Finance & economics | Dangote’s big deal What Africa’s biggest IPO can do for its stock markets A new generation of investors is buying up African stocks Sep 17th 2026 ALIKO DANGOTE is the big man of African business. He is the continent’s richest tycoon, worth give or take $30bn. He has built its largest oil-refining complex, roughly half the size of Manhattan, on the outskirts of Lagos. And on September 14th he launched Africa’s biggest ever initial public offering (IPO) for Dangote Petroleum Refinery, the mega-project’s official name, hoping to raise at least $1.6bn at a valuation of nearly $50bn. If it reaches this market capitalisation when its shares begin trading on the Nigerian Exchange in November, it could instantly become one of Africa’s most valuable listed firms. The 69-year-old Mr Dangote is giddy at the prospect. “My own driver, my mother, everybody will now come and have a stake,” he tells The

Economist. So is the bourse, which has enabled retail investors in rural areas to buy the stock on mini point-of-sales terminals. “Wealth-tech” startups are advising users on how to get in on the action. TikTokers are urging Africans in the diaspora to buy in. When the IPO began, Bamboo, a popular trading app, crashed because of sky-high demand. “In future, when we are having our annual general meeting, we will hold it in a stadium,” Mr Dangote ventures. Whether or not it fills arenas, stock-picking is certainly becoming a popular sport across Africa. Retail investors trading shares on their phones are helping lift continental stock markets. The Nigerian benchmark index is up by 71% in dollar terms this year, on a par with South Korea’s but without its artificial-intelligence bets. The Ghanaian one has increased by 50%. In March Zambia’s main index was twice what it had been a year before and has stayed near there since. African markets were once written off as small, shallow and unpredictable. They are still puny by global standards, accounting for less than 1% of global market capitalisation. But they are becoming a bit deeper and less fickle. They have proved doubters wrong by emerging from the covid-19 pandemic in good nick and, this year, by weathering the latest Gulf war. Next to frothy valuations in many parts of the world, African stocks look affordable. African companies have benefited from wiser economic policies in their domestic markets. Ghana has brought down inflation and removed lingering uncertainty about its currency. So has Nigeria, which has also forced banks and pension-fund managers to hold more capital. FTSE Russell, a global compiler of indices which in 2023 changed Nigeria’s status from a risky “frontier market” to a virtually uninvestable “unclassified” one, is reversing this decision. Zambia is restructuring its public debt, and is a winner from the global boom for copper, of which it has deep reserves. Many locally listed companies are consumer-facing brands familiar to non- professional investors. MTN Nigeria, the country’s biggest mobile-phone network, swung from a loss in 2024 to a record post-tax profit of over $700m in 2025. Mr Dangote’s cement business made nearly as much. In Malawi, where some banks’ earnings were as much as doubling year on

year, financial advisers took to TikTok in Chichewa (the local language) explaining how to become a “part owner” of your favourite lender. Investing in profitable firms is pitched to savers as a smarter way to build wealth and hedge against inflation than stuffing cash under a mattress. A host of fintech startups are making such wealth-building easier. Bamboo lets its 2.3m users across Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa invest in local and foreign stocks. In the first quarter of 2026 the platform recorded more trading in Nigerian stocks than in American ones for the first time. “The everyday Nigerians…the traders in the market…those are the customers that we are essentially building for,” says Richmond Bassey, Bamboo’s boss. The average Bamboo trade is less than $50. These new investors bring liquidity, which, as Mr Dangote puts it, “depends on people’s participation”. Yet what makes these markets attractive to punters—the prospect of spectacular gains—also makes them volatile, and so liable to equally spectacular losses. Low-earners have the most to lose. In Malawi, where last year’s bull run in stocks ended in a 20% correction since a peak in November, the same TikTok users who had encouraged punters took to warning that investing is a “rollercoaster” and a “big boy game”. The real liquidity will come from deep-pocketed institutional investors, perhaps including foreign ones. By listing his refinery in Nigeria rather than abroad, as many of the biggest African firms in sectors like mining and energy tend to, Mr Dangote may also attract more domestic smart money (he is thinking of a secondary listing in America, but only a few years from now). Africa’s perky economies are already doing this. Their current upswing will last a few years, reckons David Cowan of Citigroup, an American bank. After that, who knows. In the meantime, expect a stadium- like atmosphere on African bourses. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/09/15/what-africas-biggest- ipo-can-do-for-its-stock-markets

