employee of Ms Wiles says he spent lots of time at Mar-a-Lago in his first term, “but we’re making a lot more of the real decisions from Florida this time around.” At Mar-a-Lago Mr Trump has hosted foreign leaders, and decided to blockade Cuba’s oil supplies and to capture Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s dictator. His staff met CEOs there before the federal budget in the spring and health-care providers before the president amended Medicare (a scheme for the elderly) in July. “Look,” says one official, “in the president’s view, a lot of the smartest people in the country are already members at Mar-a-Lago.” As political activity has headed south, money has followed. Ballard Partners, America’s biggest lobbying firm (founded in Florida), now has its largest office in Palm Beach. Many foreign governments have sent in extra civil servants. “Our border guard and defence ministry”, says one consul-general, “need to be able to reach Palm Beach.” Officials from three European countries say their consulates have more staff in Miami than in New York. No surprise, then, that the property business is booming. In 2025 it accounted for 18% of Miami’s economy, up from 14% in 2014. The number of construction jobs has risen by 12% since the pandemic (see chart 2). Mr Griffin is spending roughly $2bn on a new 54-storey skyscraper.

Finance is doing well, too: survey data indicate that, thanks to all the Wall Street migrants, back-office jobs have grown by 20% since 2019. The share of corporate services, such as law and consulting, in local GDP has risen by two percentage points. Hospitality, the old mainstay, is also thriving. It employs a tenth of metropolitan Miami’s workforce, one of the highest shares in the country. Miami is the only city with a team in all four of America’s big sports, a top- class motor race and a leading tennis tournament, the Miami Open. Of Mr Trump’s four speeches at business conferences in 2025, he gave two in Miami. “We’ve always been spectacular,” says an entertainment agent at Faena, a luxury hotel, “but the new guys give us exclusivity.” Will Miami’s boom give way to a steady, sustainable expansion, or just give way? Successful cities thrive on network effects: whether in finance, tech or lobbying, firms are drawn to places where they are confident of finding customers and skilled workers; people head to where they can find the jobs they want. To make the leap Miami must overcome three obstacles. One is a potential lack of people who are not especially rich. The influx of wealth has pushed the local cost of living to dizzying heights. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, a government agency, residential rents are

above the national average and higher even than in New York. Consumer prices have risen by nearly 40% since early 2020, against 28% in America as a whole (see chart 3). As luxury food outlets have multiplied, cheaper shops have been pushed out. High costs are driving the poorest away. Since 2014 the number of millionaires has nearly doubled; but between July 2024 and July 2025 Miami’s population has shrunk by 10,000. Poor neighbourhoods, whose residents staff the hospitality industry, are emptying fastest. Another hurdle is a lack of brainpower. New York, Seattle and San Francisco are knowledge economies, attracting hordes of skilled people and the capital to harness them. Yet despite the recent influx of smarts and money, Miami is far from matching its rivals. Firms and universities in Florida, which has the fourth-biggest economy among America’s states, spent just $13bn on research in 2023, less than any other in the top ten. Florida has fewer graduates, relative to population, than the national average. Most capital deployed by Miami’s newly flush venture capitalists still goes to startups in San Francisco. Mr Griffin promises that, by 2031, many more of his employees will be working from Miami. So far 400 of them do, though most are not advising on investments. If back-office roles are stripped out, finance makes up no more of Miami’s economy than it did a decade ago. The city’s financial sector, the biggest of its white-collar industries, is a mere one-eighth of the size of New York’s. A third problem is the climate. South Florida, on a peninsula near sea level, is prone to extreme weather. A meteorologist at AccuWeather, a forecasting company, has said that no American city is more likely to be damaged by hurricanes. In August yet another academic paper, in Scientific Reports, predicted that if global temperatures exceed 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, storms will flood Miami regularly. Florida is already the costliest state in which to buy insurance for mortgaged homes. Yet there is no doubting Miami’s momentum. A bullish local politician believes that, like the Gulf before the Iran war, it can be where the rest of the world comes to pursue business and store wealth. A year ago Mr Trump hosted a dinner for 33 of America’s leading business figures at Mar-a-Lago. At least half of those attending (including Mr Trump and Ms Wiles, and

their spouses) had property in Florida. In 2029 Mr Trump’s term will be up and Florida’s political pull may start to fade. Maybe the city can thrive by continuing to attract the rich. But maybe it needs more.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/08/31/the-extraordinary-rise- of-miamis-economy

