The size of the gifts—more than all donations made last year to every political party combined—has caused angst among Reform’s opponents. The government has already announced plans to tighten existing legislation, including by restricting the amount that Britons living abroad (which until recently included Mr Delo and Mr Harborne) can give to £100,000 a year. Some parliamentarians wish to apply that cap to all donors. They also want the law to take effect retroactively, which could force Reform to return its windfall. After two years of building momentum, Reform has slipped behind Labour in The Economist’s average of opinion polls. More than two-thirds of voters now say they dislike Mr Farage, according to a YouGov poll. The party is currently hiring dozens of local campaign managers to boost its presence on the ground, and plans to double the size of its policy unit to help prepare for government. Opponents worry that Reform’s financial advantage will give it an unfair edge at the next election. But the evidence suggests there is little correlation between spending and success. The Conservatives raised more than Labour between 2020 and 2024, only to be heavily beaten at the general election. Remain easily outspent Leave at the Brexit referendum. In 2019 the Liberal Democrats received a then-record £9m donation but performed disastrously in that year’s election. Strict rules limit how much a party can spend on campaigning in the run-up to an election. It cannot fork out more than £34m nationally; each individual constituency has a separate spending cap. A study in 2021 found that the difference between having a full-blown local campaign in a particular parliamentary seat and no local operation at all amounts to three percentage points—enough to make a difference in a tight race, but unlikely to be a game-changer overall. The House of Lords will vote later this year on whether to introduce a cap on all donations, which the Commons would have to approve. The government sounds dubious, but it is considering tightening the requirement for big donors to be living in Britain at the time they get involved in politics, which could yet render the gifts from Messrs Delo and Harborne illegal. For now, other parties are busy raising their own funds off the back of Reform’s
good fortune. Labour sent a “call to action” to members, asking them to consider chipping in a few pounds. Every little helps. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/britain/2026/09/17/reform-uks-cash-windfall-should-not- frighten-its-opponents
Northern Ireland cannot balance its budget. Nobody cares The most expensive part of Britain Sep 17th 2026 In one part of Britain, a government is in effect insolvent. Northern Ireland has become an unwelcome experiment in what happens when fiscal discipline collapses under Britain’s devolved constitution. The Northern Ireland Assembly, which meets at Stormont, has not passed a budget more than five months into the financial year. Politicians do not expect one soon. The lack of a budget is the latest example of Northern Irish politicians ducking hard fiscal choices. Last year Stormont had a budget but ignored it, overspending by hundreds of millions of pounds. The British government, Stormont’s lender of last resort, understands that the situation is chronic, yet it has played along with the pretence that things are not so bad. It is growing exasperated: Sir Chris Bryant, the government’s Northern Ireland secretary,
exhorted local politicians on September 4th to stop “accommodating madness” and find a path to fiscal sustainability. Northern Ireland is comparatively poor and generously funded by the British government. In 2023 it raised £22bn ($27bn) in revenue, equivalent to 34% of its gdp. Government spending, including directly by Westminster, amounted to £36bn, or 57% of gdp. The deficit per person was £7,600, the highest of any British region or nation (see chart). Stormont has little incentive to control its spending. Unlike councils in England that have gone bust, local people are not paying the price through higher taxes. If Northern Ireland was a sovereign state and sought to borrow, it would face crippling rates of interest. But as a part of Britain, it does not need to worry about creditworthiness. The Treasury in Westminster borrows on the basis of Britain’s reputation. The British government’s control of funding is the only real way to discipline Stormont’s spending. But although the government can talk tough, it acts weak. In February it agreed to give Stormont £400m from Britain’s national reserve to patch up its overspend. According to Treasury rules, the reserve is only for “genuinely unforeseen, unaffordable and unavoidable
pressures”. Stormont’s woes are as predictable as the plot of a Laurel and Hardy film—but it got the cash. February’s handout follows the £3.3bn one given in 2024, when devolution was restored after two years without any regional government. The earlier settlement was in essence a reward for failure. It created the moral hazard that if the government collapses, Westminster will step in as a parent might bail out a profligate teen. The British government is not wholly insane. Its overriding priority is to retain devolution in Belfast. Stormont’s power-sharing government is a key element of the Good Friday Agreement, which in 1998 ended almost three decades of sectarian slaughter. If preserving devolution means periodically tossing in a few hundred million quid, it is better than civil war. One of the few things that unites Belfast’s disputatious politicians is their insistence that Northern