suggests that this is changing as economic worries grow, especially among younger voters; and, at 42, he will be Okinawa’s youngest governor and the first born after America returned Okinawa to Japan five decades ago. The result will make it easier for the government to pursue its military build-up in the region. Mr Tamaki, who is 66, embodied a politics of resistance that had long defined Okinawa. He became governor in 2018 at the head of a broad coalition opposed to a plan to replace an existing American base by building a big new one at Henoko, on the east coast of Okinawa’s main island. Residents of Okinawa have endured noise, pollution, accidents and crimes involving servicemen. The rape of a 12-year-old girl by three Americans in 1995 sparked deep outrage. The grievances carry particular weight because of Okinawa’s history; once an independent kingdom, the islands were invaded and annexed by Japan, devastated during the second world war and then ruled by America until 1972. Yet Mr Tamaki did not manage to stop Henoko during his eight years in office. Okinawa repeatedly challenged the central government in court and lost; construction is now well under way. Many grew resigned. China’s growing military power has also altered Okinawa’s anti-militarist tradition. “Without the bases, I think China will invade us,” says Mekaru Yasushi, an Okinawan in his 50s. Mr Koja appealed to voters with his promise to build a stronger economy. Okinawa has the lowest income levels in Japan. He vowed to double incomes and improve ties with Tokyo, arguing that closer co-operation would bring more cash. He approves of the Henoko move. The race also mirrored broader trends in Japanese politics, including the dominance of the conservatives and a collapse of the left-leaning opposition. Social media also shaped the campaign, often spreading false claims and AI- generated material, much of it attacking Mr Tamaki. The LDP and Takaichi Sanae, the prime minister, have welcomed the result. Japan is deploying more weapons across its south-western islands and hopes to make more use of civilian infrastructure for military purposes. A governor more willing to work with the central government should lower the political
cost of those plans. But such closeness with the government carries risks for Mr Koja. Though the bases mattered less in this election than the economy, disputes over them could return in the wake of another accident or crime, warns Hateruma Shino of Okinawa International University. If they do, she asks, “will he stand with Okinawa when that means confronting Tokyo?” ■ For exclusive coverage of Asian politics, economics and security, sign up to Asia Bulletin, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/09/16/an-electoral-result-that-helps-japans- defence-buildup
To keep out “infiltrators”, India is trapping its own citizens A buffer zone has become a miserable limbo Sep 17th 2026 A MAKESHIFT CHECKPOINT holds up bikes, business and lives. Along a village road in Hakimpur, in the Indian state of West Bengal, two girls in burqas wait as a border guard rummages through their rucksacks. Behind them is an uneasy kilometre-wide buffer zone—still within Indian territory but governed without its freedoms. Yet unlike many borderlands, this is not no-man’s-land; 25,000 inhabitants live in its seven villages. A crowd gathers to complain to The Economist about mounting restrictions and checks. The buffer is against “infiltrators” from Muslim-majority Bangladesh who, according to India’s home minister, Amit Shah, threaten the country’s security, economy and demographic balance. He has promised to “hang every Bangladeshi infiltrator upside down” and likened them to termites.
Undoubtedly there are many, perhaps millions, of Bangladeshis living without the right papers in India; but the government cites sensationalist estimates of up to 20m of them and swears they will all be kicked out. India is not a dharamshala (a charity guesthouse), Mr Shah recently told intelligence officers. He is right: some of its eastern borderlands are more akin to an open-air prison. One half-baked plan would have guarded its riverine stretches with snakes and crocodiles. Last year about three dozen Bangladeshis died at the hands of Indian border guards, according to Ain o Salish Kendra, a Bangladeshi human-rights organisation. But Indians, too, are trapped by the shrill politics of the borderland. At 4,100km, the India-Bangladesh border is one of the world’s longest, and among the most porous. Colonial history split hundreds of millions of Bengali-speakers into separate countries, but many still move back and forth across the border. Some houses have their kitchen in India and bedroom in Bangladesh. Tony Sardar, a shopkeeper, shows videos on his phone of a boat race in which Indian rowers are cheered by Bangladeshis on the other side of a river that you could easily swim across. The races stopped this spring. Border policy has hardened since 2014, when the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) took power nationally. But as the BJP prepared for the West Bengal state election in April, the rules and the rhetoric got cruder. In winning the state for the first time, the BJP gained control of the largest of the five Indian states that border Bangladesh. In August, Mr Shah’s home ministry said a new batch of intelligence units would be deployed in border towns, to keep tabs on extremists and smugglers. The party