prevent customers switching. Markets for goods and services can be surveyed totally and ceaselessly. No form is too long; no claim too small. Which of the Millennium mathematics problems can Muse solve? That is unclear. But prod Muse in the right way and you could wake up with a cheaper car-insurance policy. Might Muse agents end the world? Mark Zuckerberg, Meta’s boss, has dismissed worries about AI safety, much as the White House has. Though not yet the most popular AI product, Muse is surely the first populist one, designed for the everyman of Facebook Marketplace for whom privacy does not matter, existential risks are bunk and everything in the economy is either a bargain or a scam. The mood in markets is similar to what it was in February. Back then, as it became clear that models could write code better than humans, the question was: what happens when everyone has the coding ability of a Silicon Valley engineer? Shares in software companies were sold indiscriminately (many have since recovered). Now the question du jour is something like: what happens when everyone has the patience of a monk? The state will struggle with its newly agentic citizenry. When the cost of identifying and claiming all the rights and benefits rich countries offer their people falls, governments will end up spending more. That is an acute problem for courts, which are already flooded by AI-written filings. The rule of law demands that citizens can enforce their rights, but also that courts remain open, and judges human. Troublingly, most solutions to this trilemma involve more money or fewer rights. Companies will suffer in proportion to the profits they receive from ignorance and inertia. Economists have long speculated about why money sits in bank accounts when it could earn far more interest in a money-market fund. Or why insurance customers allow their loyalty to be punished with higher rates, and don’t simply switch. It is often said that the West suffers from a compensation culture, but plenty of compensation goes unclaimed. In Europe only around half of potential compensation for delayed and cancelled flights is actually paid out—often with the help of firms that take their own cut from afflicted customers.

When consumers let agents loose on their behalf, firms that rely on subscriptions are less secure; it costs little to test Muse by attempting to cancel an unwanted gym membership or newsletter subscription. So are businesses that depend on being able to distinguish humans from computers. A qualification earned online must now be worth less. Most would find the idea of flirting with a robot intolerable. Once agents get chatting on dating apps, those apps will be reduced to elaborate matching systems between singletons’ online personas. States and firms could attempt to reimpose frictions with their own technology. Imagine agents keeping other agents on hold, ignoring and chasing each other in increasingly aggressive email correspondence. (Ironically, such defences will make the internet even more unbearable for humans.) Shopify, an online-commerce platform, has welcomed Muse agents. Amazon has banned them. If the AI bulls are to be believed, that will soon be costly, since agents will be responsible for a meaningful share of commerce, and because they will be harder to identify: “tick the box to prove your humanity” becomes “click the yellow bikes” becomes “upload a photo with today’s newspaper”. Unburdened of administrative work, consumers might ask a more fundamental question of their new agents: what is the relationship between Man and Muse? Opinions about the homo-agentic bond will differ. The user of an agent is likely to consider her new assistant an ordinary tech product, for which she does not bear total responsibility. To the world, of course, the agent and its manager will be quite indistinguishable. Model-makers surely think much of the responsibility lies with the user. Consider three scenarios. John instructs his agent to write funny posts online, and it proceeds to libel someone; Susan tells her agent to negotiate the sale of some goods but, being prone to exaggeration, it misrepresents them; chatting with his agent, Paul orders a kite for his young son, who then receives, and cuts himself with, a knife. Careless people operating careless models, you say. But the concepts normally used to apportion blame are stretched by the nature of AI. What does it mean to say that harms caused by something as general and mystical as AI are foreseeable? If the model- maker is blamed, does it matter that its code was written by agents, plausibly designed by another lab?

The tension between autonomy and responsibility is among the most fundamental questions in AI. Mostly this has been discussed in the abstract, in terms of the existential risks and AI consciousness. Now a million agentic citizens let loose on the economy will find out for themselves. If they don’t like the result, they know how to appeal. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/business/2026/09/23/agent-of-whom

· Finance & economics

House prices survived the last rise in interest rates. Will they this time? Data centres are straining the insurance market The battle between India’s stock exchanges is heating up again Israel’s war economy is thriving You can’t trade your way through the AI apocalypse Turkey’s investment-fund fiasco How the Fed should measure inflation

