to do whatever it was that people did back then, before having a second sleep. Our volunteers were asked to wake at 2am in order to do work for two hours, before then going back to bed. Some people adjusted to this rhythm; others found it difficult to fall asleep again and entered a state of catatonic exhaustion. At least one big sales lead evaporated when our salesperson’s second sleep took place in the middle of a client meeting. There were unexpected ripple effects. When senior people began sending emails and Slack messages at 3am, more junior team members who were not involved in the trial began waking much earlier in order to respond promptly. In turn, their pre-dawn activity prompted even more colleagues to start work earlier. Once this cascade effect is taken into account, we think that sleep quality in the organisation as a whole declined. We dispatched a variety of sleep trackers—rings, wristbands, watches and more—to participants. One-fifth of colleagues were unable to get the devices to work at all, which suggests a concerning lack of technological nous. (We are rolling out a separate training programme, Appiness at Work, to tackle that problem.) Tracker data are imperfect, which caused a fair degree of stress. Of those employees who did use the trackers, many reported feeling perfectly rested until their tracker told them they had had a terrible night. Others were told that they had slept like a baby when they had actually been lying awake worrying about the quality of their sleep. These inaccuracies make it hard to interpret data showing that many of our employees are sleeping during the day. The entire senior leadership team appears to have nodded off during a recent meeting, which of course cannot be true. We tested a number of other smaller interventions, with varying degrees of success. Team members were sent a host of sleep aids, including masks, wraparound snoozebands, earplugs and mouthguards to prevent teeth- grinding. These worked better for some colleagues than others. A few people using masks had panic attacks when they woke in the night because they thought they had been taken hostage. One of our smaller colleagues was unable to get out from under her weighted blanket, and had to be released by the fire brigade.
Magnesium tablets were sent to a subset of volunteers, but due to an unfortunate error, we told people to take much higher doses than recommended. Magnesium can act as a laxative; this trial has therefore been voided. Our survey data show that team members regarded lavender spray and herbal teas as generally pleasant, but they did not have significant effects on sleep quality. One member of the legal team accidentally lavender-sprayed himself in the face and had to go to hospital for a precautionary check-up. There is ongoing litigation connected with this incident, and we recommend not using lawyers as guinea pigs in future pilot programmes of any sort. More generally, we recommend against pushing people to participate in this kind of initiative. It’s fine to make sleep aids available to people who request them. And enabling colleagues to share advice on sleep in an informal way is a good idea. For example, some people made specific recommendations for things to listen to when falling asleep—among them, audio versions of anything published by the World Bank, post-match interviews with athletes and every investor-relations conference call ever. But tracking employee behaviour in the dead of night is intrusive, and imposing uniform solutions on everyone is ineffective. Before rolling this out further, we should definitely sleep on it. ■ Step inside the world of work with our Bartleby newsletter. Each week our white-collar oracle muses on the agonies of office life. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/business/2026/09/17/sleep-like-a-pro
At last, India is getting serious about selling state assets But proper privatisation is another matter Sep 17th 2026 INDIANS ONCE held mock funerals for telephones. The few lines the state monopoly actually installed dropped dead so often that they became ripe material for satirists. When the “line man”, an employee at the bottom of the corporate hierarchy, eventually came out to fix a line, he would be treated like a VIP. Shreekant Gupta, an economist, recalled these tales ten years ago in an oral history intended to tell younger Indians about the bad old days of state capitalism. The state is still a large owner of businesses in India. Jawaharlal Nehru, the country’s first prime minister, thought it should build out the “commanding heights of the economy”, investing in heavy industrial assets such as fertiliser factories and steel smelters. Indira Gandhi, his daughter and