Ireland’s current allocation is not enough. That is hard to defend when Stormont has chosen to create Britain’s most generous free-travel scheme for pensioners, made medical prescriptions free, kept lower university fees and made Northern Ireland the only British region without water charges. Lavish spending is not matched by superlative outcomes. Stormont spends more per person on health than England or Scotland, yet it has poor outcomes. Waiting times for cancer treatment are long, and in 2023 the share of people waiting for treatment of all kinds was the highest in the uk, at 26%. Bail-outs have helped politicians avoid necessary but unpopular decisions to centralise services—which medics say would save lives. Stormont’s overspend in 2026-27 is likely to be about £1bn. In theory, this is unsustainable. Yet history does not give reasons for optimism. Soon after Ireland was partitioned in 1921, Northern Ireland’s fledgling government made the first of what Patrick Buckland, a historian, called “repeated begging expeditions”. The British state agreed to a “one-off” grant. Those one-off payments continued in 1923, 1924 and 1925. They have never really stopped.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/britain/2026/09/17/northern-ireland-cannot-balance-its- budget-nobody-cares
What Manchester reveals about Andy Burnham’s tech ambitions His two priorities sit awkwardly together Sep 17th 2026 FORGIVE TECH bosses for thinking that Andy Burnham, Britain’s prime minister, is sending mixed messages. In one of his first speeches, he talked about making Britain the “world’s leading innovation nation”. Yet one of his earliest actions was to dismantle their front door to government, the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. Rumours (since denied) have circulated of an exit tax for startup founders who leave the country. His team seem reluctant to remove regulatory speed bumps that slow the roll-out of British-designed driverless cars. Perplexed executives can learn from Mr Burnham’s record before he became prime minister. His spell as mayor of Greater Manchester between 2017 and
June 2026 makes his stance on tech clearer. It also suggests it may not work as advertised. Mr Burnham’s “Manchester model” rests on a simple idea: that inclusive growth, driven by innovation, is best achieved when business, academia and local government work together. Frontier technologies are great, provided they give local people good jobs. One of his signature projects is Atom Valley, a planned manufacturing and tech hub that would turn scientific discoveries, especially graphene, a form of carbon discovered in Manchester, into high-value jobs in the comparatively poor boroughs of Bury, Oldham and Rochdale. Another is Sister, the city centre’s latest regeneration project for a new £1.7bn ($2.3bn) innovation district. This model can attract tech firms. Circle Square, a glitzy tech hub, has drawn some big-name brands such as Hewlett Packard Enterprise, a business-software giant, and Autocab, part of Uber, a ride-hailing firm. Fergal O’Connor, the boss of Buymedia, an Irish advertising firm that uses artificial intelligence, says he chose to open its first foreign office in Manchester for its Irish-like community feel. Mr Burnham gave the company his backing. In his first speech as chancellor on September 7th, John Healey hailed the model for creating new clusters of innovation. Still, it would be too much to suggest that a thriving local tech sector is driving growth. Greater Manchester has grown faster than the national average in the last decade (a modest achievement given that Britain’s long- run growth rate hovers just above 1%). Yet this seems to reflect transport improvements more than dynamic Mancunian tech. Two of the city’s biggest tech firms are Autotrader, an online car marketplace, and ncc Group, a cyber-security company whose stock price has fallen by 55% in five years and which struggles to compete with its American rivals. Tech remains a tiny fraction of economic output in the metropolis. Mr Burnham might argue that promising firms have been starved of opportunity relative to those in the “golden triangle” of Cambridge, Oxford and London. With the extra levers he controls as prime minister, he plans to narrow regional inequalities by devolving more power to regional mayors and doling out extra money to northern scale-ups. At a national level, he speaks of championing scrappy British firms over American giants. His
ministers talk of making more chips and drones at home, acting as an early customer for promising British tech firms and keeping promising companies in Britain for longer. None of these interventions tackle Britain’s biggest problems. It will be almost impossible to stop technology firms leaking to America if British companies continue to face a dearth of late-stage capital, a shortage of compute and some of the world’s highest energy prices. Besides, a successful British tech policy may widen the very regional divides that Mr Burnham wants to close. Real gdp grew by a better-than- expected 0.4% in the three months to July 2026, led by computer programming and consultancy activities that are predominantly in London and the South East. Those regions are also home to two-thirds of British ai companies. Agglomeration effects mean that growth is likely to occur there first. If Mr Burnham is to come good on his promise to help British tech, he must accept that many of the benefits will arise in the south.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/britain/2026/09/17/what-manchester-reveals-about-andy- burnhams-tech-ambitions