines and treatments. But Filippa Lentzos, a biosecurity expert at King’s College London, says the lack of transparency around the incident in Siberia is worrying. Plague is one of a group of high-risk pathogens that have easy transmissibility and high mortality rates, including anthrax, smallpox, and viral hemorrhagic fevers such as Ebola. Biosafety laboratories are proliferating around the world, raising the likelihood of accidents. These pathogens are also considered prime candidates for use in bioweapons. Plague can be aerosolised to ease transmission to humans and genetically modified to make it resistant to antibiotics. Despite ratifying the Biological Weapons Convention in 1975, the Soviet Union ran an extensive covert bioweapons programme. In 1992 Boris Yeltsin, then president of Russia, acknowledged the programme and agreed to dismantle it. But more recently Russia has maintained secrecy around its military biological- research facilities. Satellite imagery of one such site outside Moscow
indicates significant expansion since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. In 2023 a report on treaty compliance by America’s State Department concluded that Russia maintains an offensive biological weapons programme. Based on the unofficial information currently available on the situation in Irkutsk, the WHO believes the risk to the general population to be low. No evidence suggests that the institute in Irkutsk is linked to bioweapons activities, and Russia insists its cloaked military sites only undertake defensive research. But Russia said the same thing about its chemical- weapons research before it attempted to assassinate Sergei Skripal, a Russian defector in Britain, with a military-grade nerve poison in 2018. There may be nothing to the lab-leak rumours. But with so little transparency, it is hard to take Russia at its word. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/10/06/the-plague-may-have-escaped-from-a-lab- in-siberia
Europe’s lame-duck year could hardly come at a worse time Elections will sap what little resolve Europe has to make tough decisions Oct 8th 2026 Every organisation has an idle period when getting things done becomes all but impossible: universities feel eerily quiet over summer, most offices are dormant over Christmas. Europe may be entering such a period, but one that will last the best part of a year. On October 5th Pedro Sánchez, the embattled Spanish prime minister, called early elections that will be held in late November. The starting gun has thus been fired unexpectedly early on a marathon of voting, from France to Finland by way of Greece, Poland and Italy, that will see over half of all citizens of the European Union elect new national leaders between now and the end of 2027. Until the ballots are counted, almost every awkward decision at EU level will come with an irresistible alternative: wait until after the election. A continent confronted
by war, weak growth and geopolitical upheaval is headed into enduring political paralysis at a painfully inopportune moment. The gap between what Europe knows it ought to do and its willingness to do it is, to put it kindly, never narrow. Reports arguing that it urgently needs to reform its economy, bolster its defence capabilities and reform the union itself ahead of its potential enlargement have resulted in more felled forests than an IKEA superstore. Alas, all their lofty recommendations will now have to wait. One election-bound politician after another will plead with fellow leaders that they cannot possibly make contentious compromises, for example on the much-needed deepening of the EU’s single market, in the run-up to voting. The end result will be a sort of relay race of political mañana-ism as one campaign ends and the next begins. Even after the ballots are counted, more uncertainty will follow: in many places right-wing populists with little love for the EU will either win elections or become power brokers. Thus the gap between Europe’s need to act and its ability to do so is becoming a veritable chasm. In part that is because the in-tray looks ever more daunting. Many of the old continent’s old problems remain unresolved even as new ones pile up. The EU is heading for winter with its lowest gas reserves since 2022, when Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine triggered an energy crisis that never quite receded—and has been exacerbated by the war in Iran. High fuel prices have put the pinch on consumers. Europe’s solution to its economic woes has long been to import cut-rate wares from China while governments borrowed to fund generous welfare states without unduly taxing citizens. That strategy is falling apart. Cheap Chinese imports are now seen as predatory in ways that threaten Europe’s industrial base. On October 15th EU leaders will meet to discuss whether to erect trade defences against China. The cheap credit some countries used to fund their deficits is a thing of the past, too. France is facing a bond-market squeeze as creditors demand higher yields to accept the risk of lending to a country that has not balanced a budget in over five decades. Having eschewed surpluses since the disco age, France is wildly unlikely to discover fiscal prudence before the first round of the presidential election in April. Even without elections the place seems barely governable, with students rioting for little discernible reason.
Europe’s navel-gazing causes it to fall behind a bit more every day. While China and America are vying for supremacy in artificial intelligence, Europe has no model anywhere near the cutting edge. The EU’s next long-term budget is meant to boost its competitiveness, but a deal could be delayed amid overlapping campaign seasons. None of this is entirely new: a union of many democracies inevitably entails a lot of voting. But geopolitical threats ought to concentrate European minds on how to make decisions, even as elections come and go. After a summer when Ukraine seemed to have turned the tables on Russia, it is once again being battered as winter looms. A €90bn ($101bn) slug of EU aid approved in late 2025 was meant to last two years. It now looks like more will be needed sooner. Vladimir Putin appears to have ambitions beyond Ukraine; intelligence agencies predict ever more hybrid attacks designed to sow discord within NATO. That ought to prompt Europeans to build up their collective defences, now that a flaky America is no longer a reliable security guarantor. Instead, Spain’s prime minister is campaigning on his refusal to do so. Spaniards will spend the next two months arguing about housing, and then forming a probably unstable coalition. Mr Putin is unlikely to stop blowing things up while Europe deals with its problems. The paralysis that overcomes the European project when its politicians are out campaigning is one risk. Another is that the winners of the elections may rip up the blueprints. Spain’s election will not change Europe much, though it will probably oust the only socialist politician to lead one of its big countries. Few will notice which parties win in Finland in April. But Poland and particularly France could vote in populist-right leaders who so loathe the EU that it is hard to see how the bloc could remain effective. Marine Le Pen, the front-runner in French polls, wants to defund the union and cut back support to Ukraine. Europe hardly needs elections to lapse into sclerosis. The urgency deficit has been evident throughout the past year, a period with few elections. And the string of ballots will not bring Europe entirely to a halt. Summits of EU leaders will still be held, regulations crafted, communiqués issued and so on. Crises have a way of focusing politicians’ minds even when they have one eye on the campaign trail. But responding to events is not the same as shaping them. At precisely the moment Europe needs to make big choices—
on defence, competitiveness, trade and Ukraine—its leaders may be about to retreat into their political crouches and, for many months, make none at all.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/10/08/europes-lame-duck-year-could-hardly- come-at-a-worse-time
Kemi Badenoch's pitch for power is incoherent Conservationists are building highways for bugs Britain’s Greens are now a hard-left, antisemitic party Are exams evil? Are small planes Britain’s next small boats? American bombers have abandoned a British base The coming fall of pensioner communism
Kemi Badenoch's pitch for power is incoherent But Britain’s Tories still have a shot at reuniting the right Oct 8th 2026 “There is a fight coming in British politics,” Kemi Badenoch told the Conservative Party at its annual conference on October 7th. The Tory leader promised a “battle of ideas” with the ruling Labour Party. “This party is now the no-drama party,” she declared. The Tories are feeling more upbeat and less drama-ridden than they have for a while. This is mostly because they are pleased to have survived. Nigel Farage, the leader of Reform UK, has made it his mission to kill them off altogether and replace them as the dominant party of the right. This time last year he seemed to stand a chance. Reform was top of the opinion polls and had a 13-point lead over the Tories. Now, thanks to a modest recovery by the Conservatives and a big drop in support for Reform, that gap stands at just two points. (Labour, meanwhile, has moved back up to first place.)