Finance & economics | Shaky foundations House prices survived the last rise in interest rates. Will they this time? Supports that shored up the housing market when borrowing costs last rose are gone Sep 24th 2026 RISING BOND yields imperil government finances. They will also change the housing market. The interest rate on most American mortgages, after all, closely tracks the ten-year yield on Treasuries, now around 5% and the highest in two decades; German mortgage lenders price off long-term bunds; and so on in other rich economies. If interest rates remain high, let alone rise further, a confluence of factors could spell a long period of weakness for house prices. After the last jump in borrowing costs, in 2022-23, the global housing market emerged remarkably unscathed (see chart, top panel). Even adjusting for the inflation of recent years, rich-world house prices are only 4% off

their all-time high. True, a few markets have wobbled. In New Zealand, where the housing market entirely detached from economic fundamentals during the covid-19 pandemic, real home values have fallen by 25% from their peak. Germany’s housing market, usually boringly stable, has also slumped. But many other places are seeing a housing boom of sorts. Australia’s real house prices are slightly above their pandemic peak. In the fanciest parts of San Francisco, the neighbourhoods where Sam (Altman), Jensen (Huang) and other AI moguls known mainly by their first name have homes, house prices are up by 20% over the past year. Some markets are even healthier (for owners) or more unaffordable (for buyers). Someone who had the foresight to buy a house in Portugal during the dark days of the euro-zone debt crisis in 2013 would now be sitting on an asset worth nearly 200% more in real terms. No one knows the future path of interest rates. Yet investors worry about housing. In America housing-related shares (such as those of construction firms) have underperformed the wider market by 16 percentage points since June. UBS, a bank, reckons that next year British housebuilders’ profitability will fall to its lowest rate since the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Even in Australia, where seemingly nothing can

topple the housing market, homebuilders’ share prices are 10% off their recent highs. Three factors suggest that the rich world’s housing market is vulnerable to higher rates: mortgages, household finances and supply. Take mortgages first. Households entered the last shock unusually well insulated. During the pandemic many Americans refinanced into loans fixed at 3% for 30 years. Australians rushed to take out fixed-rate mortgages, which the central bank had in effect subsidised over variable-rate ones (thanks to a “term funding facility” which lent to commercial banks at rock- bottom rates for fixed terms). In Britain, by 2022 a small chunk of mortgage lending had fixed rates for more than ten years—something once thought to be about as likely as getting a high-definition photo of the Loch Ness monster. Those “fixes” offered protection as interest rates rose. Mortgage holders have less of it today. In most countries for which The Economist could find reliable data, households have taken out variable-rate products, in the hope that rates decline. In Australia the share of the stock of mortgages on fixed rates has fallen from nearly 40% in 2022 to around 5%. In Canada the share on variable rates has doubled from its level in 2020. Even in America, the land of the eternal mortgage fix, adjustable rates are commoner than in 2021. Households that continue to fix their mortgages often do so for less time. Our estimate suggests that the average Briton who fixes their mortgage now does so for 2.4 years, down from a recent peak of 2.7 years. The decline in Canada’s effective fix looks much steeper. The second crutch in 2022-23 was cash. Generous covid-era handouts had left rich-world households with “excess” savings of $5trn (or one-tenth of GDP back then). People complained about a “cost-of-living crisis” as prices and interest rates rose, but many of them could draw on this stash to make ends meet. Today the excess savings have been drawn down. According to research published by the San Francisco Federal Reserve, Americans burned through their $2trn pile by mid-2024. In the EU households’ deposits are worth 67% of GDP, down from a recent high of 77%. The third and final support for prices relates to housing supply. The interest- rate rises of 2022-23 followed a long period of exceptionally slow pace of housing construction (see chart, bottom panel). The wave of millennials who

hoped to graduate from renting to homeownership had little choice but to pay up for what limited supply there was. In the face of the higher rates of recent years, however, housebuilding in most of the countries in our sample remains higher than it was in the mid- 2010s. Banks are strong and “YIMBYs” (who say “yes in my back yard”) have pushed local governments to relax planning rules. In the past five years America has added 7.3m homes, compared with 6.1m in the five years before that. In Auckland, the largest city in New Zealand, YIMBYish politicians pushed the number of housing consents to 16,000 last year, a huge rise on the norm before the pandemic. The number of units for sale keeps rising, giving buyers more bargaining power. For the first time in years housing may not be a one-way bet.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/09/20/house-prices-survived- the-last-rise-in-interest-rates-will-they-this-time