Finance & economics | Debt collective Europe’s bond markets are suffering a post- holiday shock Reasons for rising yields differ somewhat from those in America, but are no less problematic Sep 3rd 2026 INVESTORS INTERESTED in euro-zone government bonds face peculiar challenges. They have 21 countries to choose from, in addition to the EU’s own debt. Long holidays, including from trading desks, typically mean choppy markets during the summer. And for mysterious reasons, yields on ten-year German bunds, the bloc’s benchmark, tend to rise by 0.15 percentage points after August.

This year they started early, and not just in Germany. In recent weeks global bond markets have been febrile (see chart 1). Yields have jumped just about everywhere as investors have sold off government debt (whose price falls as yields rise), spooked by rising inflation risk, uncertainty about economic growth and zero appetite for belt-tightening. On September 1st yields on Japan’s ten-year bonds hit 3% for the first time in 30 years. American 30- year Treasuries are not far off their 19-year high of 5.31% reached in mid- August. Equivalent British gilts, which now offer a 5.9% return, have not been this cheap since 1998. Europe is not quite there yet. Ten- and 30-year bunds continue to yield considerably less than at the last peak in 2008. Similar French bonds are no higher than back then. Still, European government issuers face peculiar challenges of their own. Inflation is problem one. In contrast to America, where rising prices chiefly reflect strong domestic demand, the culprit in Europe is on the supply side, and out of policymakers’ control: the energy shock from the Iran war. Markets expect the European Central Bank (ECB) to raise its benchmark interest rate to 2.9% by mid-2027, up from 2% before America and Israel attacked Iran in late February.

Moreover, when inflation risk is high and stems from a supply shock, investors demand extra compensation for holding longer-term securities. In part, that is because they expect a premium for taking on inflationary uncertainty. It is also because in a supply shock, bonds and stocks tend to sell off together rather than move in opposite directions. This makes debt a less attractive way to diversify a portfolio, so yields must rise to draw buyers. Europe’s second challenge is fiscal. Germany’s newfound love of debt- funded investment and persistent French profligacy have pushed interest rates up since 2025. This in turn has raised debt-servicing costs. In 2028 France will spend 6% of government revenue to redeem coupons, compared with 3% in 2019, estimates Fitch, a credit-rating agency. For Italy this will climb from 7% to 8.8% in the same period. Because European taxes are much higher than in America as a share of GDP, raising them further to fill the fiscal gap is hard. Cutting spending is politically unpalatable, especially with populist insurgents on the rise across the continent. The third problem is that aside from inflation, the rise in yields is driven by growth and investment outside Europe, which is sucking up capital.

America’s economy is motoring along, helped by the building of artificial- intelligence infrastructure. The technology giants leading the charge are projected to spend over $5trn on AI data centres between 2025 and 2030. Such spending in Europe is tiny. Despite declining profits stemming partly from underinvestment, European businesses are net savers (see chart 2). Yet even though European firms are on the sidelines of the AI race, European bond-issuers are caught up in it. The American tech titans are selling their own long-dated bonds to fund the splurge—to the tune of $250bn this year and $400bn in 2027, reckons Goldman Sachs, a bank. These rich corporate issuers are as creditworthy as governments, and so compete with them for investors’ money. They are responsible for almost a tenth of euro-denominated corporate-bond issuance this year, according to the ECB. More debt globally means lots of long-term bonds. This leaves investors to absorb more “duration risk” (a change in a bond’s price in response to a change in interest rates). In Europe supply is even higher because the ECB is running down its holdings, by €1.2trn since 2022 and counting. At the same time, demand from big buyers is softening. Pension funds which bought long-dated debt to fund defined-benefit retirement schemes are switching to defined-contribution plans that try to boost returns with riskier assets like stocks. Investors stepping into their place, like hedge funds, drive a harder bargain. “We are in a new global macro regime,” sums up Freya Beamish of TS Lombard, a research firm. In other words, don’t expect yields to come down soon. Borrowers had better get used to it.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/09/01/europes-bond-markets- are-suffering-a-post-holiday-shock