another prime minister, nationalised most of the leading banks in 1969 and many of the rest in 1980. Neither worked out very well. The Licence Raj, a socialist system of managing the economy, came crashing down after an economic crisis in 1991. “No power on earth can stop an idea whose time has come,” said Manmohan Singh, the liberalising finance minister, quoting Victor Hugo, a 19th-century French author. The time had not come for privatisation, however. Despite a brief flurry of disposals in the late 1990s and early 2000s, most of the businesses acquired or built under the Licence Raj remain in state hands. The government owns everything from hotels and tourism boards to shipbuilders and a watchmaker. It still owns the telephone company (known these days as BSNL after a reorganisation at the turn of the century), though Indians can now choose super-cheap contracts from private providers. In fact the number of active Central Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs) has grown from 236 in 1991 to 291, even as their relative economic importance has shrunk. They produced a bit less than 3% of GDP last year, down from 11% in 2006. Narendra Modi, the prime minister since 2014, at first tried to revive privatisations but largely failed (the government of 1999-2004 that sold some state assets was led by an earlier, more Thatcherite, version of his party). Since the sale in 2022 of Air India, the flag-carrier, to Tata, a conglomerate—the first major privatisation since 2004—there have been few outright sales of much significance. Mr Modi has had to govern in coalition with other parties since voters denied him a majority in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament, in elections in 2024. Fully transferring control of state companies to private hands is tricky, as it entails job losses and hence fewer opportunities for patronage. The government has instead chosen to sell portions of public-sector enterprises to private investors, in a mix of trade sales and flotations, which avoids shedding control. It has a disinvestment target of 800bn rupees ($8.4bn) for the 2026-27 fiscal year, which began in April, up from 338bn rupees in 2025-26. An increased share of private ownership is meant to provide some of the benefits of privatisation, such as increased scrutiny and market discipline, while still allowing the state to profit from its stakes. The finance ministry reaped $8.2bn in dividends from CPSEs in 2025, up from $4.7bn in 2020. “Public-sector performance has been steadily improving,
whether it’s market discipline and managerial autonomy or not,” says Nagaraj Rayaprolu, a left-wing economist. Disinvestment also provides money upfront. “Old economy” companies such as Hindustan Copper, Coal India and the National Hydroelectric Power Company, stakes in all of which have been sold, command decent valuations. The building of data centres for artificial intelligence has boosted demand for electricity and copper, a critical input for many electronics components. The combined market capitalisation of listed CPSEs has climbed from $109bn in March 2020 to $400bn, thanks partly to a re-rating of Indian equities since the covid-19 pandemic. “This will be the first year where the actual divestment record will be better than the budgeted estimate,” says Nilesh Shah, of the asset-management arm of Kotak Mahindra, a private-sector bank. The government has already raised $5.5bn this fiscal year, a good chunk of its $8.4bn target. Hitesh Suvarna of JM Financial, a broker, estimates that the government could raise around $14bn from reducing its stakes in listed state-owned companies to the regulatory maximum of 75% for a single shareholder (the state keeps securing exemptions to the limit). The government would maintain the same control as India’s mighty private-sector tycoons enjoy over their companies, while raising substantial sums. The government made $3.3bn from selling just 6.5% of the Life Insurance Company (LIC) of India, a gigantic insurer, yet retains around 90% of the shares. Privatisation that would hand control of public companies to the private sector, however, is all but moribund. Only the sale of IDBI Bank, a medium- size lender, is in train. Even that might not go through. On September 8th IDBI’s share price plunged by 11%, following reports that its mooted buyer, Fairfax, a Canadian financial firm, was asking for a lower price. Fairfax is considering the purchase of a 60% stake, about half of which would be sold by the government and half by the LIC. With so much inventory at its disposal, however, Mr Modi’s government can always find some other shares to sell. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/business/2026/09/17/at-last-india-is-getting-serious- about-selling-state-assets
Olympiad Man has displaced Davos Man How maths geeks became market gods Sep 17th 2026 In Plato’s “Republic”, society comprises men of gold, who are fit to rule, men of silver, destined to be soldiers, and those of bronze, who become farmers. Since 1959 the world’s top teenage mathematicians (and, more recently, those of great ability in other fields) have tested their mettle in international competitions called Olympiads. Around 300 medals of gold, silver and bronze are awarded for maths annually. A smaller number are given for physics, chemistry and informatics (ie, computing). From the ranks of the winners has emerged an elite unlike any in the history of capitalism. Behold: Olympiad Man. The crisis over the safety of artificial intelligence is best understood as a crisis among Olympiad Men. Last year AI models managed gold-medal performances in maths. Relentless advances since have led a pair of