Finance & economics | A tale of two silicons The trickle-down economics of the AI boom How fast are AI investments translating into broader gains? Taiwan and South Korea offer hints Sep 17th 2026 WHAT IS AI good for? If polls of Americans are anything to go by, not much. A large majority oppose the building of artificial-intelligence data centres in their backyards. Nearly as many dislike the technology in general, fearing it may cost them their job or even humanity its future. Boosters retort that even before AI turbocharges productivity, as it promises to do, the data- centre investment boom is fuelling economic growth. And those benefits, the argument goes, trickle down to everyone, not just a handful of tech plutocrats. In America, any early effects are likely to be diluted by the economy’s vastness and variegation. Better places to look for hints of trickle-down chiponomics are South Korea, the world leader in advanced memory chips

necessary to manage machine-learning workloads, and Taiwan, the global powerhouse in all other AI silicon. The AI bonanza is already evident in the two countries’ headline statistics. Swelling exports have lifted annual GDP growth in South Korea to a brisk 4% or so and to a blistering 12% in Taiwan. Private consumption, which was stagnant a year ago, is accelerating (see chart 1). In the second quarter of this year it accounted for around a fifth of the increase in Taiwanese GDP and roughly a third of South Korea’s. The economic windfall is most obvious in Taiwan. TSMC, the national champion which manufactures nearly all of the world’s AI chips, increased production from 10m standard silicon wafers in 2019 to 15m last year. Its capital expenditure rose even faster in that period, from $15bn to $41bn. This has helped push up Taiwanese real fixed capital formation by nearly 40% since late 2023. Resources are pouring into the semiconductor supply chain. The share of Taiwanese employees making electronic components or computers is nearly 11%, the highest since 2016. Pay rose first in Taiwan’s electronics sector, but since 2024 rises have spread across the workforce. Average nominal wages are now growing at 3% a year in Taiwan, compared with a pre-pandemic

trend of 1.9%. Paul Cavey of East Asia Econ, a consultancy, points to the “Balassa-Samuelson effect”, an economic phenomenon whereby high productivity in an industry producing tradable goods bids up the cost of labour across the board. The government, for its part, is preparing to spend the swelling tax take from its silicon goose on handouts. Social-welfare spending is set to rise by 40% in 2027. Last month Lai Ching-te, the president, proposed giving all Taiwanese citizens an “AI dividend” of around $300, at a total cost of $7bn (or around 6% of projected revenue). A new child benefit is in the works, too. Things are less clear-cut in South Korea. That is chiefly because demand for South Korean silicon increased all of a sudden, rather than gradually. Between 2023 and 2025, as prices of notoriously cyclical memory chips initially fell after a pandemic-era craze for electronics faded, Samsung Electronics, South Korea’s biggest chipmaker, actually trimmed its capital expenditure. SK Hynix, Samsung’s main rival, tripled its spending in that period, but from a relatively piddling $6bn a year. The government-backed $500bn investment plan both firms have now signed up to has yet to be reflected in their outlays. In the past three years or so real fixed capital formation has risen by just 3%. Most of the past year’s rise in exports has thus come not from higher volumes, as in Taiwan, but from much higher prices. Economy-wide export prices have risen 57% over the past year in South Korea. Immediate benefits are therefore limited to the less than 1% of South Korean workers who toil in the chip industry and the shareholders of the memory duo and their suppliers (plus, indirectly, to the businesses which cater to the lucky few).

In nominal terms, average annual wage growth across the economy has fallen below the pre-pandemic pace of 3.5% (see chart 2). The “wealth effect”, whereby a stock-market rally makes share-owning consumers feel flush and spend more, is also muted. Although South Korea’s KOSPI stock- market has more than doubled in value since 2023, a study by South Korea’s central bank estimates that a dollar in equity gains translates to just one extra cent of consumer spending, compared with five cents, plus or minus, for stock-loving American households. South Korea’s government is also stingier. Despite projections of a 50% rise in tax revenue in 2027, it is not planning to shower citizens with cash. Some 70% of the windfall will be saved, reckons Capital Economics, a consultancy. The money will mostly be channelled towards deficit reduction and a new Future Response Fund for long-term investments. As Samsung and SK Hynix ratchet up their investments, production will increase. This should fuel demand for labour and eventually lift wages for everyone, as happened in Taiwan. Mr Cavey likens South Korea to Australia in 2003-11, when a commodity boom led to a lasting uptick in mining investments that eventually translated into broad economic benefits. The South Korean government’s planned investments in infrastructure and education may also yield productivity gains that Taiwan’s cash handouts

would not. The effects of such policies will not be as quick. But they may prove more durable.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/09/17/the-trickle-down- economics-of-the-ai-boom