in Germany. Its estimated rate of high-risk opioid use is roughly twice the German one. In 2024, with fentanyl starting to appear more often in Europe, Italy’s government unveiled a plan to counter it. But Alfredo Mantovano, the top health-ministry official for drug policy, noted that the drug had not yet made much of an impact there. Police have made few significant seizures of fentanyl, says Nicola Gratteri, an anti-Mafia prosecutor. He concludes that mafias are staying away from the drug. “If there is not a [fentanyl] epidemic, it’s not thanks to police or politicians,” says Roberto Saviano, an organised-crime writer whose book “Gomorrah” is considered a classic. “There is a veto by the mafias.” Mr Gratteri and Mr Saviano say the drug’s extreme potency and high lethality would be likely to trigger an aggressive response from law-enforcement authorities. Moreover, drugs that kill their customers tend to be less profitable in the long run. For Italian organised-crime groups, that could threaten established heroin and cocaine markets. They seem to have decided that fentanyl brings unwanted attention and is bad for business. There is no smoking gun: investigators have not produced wiretaps of Mafia bosses agreeing not to touch the stuff. But in July Vincenzo Molinese, commander of a specialised organised-crime group in the Carabinieri, Italy’s military police, told a parliamentary commission that the evidence suggested they were steering clear of it. Such decisions would have to be made at the highest levels, says Mr Saviano: “We will have proof when someone tries to bring [fentanyl] in and is killed.” In any case, Italy’s fentanyl-free zone may not last. In June 80 vials of the drug, enough for 20,000 doses, were stolen from a hospital in Rome. That prompted a security clampdown in medical facilities. Synthetic drugs offer enormous value in tiny quantities, dispensing with many of the complex logistics required for traditional intoxicants such as cocaine. Street demand for fentanyl is emerging. Eventually, says Mr Saviano, new groups seeking to gain a foothold will supply it. As Don Corleone says, when he eventually agrees to let drugs be traded in his territory: “When did I ever refuse an accommodation?”■
This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/09/24/the-mafia-may-be-keeping-fentanyl-out- of-italy
France forces the EU to lift sanctions on a Russian oligarch Azerbaijan exacts a ransom for detained French nationals Sep 24th 2026 ON SEPTEMBER 22ND France accomplished something that Viktor Orban, Hungary’s former leader, had attempted for years without success. It strong-armed the European Union into lifting sanctions on Alisher Usmanov (pictured), a Russian-Uzbek oligarch with close ties to Vladimir Putin. French diplomats said they wanted Mr Usmanov spared for reasons of “national security”. In fact, getting the oligarch exempted was a condition of a secret deal France had negotiated with Azerbaijan to release French citizens it had detained. Mr Usmanov was removed from the sanctions list along with Mikhail Fridman, a Russian oligarch. After France made its demand, Luxembourg had taken the opportunity to tack on Mr Fridman, who was pursuing an
arbitration case over frozen assets that could have forced the microstate to pay him $16bn. With the entire package of Russian sanctions scheduled to expire the following day unless it was unanimously approved by the EU’s member states, the rest of them caved in. Why Azerbaijan was so devoted to Mr Usmanov is not clear, though he is said to be friendly with Ilham Aliyev, the country’s strongman president. But Azerbaijan’s desire to squeeze concessions out of France stems from the increasingly bitter animosity between the two countries. France is a long- time backer of Armenia, and Emmanuel Macron, the French president, vocally supported the country during Azerbaijan’s recent wars against it. After the Armenians’ defeat in 2023 France began selling them weapons. Mr Aliyev responded by attacking French “Azerbaijanophobia”. His government established the Baku Initiative Group (BIG), an outfit nominally dedicated to fighting neocolonialism, though it concentrates on French and formerly French territories. The institute is part of a “cognitive-warfare” effort to paint French and EU criticism of Azerbaijan as hypocrisy, says Sossi Tatikyan of the Yerevan Centre of Foreign and Security Policy. In 2024 independence activists in New Caledonia, a French overseas territory in the Pacific, were seen with Azerbaijani flags and T-shirts sporting BIG logos. Mr Aliyev declared his solidarity with the separatists, and the boss of a local think-tank wrote of “Azerbaijan’s pivot to the Pacific”. The