has also talked up “pushbacks”, in which Bengali-speaking Muslims who are allegedly Bangladeshi, not Indian, are rounded up across India, bused to border towns and shoved into Bangladesh. This improvised method flouts due process. Undeterred, West Bengal’s new chief minister, Suvendu Adhikari, has told police to hand detainees directly to border security guards. By late June, he was boasting of 10,000 pushbacks on his watch (observers say it is more like 5,000–7,000 since the state election). Now that Bangladesh has beefed up its own border patrols, most end up in holding centres or in the buffer zone. Virtually all of those who are being deported are Muslims, suspected of being foreigners merely because they speak Bengali and pray towards Mecca. Some were picked up after a botched revision of voter lists marked many residents as ineligible to vote, casting doubts over their citizenship, despite the documents they can present. Meanwhile, locals describe watching paperless Hindus surrender to border guards, only to be reassured that Hindus, who face increasing attacks in Bangladesh, are welcome to stay. As of 2024, that double standard is law: non-Muslim minorities from neighbouring countries can claim asylum and get fast-tracked for citizenship. Daily life at the border is tiresome. Locals often waste four or five hours with guards who dismantle their bikes and stick rods or fingers into lunchboxes. In the winter fog, officers aren’t always in the mood to man the checkpoint, stranding locals on either side. Rationing meant to deter smuggling gangs also deprives villagers of food, baby formula and sanitary pads. “Are we actually part of India?” demands Ekmal Gazi, a village leader in the mostly Muslim buffer zone. India’s politics has further soured diplomatic relations, which were already extremely rocky, with its neighbour. Riaz Hamidullah, Bangladesh’s high
commissioner in Delhi, says India should show some izzat (respect). But the BJP’s lexicon of “termites” and “infiltrators” appears to leave little room for that. ■ Stay on top of our India coverage by signing up to Essential India, our free weekly newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/09/17/to-keep-out-infiltrators-india-is- trapping-its-own-citizens
Why Indians are unhappy about 7.8% economic growth A row over GDP numbers is really about how people feel Sep 17th 2026 THE WAR in the Middle East was worsening. Oil and gas prices were soaring. Asian countries were shortening work weeks and rationing fuel consumption. Yet in those difficult three months to the end of June, India’s economy grew by 7.8% year on year, blowing past analysts’ and the central bank’s own expectations. “Doomsayers were doomed and India bloomed… yet again!” Narendra Modi gloated on social media. Well. The doomsayers have been having a pretty decent run, actually. Chief among them is Subhash Chandra Garg, a retired bureaucrat who went on television and accused the government of goosing its numbers. He made the case that downward revisions in last year’s figures artificially boosted growth this year. Strip out the revisions, he said, and the economy grew by
just 2.6% before accounting for inflation, and in real terms may not have grown at all. The argument is easy to follow but wrong-headed. India overhauled its GDP workings earlier this year. The numbers Mr Garg is comparing were calculated differently, making them not comparable. Moreover, other indicators such as rising car sales, credit growth and power consumption all point to genuine growth. Yet it is the government that is on the back foot. Mr Garg has spurred a debate on the credibility of India’s statistics. Pundits have spent weeks discussing the plausibility of the GDP numbers. A visibly annoyed Mr Modi, 75, has taken to complaining in public about “angry uncles” who spread negativity. There are two reasons Mr Modi finds himself in this situation. The first is that his government has spent a dozen years delaying, suppressing and weakening India’s statistics. The census is now five years overdue. Unflattering datasets have been held back with the excuse that their methodology needed work. Long-established surveys suddenly dropped sections of their questionnaires. The government has lately taken steps to improve its official statistics, but it will be a while before trust is restored. The bigger issue is that few Indians feel the effects of this 7.8% growth. Surely the country should seem richer, more functional, less chaotic? Indians look around and see the precise opposite. Just this month a building collapsed in Delhi, killing seven, mostly students. Private ambulances arrived long before public ones. In June another building in another congested Delhi neighbourhood burnt down, killing 21. Last month Gurugram, a satellite city of Delhi with some of the most expensive flats in India, was paralysed on several days as its streets flooded. In a couple of months the air will become unbreathable again. And all that is just in the national-capital region. A widespread sense of social collapse adds to the feeling of a country coming apart. This month a musician was beaten to death in his house in Delhi after asking men drinking outside to keep it down. A few days before that a video went viral of a Hindu “activist” boasting about assaulting someone with impunity. Worst of all, the ladder to a better life has been yanked up. Repeated leaks of public exams that determine entry into