country also began to treat detained French citizens as bargaining chips. At least one has been let go since the EU dropped its sanctions on Mr Usmanov: Martin Ryan, a British-French dual national convicted of espionage. Another French national whom Azerbaijan might release is Anass Derraz, a water-company executive. Ironically, he was arrested on charges of helping a different Russian oligarch evade sanctions, allegedly in concert with Alexandre Benalla, Mr Macron’s disgraced former head of security. Mr Derraz denies the charges against him. The exceptions for Messrs Fridman and Usmanov show that European countries, though they present sanctions as a matter of collective security, are open to deals. Other oligarchs will try to bargain as well. To prevent that, the EU agreed that the current renewal is valid for three years, up from six months. Russian oligarchs doubt it will hold. Andrii Sybiha, Ukraine’s
foreign minister, spoke of “the humiliation of the EU”. France has struck a blow against Europe’s credibility.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/09/24/france-forces-the-eu-to-lift-sanctions- on-a-russian-oligarch
Red alert! Europe’s populist left is on the march, slowly Populism isn’t just for right-wingers Sep 24th 2026 For a movement predicated on historical inevitability, communism is taking an awfully long time to triumph in Europe. It has been nearly two centuries since Marx and Engels proclaimed the bourgeois goose cooked. Somehow the capitalists have contrived to retain control over the commanding heights of the economy, and even reclaim them in bits of central Europe that had fallen under the Soviet yoke. This dearth of revolutionary momentum is not for lack of zeal among the true believers on the populist left. Two dozen parties wed to class-struggle ideology across Europe have kept themselves busy mounting barricades, calling for strikes and organising seminars on the true nature of colonialist patriarchy. Despite their efforts the dictatorship of the proletariat remains as distant as ever. If a spectre haunts Europe these days, it is of the populists at the other end of the spectrum, those on the
illiberal right, who seem to be making more tangible progress towards overturning the established order. Yet if the downtrodden have yet to seize much beyond the occasional committee room, the political faction on the left of the left is having a moment. On September 20th comrades across Europe cheered as Elif Eralp of Die Linke, the German party of red-flag wavers, came top in state elections in Berlin. Granted, Ms Eralp, whose parents migrated to Germany from Turkey, was offering merely to clobber private landlords and turn the capital into a “city of solidarity” rather than seize the means of production, but still. In Sweden the Left Party (once known as “communist”, it dropped the moniker in 1990) did well enough in national elections this month that it will be needed for the centre-left to secure a parliamentary majority. At European Union confabs, these parties’ future ministers may bump into fellow travellers from Spain, where the populist left is also in government. It may not be Greece in the late 2010s, when Syriza ran the country (into the ground), but in many places the reds are doing all right. The populist right has enough political oomph to scare centrists into wondering what might happen should more of them come to power. In contrast, their left-wing counterparts often have all the electoral menace of a revolutionary poster peeling from a student-union wall. The Left group in the European Parliament, a rough proxy of influence across the EU, counts 46 members in a chamber of 720—behind three centrist factions, ecologists and the populist right. Yet the movement’s modest electoral success belies its influence. Besides being a potential coalition ally, it can act as a spoiler. In France, for example, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the cantankerous leader of Unsubmissive France now on his fourth presidential run, has no chance of winning the election in April. But polls show he might be the runner-up in the first round. Such an outcome would be a godsend for Marine Le Pen, the right-winger who is far ahead in the polls. She faces a tight run-off against any centrist candidate, but would handily beat Mr Mélenchon. He could, indeed, change France—by bringing the populist right to power. Even as most voters still plump for pro-capitalist outfits, parties on the populist left feel they have the revolutionary wind in their sails. In many countries they have tapped into outrage over Gaza. Confabs of hard lefties feature more Palestinian flags than hammer-and-sickles these days (the